LCB/A16-3 Serial 0012 **0**p HON/JOSS/118

WESTERN NAVAL TASK JOSS ATTACK TO June 20, 1943; 1800.

Information and Intelligence Annex No. 118-43.

ANNEX "ITEM" TO JOSS ATTACK FORCE OPERATION PLAN NO. 109-43.

- A. BRIEF OF OPERATION "HUSKY"
- B. BEACH DATA including oblique sketches.C. CODE WORDS, LIST OF.
- ENEMY RADAR.
- GUNFIRE SUPPORT AREAS.
- UNITED STATES NAVAL UNITS INVOLVED.
- "JOSS" LANDING CRAFT BY BEACHES.
- H. AIRPLANE DATA, ENEMY PLANES.
- I. GENERAL INFORMATION, SICILY. Classification changed to pro



Mapcharts - with grid Airplane recognition sheets

> 31 4032 324 2000 14 - 14

Authority AGF Ltr 380.1 (14 Mar 47) Gr

JOHN R. PUGH Lt Col, Cav

NOTE: Attention is invited to the necessity Constant fully safeguarding Part C of this Annex and destroying it when it has served its purpose.

PLAN "HUSKY"

#### GENERAL OUTLINE OF PLAN

"HUSKY" is a joint British - United States operation, the object of which is the capture of Sicily as a base for future operations.

The operation will be under the command of the Allied Commander in Chief, General Eisenhower; under him and exercising their command jointly will be:

Naval - Commander in Chief, Mediterranean Fleet (Admiral A. B. Cunningham, R.N.)

Army - Deputy Allied Commander in Chief -(General Alexander, R.A.)

- Commander in Chief, Mediterranean Command -Air (Air Chief Marshall Tedder, R.A.F.)

The attack will be launched from two separate but adjoining sectors:

- (a) The Eastern Task Force at the southeastern end of Sicily by British Forces from the Middle East, Tunisia and United Kingdom.
- (b) The Western Task Force at the southern coast of Sicily by United States troops from North Africa and the United States.

The protection of the assaulting forces from surface attack will be a British Naval responsibility.

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ANNEX "ITEM" TO JOSS ATTACK FORCE OPERATION PLAN NO. 109-43 (Cont'd)

#### PART A (Cont'd)

The EASTERN TASK FORCE area is bounded:

On the West by a line drawn 225° from PUNTA RELIGIONE (36° 42' N,  $14^{\circ}$   $\overline{47}$  E).

On the South - the extension of a line drawn 110° from PUNTA SPADILLO (PANTELLARIA).

On the East by the meridian of 17° East.
On the North by a line drawn 90° from CAPE FARO (STRAITS OF MESSINA).

The boundaries of the Task Force are flexible and should not be regarded as "chop lines".

Simultaneous pre-dawn assault points involved and designation are as follows:

#### EASTERN TASK FORCE (BRITISH)

- 1. At AVOLA assault by division from Middle East to be known as the ACID NORTH and ACID SOUTH.
- 2. At MARZAMEMI assault by troops from Middle East known as BARK EAST.
- At PORTO PALO by troops from Tunisia known as BARK SOUTH.

  At SPIAGGIA DEL 'AMBRA by troops from the United Kingdom known as BARK WEST.

These assaults have for their objective the capture of SYRACUSE and PACHLIN AIRFIELD, and the establishment of a firm beachhead up to the line SYRACUSE-PAIAZZOLO-RAGUSA from which advances can be made for the capture of CATANIA and the GERBIMI groups of airfields.

The WESTERN TASK FORCE will make simultaneous pre-dawn assaults at the points below:

- 1. At SCOGLITTI by troops from the United States known as the CENT Force.
- 2. At GELA by troops from North Africa known as DIME Force.
- 3. At LICATA by troops from North Africa known as the JOSS Force.

The senior United States Naval Officer in the WESTERN TASK FORCE is Vice Admiral H. K. Hewitt, U.S. Navy, Commander of the WESTERN NAVAL TASK FORCE. Lieutenant General Patton, U.S. Army, is the Army Commander of the WESTERN TASK FORCE. Naval forces in the JOSS assault force will be under the command of Major General L. K. Truscott, U.S. Army.

Friendly aircraft participating in the operation will be marked with existing National markings, except that the United States white star will be enclosed in a yellow circle. Thus all Allied aircraft will have the general similarity of a circle, i.e., the British and French roundel and the United States circle enclosing the star.

On D minus two, a Covering Group, consisting of United States craisers and destroyers, will cover the eastward movement of Allied convoys.

BEACH NO .:

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COLOR:

BLUE

#### PART A (CONT'D)

Force "H", a strong British force, will cover the Allied assaults from enemy surface vessel approach from the Ionian Sea. If the Italian Fleet sorties from western ports of Italy, Force "Z", a strong British force, will operate southward of Sardinia in positions favorable to covering the Allied assaults from enemy surface vessel approach from the Tyrrhenian Sea.

From D minus two onwards a British screening force comprising two MTB flotillas and one MGB flotilla will operate to screen the western flank of the Western Task Force. The operating area of this screen will be west of the meridian thirteen degrees East, and north of a line connecting Latitude 37° N., longitude 13° E., with Latitude 38° N., longitude 11° E. At 0800 on D day this screen will come under the command of the Naval Commander, Western Task Force.

During moonlight on D minus one, own paratroops will be dropped from transport planes into zones behind enemy lines in order to capture enemy airfields and divert enemy forces from the beach defenses prior to the assault from seaward.

Controlled mine fields are reported to exist off all southern beaches, but the reports are of indeterminate reliability.

#### PART B

#### BEACH DATA

PLACE AND COORDINATES: Falconara (1) CHART NO. 187  HO13347 - HO27345 (1/50000)
MAP - GSGS (Sheet No.) 271/272 LENGTH 1500-1600 yds; WIDTH 30-50 yds. LOCATION OF CENTER: 37°-06'-17" N 14°-01'-50" E.
ESTIMATED GRADIENT: 1:65 SUITABLE FOR: All types (LST with pontoon)
NATURE OF BEACH: Fine sand backed by low dunes in west; firmer sand on east.
SEAWARD APPROACHES AND OBSTRUCTIONS: Clear. 5-fathom curve 1500 yards
offshore. 10-fathom curve 3 miles offshore. Rock patches off each
flank. Off-lying rocks east end. Wave measurements show no trace
of bar. Exposed to south.
DEFENSES: A few MGs at the water's edge at the west end of the beach and
a strong-point and pill-boxes just inland constitute the immediate
defenses of Beach 70-A. Beyond the limits of the beach to the east are
four strong-points and a series of pill-boxes, and to the west are a
road block and AT ditch and many MGs and pill-boxes. The four howitzers
at G 975362 and the coast defense battery at H 064358, both about 4,500
meters from the center of the beach, are believed capable of firing on
the beach or on the water in front of it. The railway battery in the
port area of LICATA could fire very effectively on Beach 70-A. In
addition the CD battery at G 914394, about 12,000 meters NW, could
probably fire on Beach 70-A. It could definitely bring fire to bear
in front of it.



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ANNEX "ITEM" TO JOSS ATTACK FORCE OPERATION PLAN NO. 109-43 (Cont'd)

#### PART B (CONT'D).

BEACH NO.: 70-B - JOSS	COLOR:	YELLOW
PLACE AND COORDINATES: Falconara (2)  982346 - H 00403475 (1/	50000)	CHART NO. 187
MAP - GSGS (Sheet No.) 271/272		
LOCATION OF CENTER 37°-06'-25" N	140-00'-10" E;	
	IDTH (YARDS):	20-60
ESTIMATED GRADIENT: 1:62 (at 650) S		ll types with pontoon)
NATURE OF BEACH: Fine sand backed by low dunes		
of R. Salso beach backed by swamps and lago	ons. Western mil	e of beach
probably unsuitable.		
SEAWARD APPROACHES AND OBSTRUCTIONS: Satisfacto		
this beach and 70-A and beyond west end. E	xposed to south.	Aside from
rocks on each end and beyond west end, seaw	ard approaches ar	e clear of
danger. May be irregular bar (depth unknow		
DEFENSES: This beach is flanked and backed up b		
is a road-block and AT ditch to the east, a		
The four howitzers at G 975362 and the coas		
the former about 2,000 meters NW and the la		
of the center of the beach, are believed ca	pable of firing o	n the beach
or on the water in front of it. The railwa	y battery in the	port area of
LICATA could fire very effectively on Beach	70-B. In additi	on, the CD btry
bi at G 914394, about 9,000 meters NV, could p		each 70-A.
It would definitely bring fire to bear in f	ront of it.	

BEACH NO.: 71 - JOSS	COLOR: GREEN - East
PLACE AND COORDINATES: Sta. Mollarella (1)  G 892338 - G 896338 (1/50000)	CHART NO. 187
MAP - GSGS (Sheet No.) 271	
LOCATION OF CENTER 37°-06'-05" N 13°-53'-2	
LENGTH (YARDS) 400 WIDTH (YAR	WS) 40
ESTIMATED GRADIENT: 1:65 SUITABLE	FOR: All types (LST with pontoon)
NATURE OF BEACH: Fine sand. Very soft on eastern end.	
SEAWARD APPROACHES AND OBSTRUCTIONS: No off-lying dang	ers. Narrow
entrance flanked by rocks. Good day identificatio	on, but night use

SEAWARD APPROACHES AND OBSTRUCTIONS: No off-lying dangers. Narrow entrance flanked by rocks. Good day identification, but night use requires markers. Fairly well sheltered except from south. No photographic evidence of bar. Entrance narrow and rockbound; leading lights necessary.

DEFENSES: Beaches 71 and 72 are completely backed by wire, which leads inland to a casemated gun, possible AT, or an AT ditch. There are numbrous strong-points within 5000 yards of the beaches. The howitzer btry at G 978361, 10,000 yards ENE, could probably fire, if not on the beaches themselves, at least on the water in front of them. The railway btry on the mole at LICATA (G 948331), and the DP btrys at G 942333, and G 912340 could also fire on the water in front of Beaches 71 and 72. The coast defense btry at G 914394, and particularly the one at G 902401, as well as the weapons intended for the unoccupied emplacements at G 913385 and G 892418, could all bring fire to bear either on the beaches or in front of them.



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ANNEX "ITEM" TO JOSS ATTACK FORCE
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
#### PART B (CONT'D)

BEACH NO.: 72 - JOSS	COLOR: GREEN - West
PLACE AND COORDINATES: Sta.Mollarella (2) G 88923420 - G 89073390	CHART NO. 187
MAP - GSGS (Sheet No.) 271	
LOCATION OF CENTER: 37°-06'-10" N	13 <sup>0</sup> -53'-12" E.
LENGTH (YARDS): 200	WIDTH (YARDS) 20
ESTIMATED GRADIENT: 1:50	SUITABLE FOR: All boats - (LST with pontoon)
NATURE OF BEACH: Fine sand.	
of beach. Sea approach clear.	lying rocks near both ends
DEFENSES: See Beach 71.	
70.00	MOTOD. DED
BEACH NO.: 73 - JOSS	COLOR: RED
PLACE AND COORDINATES: Punta di Gaffi G 85453790 - G 872360	(1/50000) CHART NO. 187
MAP - GSGS (Sheet No.) 271	
LOCATION OF CENTER: 37°-07'-40" N.	- 13 <sup>0</sup> -51'-25" E.
LENGTH (YARDS): 3000	WIDTH (YARDS): 5-20
ESTIMATED GRADIENT: 1:75 (1300 yards east of Torre di Gaffi).	SoftAble For (LST with pontoon
NATURE OF BEACH: Fine sand and shingle, backs 30 feet high.	ed by low cliffs approximately
SEAWARD APPROACHES AND OBSTRUCTIONS: Clear.	Torre di Gaffi and Nichola
Point are good landmarks. North center of ledges about 150 yards, long, 30 yards of	of beach has below-surface rocky
southwest. Concrete blocks to prevent be	each erosion are reported, but
exact location unknown. Appears landing	should be confined to north-
western 1500 yards of beach. 10-fathom	ourse is 2 miles offshore.
	Caile IP 5 witton offeriore.
3-fathom curve 750 yards offshore.  DEFENSES: Weapon pits and pill-boxes are site	od along the center of the heach
with others at the western end. The beau	ch can be swent by fire from mill-
boxes at or near ROCCA SAN NICOLA and from	om a strong-noint around the
TORRE DI GAFFI. At the latter place is	
FREYA and two giant WURZBURG's). There	a range radar instarration (a
their and two giant workbond's). There a	withou bear of C 2074114 if
three of them along Highway 115. The hou	alogo to Roach 77 The Harm
occupied, could probably fire on or very	NE commands the approaches to
medium CD btry at G 902401, 5,000 yards	wa, commands the approaches to
the beach, as does the railway btry on the	ne mole at bluara, at G 940))1.
The DP btry at G 912340 could also proba	bly fire on the approaches.
The btrys at G 914394 and G 913385 are n	ot sited to lire toward beach (),
although it is possible one or more of the	uert anns contairrite in cust



direction.

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PART B (CONT'D)

Names of the principal Army Officers in the JOSS Attack Force are as follows:

Regimental Commanders

7th Infantry - Col. Sherman (RED)

Exec. Off. - Lt.Col. Williams

(YELLOW) 15th Infantry - Col. Johnson

Exec. Off. - Lt.Col. Brady

30th Infantry -Exec. Off. -(BLUE) Col. Rogers Lt.Col. McGarr

Battalion Commanders


(RED)

(1. Lt. Col. Moore 7th (2. Major Duvall (3. Major Eisenhour

(1. Major Pritchard (YELLOW)
15th (2. Lt. Col. Billings (GREEN)
(3. Lt. Col. Manhart

(1. Lt. Col. Sladen

30th (2. Lt. Col. Bernard (BLUE)
(3. Lt. Col. Doleman



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ANNEX "ITEM" TO JOSS ATTACK FORCE OPERATION PLAN NO. 109-43 (Cont'd)

#### PART C

#### LIST OF CODE NAMES

				(	
	Code Name	Place Name	3	Code Name	Place Name
į	Agouti	Bizerte	; }	Gunmetal	Messina
	Antitoxin	Milazzo		Hashish	Sfax
	Appalling		1	Hodgoblin	Pantellaria
	Banjo	Gozo		Homespun	Ponte Olivo
	Bassoon	Misurata Marina	:	Hoodwink	Pozzallo
-	Blackburn	Termini Imerese	:	Horrified	Sicily
	Bobcat	Trapani	:	Horsefly	Villa San Giovanni
	Caribou	Trappeto (Golfo di	:	1101 001 10	(Italy)
	- OC1 400 C	Castellammare)	•	Incisor	Reggio Calabria (It.)
	Chamelson	Valetta (Malta)	:	Infidel	Porto Gerbo
	Chimpanzee		:	Invincible	Sciacca
	Chipmunk		:	Jackstay	Sardinia
	Coney		:	Jericho	Porto Palo di Menfi
	Coyote		:	Jorrocks	Porto Empedocle
	Crowhurst		:	Ladbroke	Siracusa
	Crowle	Collo	•	Laindon	Tunis
	Crowsest	Marsala	•	Lambley	Phillippeville
			:	Lamlash	Haifa.
	Croxton	Bir Dufan	•	Langham	Beyrout
	Culcheth		:	Langtree	Algiers
	Dogfox		•	Lauragh	Sousse
	Dulcimer		•	Lenton	Gibraltar
	Effendi E	Bone	•	Lerryn	Bougie
	Evaporate	Capo Negro	•		Casablanca
	Extract	Capo Passero		Lidget Malicious	Palermo
	Farnley	Punta Secca (Capo	ě	Muckle	Niscemi
		Scaramia)(Capo			Biscari
		Scalambri)	:	Parkhead	Gardubia (Tripolitania)
	Fascist	Oran	•	Pelsall	Kairouan
	Federal	Gela	:	Penarth	
	Felton	Palazzolo	•	Penryn	Tunisia
	Fibula	Licata	:	Petworth	Lampedusa
	Finance	Malta	÷	Potash	Capo Ognina
	Flatter	Marina D'Avola	:	President	Capo San Vito
	Flitton	Castelvetrano	:	Queenbee	Comiso
	Fustian	Catania	:	Rataplan	Pachino
	Galore	Carini Bay	:	Refrain	Gerbini
		(Bala di Carini)	:	Sidereal	Marina di Ragusa
	Gizzard	Capo Gallo	;	Streamline	Lipari Islands
	Flutton	Augusta	:	Tambourine	Mazara del Vallo
	Grummet	Corsica	:	Templar	Castellammare
			;	Threshold	Capo Zaffarano
			:	Thurlow	Chiaramonte - Gulfi
			:	Thursby	Misurata
			:	Tiltstock	Sampieri
			:	Welcome	Capo Murro di Porco
			:	Zambuck	Avola
	(Geographical	List - next page)	:		





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ANNEX "ITEM" TO JOSS ATTACK FORCE OPERATION ORDER NO. 109-43 (Cont'd)

#### PART C (CONT'D)

#### LIST OF CODE NAMES - Geographical Locations

Place Name	Code Name	:	Place Name	Code Name
**************************************		4		
Alexandria	Coney		Marsala	Crowsnest
Algiers	Langtree	:	Mazara del Vallo	Tambourine
Augusta	Glutton	:	Messina	Gunmetal
Avola	Zambuck		Milazzo	Antitoxin
Benghazi	Chipmunk	4:	Misurata	Thursby
Beyrout	Langham	:	Misurata Marina	Bassoon
Bir Dufan	Culcheth		Niscemi	Muckle
Biscari	Parkhead	:	Oran	Fascist
Bizerte	Agouti	:	Pachino	Rataplan
Bone	Effendi	• :	Palazzolo	Felton
Borizzo	Crowhurst	• •	Palermo	Malicious
Bougie	Lerryn	:	Pantellaria	Hobglobin
Capo Gallo	Gizzard	:	Philippeville	Lambley
Capo Murro di Porco	Welcome	, :	Ponte Olivo	Homespun
Capo Negro	Evaporate	:	Porto Empedocle	Jorrocks
Cape Ognina	Potash		Porto Gerdo	Infidel
Capo Passero	Extract		Porto Palo di Menfi	Jericho
Capo San Vita	President		Port Said	Dogfox
Capo Zaffarano	Threshold	4	Pozzallo	Hoodwink
Carini Bay			Punta Secca	(
(Baia di Carini)	Galore	2	(Capo Scaramia)	(Farnley
Casablanca	Lidget	•	(Capo Scalambri)	(
Castellammare	Templar	:	Ragusa (Sicily)	Croxton
Castelvetrano	Flitton	:	Reggio Calabria (Italy)	Incisor
Catania	Fustian	:	Sampieri	Tilstock
Chiaramonte - Gulfi	Thurlow		Sardinia	Jackstay
Collo	Crowle	:	Sciacca	Invincible
Comiso	Queenbee		Sfax	Hashish
Corsica	Grummet		Sicily	Horrified
Gardubia (Tripolitania)	Pelsall		Siracusa	Ladbroke
Gela	Federal	:	Sousse	Lauragh
Gerbini	Refrain	:	Termini Imerese	Blackbuck
Gibraltar	Lenton	`:	Tobruk	Coyote
Gozo	Banjo		Trapani	Bobcat
Haifa	Lamlash	<b>;</b>	Trappeto (Golfo di	
Kairouan	Penarth	1	Castellammare)	Caribou
Lampedusa	Petworth	;	Tripoli (Africa)	Chimpanzee
Licata	Fibula	2	Tunis	Laindon
Lipari Islands	Streamline	::	Tunisia	Penryn
Malta	Finance	::	Valetta (Malta)	Chameleon
Marina D'Avola	Flatter	:	Villa San Giovanni	
Marina di Ragusa	Sidereal	•	(Italy)	Horsefly
Marinella	Appalling	•	Vizzini	Dulcimer
	,	<b>:</b>		



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ANNEX "ITEM" TO JOSS ATTACK FORCE
OPERATION PLAN NO. 109-43 (Cont'd).

#### PART D

#### ENEMY RADAR (BRITISH R.D.F.)

There is a large enemy radar located on Beach No. 73, near Torre di Gaffi, Both of the two types present is given below.

#### (a) FREYA.

Long range early warning stations on the 126.5 mc/s band, which give range and bearing of approaching aircraft but not height. They can pick up an aircraft at 10,000 feet about 140 miles away, at 5,000 feet about 73 miles away, at 1,000 feet about 48 miles away, at 500 feet about 37 miles away, and at 50 feet about 22 miles away. These stations can be modified to detect surface vessels, and some have already been so modified. The FREYA station is usually protected by blast walls, but photographic evidence shows that some in the SICILY-SARDINIA area are entirely unprotected and the others have probably only sand-bag protection.

#### (b) GIANT WURZBURG.

Used for day and night fighter control (British: G.C.I.). These stations, which work on the 560 mc/s band, have a maximum range of 45 miles, operate on the narrow beam principle, and work in conjunction with FREYA stations. The usual set-up is one FREYA for general search and two high-powered giant WURZBURG's for close control. They are believed capable of picking up surface vessels, but if aircraft were in their area, they would probably not be engaged in surface watching. The latest intelligence shows that there are night fighter stations at COMISO and CASTELVETRANO. They are controlled by the G.C.I. stations near CATANIA and MARSAIA, and control during interception is exercised by means of high-frequency and ultra-high-frequency voice communications. Both small and giant WURZBURG stations are entirely above ground, and they cannot be protected by sand-bags or blast walls, since these would interfere with their operation. Their cabins, however, are of steel and would probably resist small-arms fire.

#### PART #

#### GUNFIRE SUPPORT AREAS

JOSS gunfire support areas are as follows:

#### Gunfire support

area	
A	044317 - 118317 - 118210 - 044210
В	904310 - 979310 - 979200 - 904200
C	850340 - 878310 - 878200 - 810200 - 810287
D	735392 - 796348 - 729257 - 668302



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Task Force 80.2

ANNEX "ITEM" TO JOSS ATTACK FORCE OPERATION PLAN NO. 109-43 (Cont'd)

#### PART F

#### WESTERN NAVAL TASK FORCE

The individual units attached to various Task Groups of the WESTERN NAVAL TASK FORCE are given herewith for the benefit of those craft not having "Organization of the United States Fleet".

Escort Group

```
Desron 7
                           PLUNKETT (DD431) Destroyers (F)
                           Desdiv 13
                             NIBLACK (DD424)
                             BENSON (DD421)
                             GLEAVES (DD423)
                         Desron 8
                           WAINWRIGHT (DD419)(F)
                           Desdiv 16
                            MAYRANT (DD402)
                             TRIPPE (DD403)
                             RHIND (DD404)
                             ROWAN (DD405)
                         DIME Attack Force, Rear Admiral Hall, USN
     Task Force 81.
                         Transdiv 3
                           SAMUEL CHASE, Transport (HQ Ship)(F)
                           DICKMAN
                                         Transports (AP)
                           BARNETT
                           LYON
                           STANTON
                           THURSTOW .
                                         MT/Store Ships (AK)
                           OBERON
                           BETELGUESE
                         Crudiv 8
                                         (CL)
                           SAVANNAH
                           BOISE
                         Desron 33
                           NELSON (DD623) Destroyers (F)
                           Desdiv 33
MURPHY (DD603)
                             GLENNON (DD620)
                             JEFFERS (DD621)
                             MADDOX (DD622)
                           Desdiv 34
                             BUTLER (DD636)
                             GHERARDI (DD637)
                             HERNDON (DD638)
                             SHUBRICK (DD639)
                         CENT Attack Force, Rear admiral Kirk, USN
     Task Force 85.
                         ANCON (HQ Ship), Flag of CTF 85.
                         Transdiv 1
                           LEONARD WOOD Transports (AP)
                           DOROTHEA DIX
ALEYONE
ANDROMEDA
                           FLORENCE NIGHTINGALE
                           JAMES O'HARA
                                         MT/Store Ships(AK)
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


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#### PART F (CONT'D)

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Task Force 85
                      Transdiv 5
(Cont 'd)
                        CHARLES CARROLL
                                           Transports (AP)
                        THOMAS JEFFERSON
                        SUSSE ANTHONY
                        WILETAM BIDDLE
                        PROGYON
                                           MT/Store Ships (AK)
                        ARCTURUS
                      Transday 7
                        CALVERT
                                           Transports (AP)
                        NEVILLE
                        ANNE ARUNDEL
                        FREDERICK FUNSTON
                        BELLATRIX
                                           MT/Store Ship (AK)
                      PHILADELPHIA (1 CL)
                      H.M.S. ABERCROMBIE
                      Desron 15
                        DAVIDSON (DD618) Destroyers (F)
                        Desdiv 29
                          MERVINE (DD489)
                          QUICK (DD490)
                          BEATTY (DD640)
                          TILLMAN (DD641)
                       Desdiv 30
COWIE (DD632)
KNIGHT (DD633)
                          DORAN (DD634)
                         EARLE (DD635)
                     Desron 16
                       PARKER (DD604)(F)
                       Desdiv 31
LAUB (DD613)
                         KENDRICK (DD612)
                         MAC KENZIE (DD614)
                       Desdiv 32
                         BOYLE (DD600)
                         CHAMPLIN (DD601)
                         NIELDS (DD616)
                     Mindiv 7
                        STAFF (AM114)
                                           Minesweepers
                        SKILL (AM115)
                        SPEED (AM116)
                        STRIVE (AM117)
Task Force 86.
                     JOSS Attack Force, Rear Admiral Conolly, USN
                     Crudiv 13
                       BROOKLYN (CL)
                       BIRMINGHAM
                     Desron 13
                       BUCK (DD420)(F)
                       Desdiv 25
                         WOOLSEY (DD437)
                         LUDLOW (DD438)
EDISON (DD439)
                         BRISTOL (DD453)
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ANNEX "ITEM" TO JOSS ATTACK FORCE OPERATION PLAN NO. 109-43 (Cont'd)

#### PART F (CONT'D)

Task Force 86 (Cont'd)

Desdiv 26
WILKES (DD441)
NICHOLSON (DD442)
SWANSON (DD413)
ROE (DD418)

## PART G DISTRIBUTION OF LANDING CRAFT - JOSS - BY BEACHES

	L.C.I.	¥ .	L.C.T.	: 		L.S.T.	
		Beach No	o. 70-A -	BLUE			
85 86 89 .90 91 92 94	319 320 321 322 324 326 349 350	15 16 19 14 15 18 19 19 22 23	242 244 10 277 15 294 15 364 16 431 17 434 10 435			310 315 316 317 318 332 387 388	
		Beach No.	70-B -	YELLOW	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
	95 96	7 17 20 22 24 25 26 27	29 36 125 136 137 147 148 149	152 153 154 202 204 205 210		1 3 157 158 197 309 326	327 333 351 352 372 373 386
		Beach No.	71-72 -	GREEN			
		E LEOPOLD ESS ASTRID	33 34 35	: : :		6 314 357 374 375 376	
		Beach	No. 73 - 1	RED			
15 2 3 4 5 8 9 1 1 1	15 16 209 211 212 213 217 218	: 198 : 199 : 200 : 201 : 203 : 206 : 208	209 212 213 222 223 224 271	274 296 311 332 340 342 430		347 348 350 358 359 360 383	
	LADJ		-11-	<b>.</b> 			



Information and Intelligence Annex No. 118-43.

ANNEX "ITEM" TO JOSS ATTACK FORCE OPERATION PLAN NO. 109443 (Cont'd)

## PART H3 GERMAN AND ITALIAN AIRCRAFT - TYPES LIKELY TO BE ENCOUNTERED

(I)		No.	No.		Estimated number in Sicily
Type			tail :		on D day
		•	1 22 14 14		
ong Range Bombers:		<u> </u>	ERMAN		: 120
unkers 88	Ju 88	: 2	1	low wing monoplane	
omber Reconnaissance:		:			: 20
unkers 88	Ju 88	: 2	: 1 :	: low wing monoplane	
leinkel 111	He lll	: 2	: 1	low wing monoplane	
orpedo Bombers:		•			: No estimate
leinkel 111	He lll	: 2 : 2	: 1 :	: low wing monoplane	
unkers 88	Ju 88	: 2	: 1 :	low wing monoplane	•
Dive Bomber:	:	•	•		. None reporte
unkers 87	Ju 87	: 1	1, 1,	: low wing monoplane	:
lighter Bomber;		•			: 40
ocke-Wulf	FW 190	: 1	: 1	low wing monoplane	-
			•		. 170
Single Engine Fighter: Messerschmitt 109	Me 109	: 1	: 1	: : low wing monoplane	: 170
		•		•	•
win Engine Fighters:		:	•		: 60
lesserschmitt 1.10 Nesserschmitt 2.10	Me 110 Me 210	: 2 : 2	: 2 :	: low wing monoplane : low wing monoplane	
1000 GE 36 EEEE CO C 21,20	Me Lio		:	i tow write monopromi	1
lactical Reconnaissanc		:	:		: 10
lesserschmitt	Me 109	: 1	: 1	: low wing monoplane	· ;
		•			
	•	IT	ALIAN		•
Somber Reconnaissance:	*	•	•	•	: : 40
Savoia-Marchetti 79	SM 79	; 3	: 1	· low wing monoplane	
Savoia-Marchetti 84	SM 84	; 3 ; 3 ; 2	: 1	: low wing monoplane	
Cantieri Z 1007	CZ 1007	: 3	: L	: low wing monoplane	
list BR 20	BR 20	: 2	: 2	: low wing monoplane	•
Corpedo Bombers:		•	•		<b>2</b> 5
Savoia-Marchetti 79	SM 79	: 3 : 3	: 1	: low wing monoplane	
Savoia-Marchetti 84	SM 84	: 3	: 1	: low wing monoplane	
Single Engine Fighters	:	:	•	i	: : 175
lacchi 200	Mc 200	: 1	: 1	: low wing monoplane	
Maochi 202	Mc 202	: 1	: 1	: low wing monoplane	<b>*</b>
Ancchi 205	Mc 205	: 1	: 1	: low wing monoplane	
Tiat G 50	G 50	: 1	1	: low wing monoplane	F ∲ . ±
iat GR 42	GR 42	: 1	: 1	: biplane	
Regainme (2001	Re 2001	1	: 1	: low wing monoplane	
a producer seem to the company of th			:	<b>₹</b>	. <b>•</b> ,

LCB/A16-3 Serial



Information and Intelligence Annex No. 118-43.

ANNEX "ITEM" TO JOSS ATTACK FORCE OPERATION PLAN NO. 109-43 (Cont'd)

#### , PALRT H (CONT'D)

, Туре			: No	•	No. vertica tàil	1	Wing	Estimated number in Sicily on D day
			• 1,1116,7	nes:	surface	- 8		on D day
•					/ <b>/ ()</b> () <b>/ ()</b> () <b>/ ()</b>		5)	•
			111411	N -	(CONTI	MORT	<u>υ)</u>	
Tactical Reconnais:	sance:		:	:		:		: 15
Caproni 311	Ca	311	.: 2	:	1	. :	low wing monoplane	•
Caproni 312	Ca	312	: 2	2 :	1	:	low wing monoplane	
Caproni 313	Ca	313	: 2	2 :	1	:	low wing monoplane	:
Fiat CR 42	CR		: ]		1	:	biplane	•
	<i>t</i>		:	:				•
Coastal:			:					: 50
Cantieri Z 501	CZ	501	: 1		1	:	parasol monoplane	1
Cantieri Z 506		506	•		1	:	mid wing monoplane	
	<b>3</b> -	<i>J</i> U	•			Ţ		•
			•	•		•		•
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •		•	•	•		•		•

#### PART I.

#### PERTINENT GENERAL INFORMATION ON SICILY

#### 1. Topography.

Almost the whole of the Island of Sicily is mountainous with several well-developed marginal plains. Mount Etna, 10,741 feet, dominates the eastern part of the island and there are mountains to the north and west. The southern coast is more level and has lowlands facing the sea.

There are no important rivers and most of the streams are dry in summer.

There is a well-developed highway system throughout the island. Both standard and narrow-gauge railroads are used.

#### 2. Hydrography.

For the most part, the coast of Sicily is clear to the 5-fathom line which is usually within a mile or two of the shore. There are local areas of reefs and shoals usually located near the heads of capes and promentaries. All important harbors, without exception, have been improved with structures of one sort or another.

#### 3. Tides.

Tides on the coast of Sicily are of no importance due to the very small variation of sea level.

Occasionally a phenomena known as "Marrobbio" occurs during which a sudden change in sea level occurs. It is usually preceded by a calm and a black and blue sky is commonly, but not always, preceded by westerly winds followed by southwesterly winds. During the "Marrobbio" the water suddenly rises up to three feet above the normal level and sweeps into harbors and rivers with great rapidity - receding within a few minutes with the same rapidity.

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ANNEX "ITEM" TO JOSS ATTACK FORCE PERRAMION PLAN NO. 109-43 (Cont'd)

#### PART I (CONT'D)

#### 4. Currents.

The currents in the vicinity of Sicily are generally weak and variable and are to a large extent controlled by prevailing winds. Along the south coast the currents are weak and generally flow southeast to east but can be completely reversed by strong winds. 3-knot current is sometimes reported at Licata with strong WNW winds, but the average current is about 1/2 knot to the eastward.

#### 5. Winds.

The winds in the vicinity of Sicily are strongly influenced by the adjacent land masses. Generally the winds blow from west and northwest the year round except in autumn when southeast winds are relatively more frequent. Occasionally the "Sirocco" blows from Africa, a very hot south wind with an occasional velocity reaching 40 miles per hour. The "Sirocco" rarely lasts over three pays and usually brings clouds of dust from the Sahara causing bad haze conditions.

Usually there is little surf in July and August.

#### 7. Weather.

Rainfall in Sicily averages about 30 inches a year, mostly in the months from October to January. During the balance of the year the rainfall is negligible. There are occasional thunder storms, mostly in autumn.

Temperatures are highest in July and August, averaging about 75° F though temperatures of 100° F or over are not uncommon. Fog is relatively rare and rarely lasts for more than a few hours. Haze occurs about 10% of the time mainly in the summer when dusts storms blow across from Africa.

Mirages occur in the Straits of Messina - images are sometimes cast upon cloud banks in a startling manner, a phenomena locally called "Fata Morgana".

A light haze frequently settles on the off-shore waters of the southern coast of Sicily a few hours after sunset and remains until sunrise.

> R. L. CONOLLY, Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy, Commander JOSS Attack Force.

DISTRIBUTION:

S. H. HAHN.

acting Flag Secretary.

UNGLASS



BIZERTE, TUNISIA, June 20, 1943; 1800.

Sousse JOSS Sortie Plan No. 128-43 ANNEX "SUGAR" TO JOSS ATTACK FORCE OPERATION PLAN NO. 109-43

#### TASK ORGANIZATION

- (a) 86.111 Tunisian JOSS Fast Convoy, Commander Sabin, U.S. Navy.
- (b) 86.1111 JOSS Section, Commander Imlay, U.S.C.G.R.

  LCI Flotilla Two less LCI 32.

  LCI Flotilla Four less LCI 86, 88, 95, 96
- (c) 86.1112 CENT DIME KOOL Section, Commander Leppert, U.S. Navy.

  LCI Flotilla One
  LCI Flotilla Twenty-One (Sixteen British LCI(L))
- (d) 86.112 Tunisian JOSS Fast Screen, Commander Block, U.S.N.R.
- (e) 86.1121 JOSS Section Screen, Commander Block, U.S.N.R.

  SEER
  PC 543, 550, 559, 562
- (f) 86.1122 CENT DIME KOOL Section Screen. (SOP of assigned escorts)

  Escorts assigned by Commanders CENT and DIME Assault Force.

#### 1. Information

- (1) The port of SOUSSE has been designated as the final staging port of all LCI(L) of the Western Naval Task Force.
- (2) All Western Naval Task Force LSTs are sailing from BIZERTE and TUNIS on D minus two in a two-section convoy (Tunisian JOSS Medium Convoy) with the sections five miles apart. First section JOSS LSTs; Second Section CENT DIME KOOL LSTs.
- (3) All Western Naval Task Force LCTs are sailing from BIZERTE and TUNIS in a two-section convoy (Tunisian JOSS Slow Convoy) with the sections five miles apart. First Section JOSS LCTs; Second Section CENT KOOL LCTs.
- (4) Commander Western Naval Task Force has directed that the LST, LCT and LCI for JOSS and/for CENT, DIME and KOOL rendezvous on D minus one and proceed to respective assault beachheads. When proceeding to beachheads KOOL craft will follow astern of DIME craft.
- (5) Air coverage of four planes will be furnished to the <u>Tunisian JOSS</u>

  <u>Fast Convoy</u>; by the North African Coastal Command during movements
  through the TUNISIAN WAR CHANNEL, and by the Malta Air Command (British)
  during the rest of D minus one day.

#### Assumptions

- (1) Enemy mines may be encountered:
- (2) Enemy submarines may be present;
- (3) Enemy air attacks may develop.





ANNEX "SUGAR" TO JOSS ATTACK FORCE

OPERATION PLAN NO. 109-43 (Cont'd)

Sousse JOSS Sortie Plan No. 128-43

- 2. These units will sortie from SOUSSE and upon clearing SOUSSE, will form Cruising Disposition ITEM and proceed to a rendezvous off MALTA with the Tunisian JOSS Medium Convoy and the Tunisian JOSS Slow Convoy.
- 3. (a) Tunisian JOSS Fast Convoy.

Get underway and proceed out of harbor through swept channel in time to take departure from SOUSSE at zero two hundred D minus one.

#### (b) JOSS Section.

Upon departure take such cruising formation as will facilitate and expedite the forming up of the JOSS Assault Force by Task Groups of beach units upon rendezvousing with the <u>Tunisian JOSS Slow Convoy</u> and the <u>Tunisian JOSS Medium Convoy</u>.

- (c) CENT DIME KOOL Section. Upon departure take cruising formation five miles behind the last ship of the JOSS Section and in such formation as will facilitate and expedite the forming up of the CENT, DIME and KOOL landing craft upon the rendezvousing with the CENT DIME KOOL Section of the Tunisian JOSS Slow Convoy and the Tunisian JOSS Medium Convoy.
- (d) <u>Screen</u>. Get underway and proceed out of harbor through swept channel well in advance of the LCI(L)s and patrol off the harbor during their sortie. Protect and support convoy.
- (e) JOSS Section Screen.

Screen JOSS Section LCI(L)s.

(f) CENT DIME KOOL Section Screen

Screen CENT DIME KOOL Section LCI(L)s.

- (x) (1) This plan is effective at zero zero one on July seventh.

  Zero hour will be designated by Commander Tunisia JOSS Fast Convoy.
  - (2) Use maximum speed to keep closed up.
  - (3) Take every available measure to ensure, (a)
    - (a) earliest warning of submarine or aircraft,
    - (b) destruction of hostile submarines or aircraft.
  - (4) While at sea during daylight, maintain battery continuously in Condition of Readiness Two, except when in Condition One.
- 5. Use Communication Plan, Annex CHARLIE to JOSS Attack Force Operation Plan One hundred nine dash forty-three.

Commander JOSS Attack Foree in BISCAYNE.

The short title of this order is HON/JOSS/128.

DISTRIBUTION:

List 1


NOIC SOUSSE (3)

FOIC Biverte

As: H' HAHN, how

Acting Flag Secretary.

LCB/A16-3 Serial 0011 0m



WESTERN NAVAL TASK FORCE, JOSS ATTACK FORCE, U.S.S. BISCAYNE, FLAGSHIP.

BIZERTE, TUNISIA June 20, 1943; 1800.

JOSS LANDING ATTACK PLAN No. 116-43.

ANNEX "GEORGE" TO JOSS OPERATION PLAN NO.



#### TASK ORGANIZATION

(a) 86.1 Support Group, Rear Admiral Dubose, U.S. Navy.

BROOKLYN BIRMINGHAM BUCK LUDLOW

(b) 86.2 Gaffi Attack Group, Commander Sabin, U.S. Navy

86.21 Fire Support

SWANSON ROE

3 LCG(L), British

2 LCF(L), British

86.22 Landing Craft, Control Craft, A/S screen and Sweepers - RED

SEER

LSTs 350,358,359,360 of Division Four.

LSTs 347,348 of Division Three and LST 383 with pontoon.

LCIs 1,2,3,4,5,8 of Division Seven.

LCIs 9,15,16 of Division Eight.

LCIs 10,11,209,211,217,218 of Division Mine.

LCIs 212, 213 of Division Ten.

LCTs 206, 209, 213 of Division Sixty-One.

LCTs 222, 223, 221, 271, 274 of Division Sixty-Two.

LCTs 276, 311, 332 of Division Sixty-Five.

LCTs 198, 199, 200, 201, 203, 212 of Division Fifty-One.

LCTs 340, 342, 430 of Division Sixty.

PC 543 626

SC 497, 498, 503, 506. 978 : LCI 10 (RCT Headquarters Ship)

#### 86.23 Task Group - RED

U. S. army Units embarked.

(c) 86.3 Molla Attack droup, Commander Morris, U.S. Navy.

86.31 Fire Support

EDISON (DD)

1 LCG(L), British

1 LCF(L), British

86.32 Landing Craft, Control Craft, A/S Screen, and Sweepers - GREEN

SENTINEL

HMS PRINCE LEOPOLD

HMS PRINCESS ASTRID

LSTs 6, 314, 357, 374, 375, 376 of Division Twelve.

LCTs 33, 34, 35 of Division Fifty-Seven.

LCI 32 (RCT Headquarters Ship)

PC 545, 546.

sc 526, 530, 532. 979





H6N/JOSS/116

JOSS LANDING ATTACK PLAN ... No. 116-43.

ANNEX "GEORGE" TO JOSS ATTACK FORCE OPERATION PLAN NO. 109-43 (Cont'd).

#### 86.33 Task Group - GREEN

U.S. Army Units embarked.

#### (d) 86.4 Salso Attack Group, Commander Floyd, U.S. Navy

#### 86.41 Fire Support

WOOLSEY

3 LCG(L), British

3 LCF(E), British

#### 86.42 Landing Craft, Control Craft, A/S Screen and Sweepers - YELLOW

LSTs 197, 326, 327, 351,352,1,3,157,158,372,373 of Group Three.

LST: 309 of Division Three and LSTs 333 and 386 with pontoons.

LCIs 95, 96 of Division Twenty-Two.

LCTs 17,20,22,24,25 of Division Fifty-Five.

LCTs 7,26,27,29,36 of Division Fifty-Six.

LCTs 125,136,137,147,148,149 of Division Fifty-Eight. LCTs 152,153,154,202,210,221 of Division Fifty-Nine.

LCTs 204,205 of Division Sixty.

PC 550, 559

SC 533, 534, 535, 638, 639, 649, 651 LCI 95 (RCT Headquarters Ship)

#### 86.43 Task Group - YELLOW

U. S. army Units embarked.

#### Falconara Attack Group, Commander Nelson, U.S. Navy. (e) 86.5

#### 86.51 Fire Support

WILKES

NICHOLLON

2 LCG(L), British

2 LCF(L), British

#### 86.52 Landing Craft, Control Craft, A/S Screen and Sweepers - BLUE

LSTs 310,315,316,317,318,332 of Division Eleven.

LSTs 387,388 with pontoon

LCIs 85,86,88 of Division Nineteen

LCIs 89,90,91,92,93,94 of Division Twenty.

LCIs 319,320,321,322,349,350 of Division Twenty-One.

LCIs 324, 326 of Division Twenty-Two. LCTs 15,16,19,364,140 of Division Forty-Nine.

LCTs 431,434,435,155,196,197 of Division Fifty. LCTs 242,241,244,220,294,277 of Division Fifty-Three

LCTs 237, 185 of Division Fifty-Four.

PC 562, 626. SC 655, 666, 695, 696, 697.

LCI 86 (RCT Headquarters Ship).

#### 86.53 Task Group - BLUE

U. S. Army Units embarked.





HON/JOSS/116

No. 116-43.

JOSS LANDING ATTACK PLAN . . . . . ANNEX "GEORGE" TO JOSS ATTACK FORCE OPERATION PLAN NO. 109-43 (Cont'd)

86.6 Force Flagship

BISCAYNE BRISTOL

100 (g) 86.7 Train Salvage

> MORENO (towing pontoons) INTENT . RESOLUTE

(h) 86.8 Reserve Group, Commander Imlay, USCGR.

LST 377 of Division Four and LST 385 of Division Seven. LCIs 12, 13, 14 of Division Eight. LCIs 214, 215, 216, 219 of Division Ten. LCIs 35, 229, 231, 232 of Division Eleven. LCIs 83, 84, 87 of Division Wineteen. LCI 325 of Division Twenty-Two. LCTs 195, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219 of Division Fifty-Two. LCTs 290, 29 of Division Fifty-Four. 12 LOT(3) or (4), British SOS 508, 522, 770, 771, 977, 978, 979.

86.81 Task Group - Reserve

U.S. Army Units embarked.

86.9 Minesweeping Group (i)

YMS 3, 13, 15, 20, 21, 78...

Information. A British submarine will act as a navigation beacon in the JOSS area. The submarine has been directed to take station five point six miles directly south of CASTEL SAN ANGELO, on the summit of MOUNT ECNOMO.

Assumptions. That the initial landing will take place during darkness. That strong submarine, E-boat, and air attacks are to be expected. That mines may be encountered. That weather conditions will permit landing through the surf on designated beaches. That false beaches will not preclude the landing ships and craft from landing on the true beaches.

2. This force will firmly establish JOSS Task Force on beachheads ashore near LICATA, SICILY; support subsequent coastal military operations, protect the left flank of the operation against interference from the northwest in order to capture and secure the port of LICATA in order to assist in seizing and holding SICILY as a base for future operations.

#### 3. (a) Support Group

Cover JOSS Attack Force against hostile surface forces and destroy those encountered. Destroy hostile shore batteries at LICATA, support landing. Provide gunfire support to Task Groups RED, GREEN, YELLOW, BLUE in accordance with Fire Support Plan, Annex "FOX" to JOSS Attack Force Operation Plan One Hundred Nine dash Forty-Three.



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HON/JOSS/116

JOSS LANDING ATTACK PLAN
No. 116-43

PLAN ANNEX GEORGE TO JOSS ATTACK FORCE CPERATION PLAN 109-47 (Cont'd)

#### (b) Gaffa Attack Group (RED)

Establish Task Group RED ashore on RED beach at H hour of D day in accordance with Task Group RED plan of Attack. Support military operations by naval gunfire in accordance Fire Support Plan, Annex F to JOSS Attack. Force Operation Plan One Hundred Mine dash Forty-Three. Silence batteries and destroy searchlights which threaten landing craft or landing beaches. Provide one PC for special navigational and scout purposes. Control Ships comply with procedure set forth in ComPhibNAW Force Confidential Instructions CHARLIE Six dash Forty-Three. When unloaded from assault flight direct LCTs 222, 224, 274, 276, 311, 332, upon retracting, clear beach to westward, withdraw directly to seaward to rendezvous ROGER EASY. When assembled these LCTs proceed to rendezvous ROGER ITEM, join with designated LCTs from YELLOW beach then proceed and report to Commander CENT Task Force off SCOGLETTI for duty in unloading transports. When released by Commander CENT Task Force proceed to Advanced Amphibious Training Base Bizerte unless otherwise directed.

#### (c) Molla Attack Group (GREEN)

Establish Task Group GREEN ashore on GREEN beach at H hour of D day in accordance with Task Group GREEN Plan of attack. Support military operations by naval gunfire in accordance Fire Support Plan, Annex F to JOSS Attack Force Operation Plan One Hundred Nine dash Forty-Three. Silence batteries and destroy searchlights that threaten landing beaches or landing craft. Provide one PC for special navigational and scout purposes. Control Ships comply with procedure set forth in ComPhibNAW Force Confidential Instructions CHARLIE Six dash Forty-Three. After initially landing LCVP at Beach GREEN and recovering boats, LSTs withdraw to rendezvous with Reserve Group.

#### (d) Salso Attack Group (YELLOV)

Establish Task Group YELLOW ashore on YELLOW beach at H hour of D day in accordance with Task Group YELLOV Plan of attack. Support military operations by naval gunfire in accordance Fire Support Plan, Annex F to JOSS Attack Force Operation Plan One Hundred Nine dash Forty-Three. Silence batteries and destroy searchlights that threaten landing beaches or landing craft. Provide one PC for special navigational and scout purposes. Control Ships comply with procedure set forth in ComPhibNAV Force Confidential Instructions CHARLIE Six dash Forty-Three. LST Division Six after initially landing LCVP at Beach YFLLOV and recovering boats, withdraw to rendezvous with Reserve Group. When unloaded from Assault flight direct LCTs 125, 136, 137, 147, 148, 149 upon retracting, clear beach to westward, withdraw directly to seaward to rendezvous ROGER ITEM, join with LCTs from BLUE beach and proceed and report to Commander DIME Attack Force off GELA. When unloaded from assault flight direct LCTs 152, 153, 154, 202, 204, 205, 210, 221 upon retracting, clear beach to westward, withdraw directly to seaward to rendezvous ROGER ITEM. Join with designated LCTs from RED beach, then proceed and report to Commander CENT Task Force off SCOGLETTI. Provide one SC as escort and Task Unit Commander.



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JOSS LANDING ATTACK PLAN No. 116-43 ANNEX GEORGE TO JOSS ATTACK FORCE OPERATION PLAN 109-43 (Cont'd)

#### (e) Falconara Attack Group (BLUE)

Establish Task Group BLUE ashore on BLUE beach at H hour of D day in accordance with Task Group BLUE Plan of attack. Capture and secure the port and airfield of LICATA. Support military operations by naval gunfire in accordance Fire Support Plan, Annex F to JOSS Operation Plan One Hundred Mine dash Forty-Three. Silence batteries and destroy searchlights that threaten landing beaches or landing craft. Provide one PC for special navigational and scout purposes. Control ships comply with procedure set forth in ComPhioMAW Force Confidential Instructions CHARLIE Six dash Forty-Three. When unloaded from assault flight, direct LCTs 155, 196, 197, 294, 431, 434 upon retracting, clear beach to weastward to rendezvous ROGER ITEM, join with LCTs from YELLOW Beach, and proceed and report to Commander DIME Attack Force off GELA.

#### (f) Force Flagship

BISCAYNE operate as directed by Commander JOSS Attack Force.

BRISTOL screen flagship. Carry out special navigational and scout work assignment. Execute assigned fire support mission.

#### (g) Train Salvage.

MORENO, at first light, site pontoons on YELLOW or BLUE beach as directed and prepare them for use. When pontoons are secured salvage landing craft BLUE beach.

INTENT salvage landing craft YELLOW beach.

RESOLUTE salvage landing craft RED beach. When LICATA is captured assist in opening net booms and clearing port.

#### (h) Reserve Group

Establish Reserve Unit ashore at the time and at the beaches directed by Commander JOSS Attack Force.

#### (i) Minesweeping Group

Sweep ahead of formation during approach when inside one hundred fathom curve. Sweep area between JOSS and DIME from H hour until H plus five. Sweep areas between Task Units commencing with H plus six.

(x) This Landing Attack Plan will be effective on D day and H hour, except as H hour may be retarded by signal, but the Communication Plan for it shall be made effective at fourteen hundred on D minus one.

D day will be signalled. H hour is zero two four five.

Attack groups shall press home the assault with relentless vigor regardless of loss or difficulty. So instruct every participant in this operation regardless of rank or rating.

Destroy enemy forces encountered.

Avoid congestion of landing boats on beaches.

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HON/JOSS/116

JOSS LANDING ATTACK PLAN No. 116-43 ANNEX CEORGE TO JOSS ATT.CK FORCE
OPERATION PLAN 109-43 (Cont.d)

Follow-doctrine set forth in Annex DOG to Operation Plan One Hundred Nine dash Forty-Three.

Except as modified by Annex CHARLIE maintain radio silence and visual silence until surprise has been lost, landing has been effected, or until otherwise directed by Commander JOSS Attack Force.

Every line officer on every ship and landing craft shall be made cognizant of the operation as a whole and the details of the primary task allotted to his unit. At the same time they must be impressed with the vital necessity of maintaining the security of this information. Upon departure from port enlisted men, particularly boat crews, shall be given full and complete information to prepare them for their tasks in the landing operation.

- 4. Evacuation of wounced in accordance with Medical Plan, Annex MIKE.
- 5. Use Communication Plan, Annex CHARLIE to JOSS Attack Force Operation Plan One Hundred Nine dash Forty-Three.

Rendezvous as in Operation Plan One Hundred Nine dash Forty-Three.

Make action reports accordance NavNaw Confidential Letter One CHARLIE LOVE dash Forty-Three and ComPhibNAW Force Confidential Instructions CHARLIE Four dash Forty-Three. Make reports of serious damage to ships in accordance NavNaw Confidential Letter Two CHARLIE LOVE dash Forty-Three.

Commander JOSS Attack Force (Commander Task Force Eighty-Six) in BISCAYNE.

Richard L. Conolly, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Commander, JOSS Attack Force.

#### DISTRIBUTION:

List 2

CTF 87 (10)

All LSTs (5) (Includes 1 copy for each Boat

Officer on board the LST)

S. H. HAHN

Acting Flag Secretary.

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WESTERN NAVAL TASK FORCE JOSS ATTACK FORCE, U.S.S. BISCAYNE, FLAGSHIP.

BIZERTE, TUNISIA, June 20, 1943; 1800.

HON/JOSS/119

JOSS Follow-Up Plan No. 119-43. ANNEX "JIG" TO JOSS ATTACK FORCE OPERATION PLAN NO. 109-43.

#### TASK ORGANIZATION

- (a) 86.9 Joint Loading Control, Captain R. M. Zimmerli, U.S. Navy.
- (b) 86.91 Commanding Officer, AATE Bizorte, Lieut.Comdr. G.H. Patterson, USNR.
- (c) 86.92 Commanding Officer, AATB Tunis, Liout.Comdr. L.D. Roberts, USNR.
- (d) 86.93 Commanding Officer. USS DELTA, Captain C.D. Headlee, U.S. Navy.
- (e) 86.94 Commanding Officer, USS ACHELOUS, Lieut. W. Ringies, USNR.
- (f) 86.95 Commander IST Groups 1.2.3.4.5.6, Comdr. R.E. Nelson, U.S. Navy.
- (g) 86.96 Commander LCI Flotillas One. Two and Four, Comdr L.S. Sabin, U.S. Nav
- (h) 86.97 Commander LCT Flotilla Nine, Ten, Eleven, Lt.Comdr. J.B. Freese, USNR
- (i) 86.98 Escort Sweeper Group, Commander A. F. Block, U.S. Navy.
  - Information. United States Forces have been landed over beachheads on the southeastern coast of SICILY by the Western Naval Attack Force. Twenty-two thousand troops and two thousand seven hundred vehicles of the Army forces alloted JOSS, together with their supplies, remain to be transported across the STRAITS OF SICILY from BIZERTE, and twenty-one thousand troops and thirty-three hundred vehicles of the Army forces alloted DIME and CENT, together with their supplies, remain to be transported from TUNIS.
  - This Task Group will re-enforce, support and maintain United States troops landed by the Western Naval Task Force in SICILY by rapid repair, servicing and reloading of all landing craft upon their return from Sicilian waters and by sailing them in escorted convoys to designated Sicilian beaches or ports, not later than D plus three and again on D plus seven, and subsequent thereto as later directed.
  - 3. (a) <u>Joint Loading Control</u>. Subject to such instructions received from higher authority organize, control and coordinate activities of other task units for the accomplishment of the mission.
    - (b) Commanding Officer. AATB Bizerte.
      - (1) Provide berthing facilities.
      - (2) Organize and provide repair facilities for landing craft on a twenty-four hour basis commencing with D plus one.
      - (3) Provide fueling arrangements on a twenty-four hour basis commencing with D plus one.
      - (4) Transfer all Army or Foreign service wounded received from incoming landing craft to Army Evacuation Hospital.
      - (5) Transfer all seriously wounded U.S. Naval personnel to Naval Dispensary, AATB Bizerte until it is full, then to Army Evacuation Hospital.
      - (6) Retain all slightly wounded U.S. Naval personnel in temporary barracks dispensary facilities, AATB Bizerte.



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JOSS Follow-Up Plan No. 119-43. ANNEX "JIG" TO JOSS ATTACK FORCE OPERATION PLAN NO. 109-43 (Cont'd)

- (7) Retain all U.S. Naval survivors in temporary barrack facilities, AATB Bizerte: Issue emergency outfits of clothing. When personnel is pronounced fit by Medical Officer, utilize to best advantage to temporarily replace casualties in other landing craft, or temporarily in Base activities.
- (8) Transfer all Army or Foreign survivors to appropriate commanders in the BIZERTE area.
- (9) Provide following services to LCIs:
  - a. Fuel all LCIs to three thousand five hundred gallons.
  - b. Water all LCIs to five thousand gallons.
  - c. Provide a normal magazine fill.
  - d. Bring provisions to a seven-days stock for twenty-seven officers and men one thousand eight hundred ninety pound
  - e. One drum lubricating oil.
  - f. Provide replacements for sick, wounded or missing. officers or crew.
  - g. Provide necessary life jackets or belts for troops.
- (10) Provide following services to LCTs:
  - a. Fuel all LCTs to capacity of tanks.
  - b. Water all LCTs to capacity of tanks.
  - c. Provide a normal magazine fill.
  - d. Bring provisions to a seven-days stock for twenty-two officers and men one thousand five hundred forty pounds.
  - e. One drum lubricating oil.
  - f. Provide relief crew.
  - g. Provide necessary life jackets or belts for troops.
- (11) Provide following services to ISTs:
  - a. Fuel all LSTs that have less than fifteen thousand gallons fuel on board to thirty-five thousand gallons.
  - b. Water all ISTs to thirty thousand gallons. Water ISTs 318,332,326,327,347,383,385,386,387,388 to sixty thousand gallons.
  - c. Bring provisions to seven-days stock for five hundred men - thirty-five thousand pounds.
  - d. Provide a normal magazine fill.
  - e. Provide replacements for wounded or missing officers or crew.
  - f. Provide replenishment of medical supplies expended.
  - g. Frovide necessary life jackets or belts for troops.

#### (c) Commanding Officer. AATB Tunis.

- (1) Provide berthing facilities.
- (2) Organize and provide repair facilities for landing craft on a twenty-four hour basis commencing with D plus one.
- (3) Provide fueling arrangements on a twenty-four hour basis commencing with D plus one.
- (4) Transfer all Army or Foreign service wounded to the Army Evacuation Hospital. Transfer non-wounded to appropriate commands in the TUNIS area.
- (5) Transfor all scriously wounded U.S. Naval personnel to Naval Dispensary, AATB Tunis, until its facilities are full, then to Army Evacuation Hospital.
- (6) Retain all slightly wounded U.S. Naval personnel in temporary dispensary facilities, AATB Tunis.

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JOSS Follow-Up Plan

No. 119-43

11. 1 22.5

ANUEX "JIG" TO JOSS ATTACK FORCE OPERATION PLAN NO. 109-43 (Cont'd)

(7) Retain all U.S. Naval survivors in temporary barracks facilities, AATB Tunis. Issue emergency outfits of clothing. When personnel is pronounced fit by Medical Officer, utilize to best advantage to temporarily replace casualties in other landing craft, or temporarily in Base activities.

(8) Provide following services to LCIs:

- a. Fuel all LCTs to three thousand five hundred gallons.
- b. Water all LCIs to five thousand gallons.

c. Provide a normal magazine fill.

d. Bring provisions to a seven-days stock for twenty-seven officers and men - one thousand eight hundred ninety poun

e. One arum lubricating oil.

f. Provide necessary life jackets or belts for troops.

(9) Provide following services to LCTs:

- a. Fuel all LCTs to capacity of tanks.
- b. Water all LCTs to capacity of tanks.

c. Provide a normal magazine fill.

- d. Bring provisions to a seven-days stock for twenty-two officers and men - one thousand five hundred forty pounds
- e. One drum lubricating oil.

f. Provide relief crow.

g. Provide necessary life jackets or belts for troops.

(10) Provide following services to LSTs

a. Fuel all ISTs that have less than fifteen thousand gallons fuel on board to thirty-five thousand gallons.

b. Water all ISTs to thirty thousand gallons. Water ISTs 306,308,311,336,337,338,346,356,389 to sixty thousand gallons.

c. Bring provisions to seven-days stock for five hundred men - thirty-five thousand pounds.

d. Provide a normal magazine fill.

- o. Provide replacements for wounded or missing members of officers or crew.
- f. Provide replenishment of medical supplies expended.
- g. Provide necessary life jackets or belts for troops.

(d) Commanding Officer, USS DELTA.

Effect emergency repairs to all landing craft and Escort Sweeper Group and supply emergency needs of equipment and material from ship's stock, on a twenty-four hour basis.


(e) Commanding Officer, USS ACHELOUS. Effect emergency repairs to all landing craft and Escort Sweeper Group and supply emergency needs of equipment and naterial from ship's stock, on a twenty-four hour a day basis.

(f) Commander IST Groups 1.2.3.4.5.6.

(1) Make every effort to expedite turn-around. ISTs must accomplish servicing and loading and be ready to sail in less than twenty-four hours.

(2) Supply relief personnel, officers and enlisted, from damaged

or immobilized ships.



#### JOSS Follow-Up Plan No. 119-43.

ANNEX "JIG" TO JOSS ATTACK FORCE OPERATION PLAN NO. 109-43 (Con'd).

(g) Commander LCI Flotillas One, Two and Four.

(1) Make every effort to expedite turn-around. LCIs must accomplish servicing and loading and be ready to sail in less than eight hours.

(2) Supply relief personnel, officer and enlisted, from damaged

or immobilized ships.

(h) Commander LCT Flotillas Nine, Ten, Eleven. Make every effort to expedite turn-around. LCTs must accomplish servicing and loading and be ready to sail in less than sixteen hours.

(i) Escort Sweeper Group

(1) Fuel and water to capacity but on a basis of non-interference with landing craft operations.

(2) Supply relief personnel, officer and enlisted, from damaged

or immobilized ships.

(3) Report to Joint Loading Control estimated time of readiness for further operations.

(4) If over twenty percent depleted, restore to normal magazine fill.

- (x) This plan is effective at zero zero zero, eighteen June, nineteen forty-three.
- (a) The S.O.P.A. of each convoy or group of landing craft or combatan unit is responsible for advising the AATB Bizerte or AATB Tunis by operational priority despatch not less than eight hours prior to his ETA of:

ABLE - The numbers and types of ships under his command, BAKER - The ETA BIZERTE or TUNIS,

CHARLIE - The ships that have suffered sufficiently severe battle damage to prevent their being made ready for sea again prior to the next Follow-Up with essential details as to draft and list of ship to starboard or port,

DOG - The landing craft which have been unable to discharge sixty percent of their cargo and the nature of their defects,

EASY - Total number of (1) dead, (2) stretcher or (3)

ambulatory cases,

FOX - Total number of survivors on board rescued from ships that may have been sunk or from crashed aircraft,

GEORGE - Rough average percentage of various types ammunition expended.

- (b) Ships or landing craft in imminent danger of sinking, or capable of returning to harbor but damaged so that beaching will be necessary may utilize a beaching position just south of CAP FARINA and between points one-half mile and two miles southwest of the cape.
- (c) Damaged ships proceeding to harbor whose draft exceeds twentysix feet, or ships or landing craft with disabled propulsion or steering gear, so that they will require the assistance of tugs for entering the harbor are to proceed to the disabled ships anchorage just off the port and anchor. On being challenged by the Port War Signal Station (British) they are to reply giving identification and . the words "Ship disabled".



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ANNEX "JIG" TO JOSS ATTACK FORCE OPERATION PLAN NO. 109-43 (Cont'd).

JOSS Follow-Up Plan No. 119-43.

- (d) Individual landing craft shall be prepared to supply by visual sinable Port War Signal Station (British) data on the same basis as above or such information regarding their condition as may be desired
- (e) Ships and landing craft entering PASERTE may expect to receive directions from the <u>Joint Loading Control</u> organization by Loud Hailer as they pass through the narrow channel at the Signal Station, detailed instructions as to the berth or anchorage they shall proceed to.
- (f) Additional information required from all landing craft upon arrival at berth or dock is:

(1) Provisions required to meet the standard set forth in paragraph three.

(2) Potable water required to meet the requirements of paragraph three.

(3) Number life jackets on board, other than those for regular crew (including boat crews).

(4) Medical supplies required for replenishment.

(5) Number of LCVP needing replacement.

- (g) When a landing craft arrives in port in damaged condition, or suffering from machinery derangement, the Flotilla Engineer or his Assistant, together with an officer from the Repair Organization of the Base shall make an early inspection of the damage or derangement and if the repairs or damage is such that the ship cannot be made ready to sail with the D plus seven convoys, repair work shall not be undertaken on her unless it can be done without interference with work on landing craft that can be ready to sail on D plus three or D plus seven.
- (h) All outward bound Follow-Up convoys shall be routed through the TUNISIAN WAR CHANNEL to Point KING EASY at thirty-six degrees, fifty-one point six minutes north; eleven degrees, fourteen minutes east, thence to destination via a route six miles wide whose center is marked by the following points:

JIG ABLE - Thirty-six degrees, forty minutes north; twelve degrees east.

JIG BAKER - Thirty-six degrees, thirty minutes north; twelve degrees, fifty-six minutes east.

JIG CHARLIE - Thirty-six degrees, forty-two minutes north; thirteen degrees, fifty minutes east.

The route is six miles wide. Convoys, groups of ships, or craft with a speed of advance of ten knots or more are to keep to port of the center line. Convoys or groups of ships or craft with a speed o advance of less than ten knots are to keep to starboard of the cente line.

(i) All inbound Follow-Up convoys shall be routed to Point ABIE JIG at thirty-six degrees, fifty-three minutes north; thirteen degrees, fifty minutes east, thence via a route six miles wide whose center is marked by the following points:

BAKER JIG - Thirty-six degrees, forty-one minutes north; twelve degrees, fifty-two minutes east.

CHARLIE JIG - Thirty-six degrees, fifty-four minutes north; twelve degrees east.

KING EASY - Thirty-six degrees, fifty-one point six minutes north: eleven degrees, fourteen minutes east.

THISIA WAR CHANNEL to destination.

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S.E.C.R.E.T

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JOSS Follow-Up Plan No. 119-43. ANNEX "JIG" TO JOSS ATTACK FORCE OPERATION PLAN NO. 109-43 (Cont'd).

5. Use Communication Plan, Annex C.
Use Zone Laker time.
Commander JOSS Attack Force in U.S.S. BISCAYNE.

The short title of this order is HON/JOSS/119.

R. L. CONOLIX,
Rear Admiral, U.S.Navy,
Commander JOSS Attack Force.

DISTRIBUTION:

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SOIS

S. H. HAHN,

Acting Flag Secretary.

LUB LCB/A16-3

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HON/JOSS/109

JOSS Operation Plan No. 109-43

WESTERN NAVAL TASK FORCE JOSS ATTACK FORCE, U.S.S. BISCAYNE, FLAGSHIP.

.10 11 ...

BIZERTE, TUNISIA. June 20, 1943; 1800.

#### TASK ORGANIZATION

(a) 86.1 Cover and Support Group, Rear Admiral Dubose, U.S. Navy.

Cruiser Division Thirteen Destroyer Squadron Thirteen .... Nine LCG(L) British Eight LCF(L) British

(b) 86.2 Landing Craft Group, Commander Sabin, U.S. Navy.

LST Groups Two, Three, Six, Division Seven less LST Four and LST Three Eight One.

LCI Flotillas Two and Four.

LCT Flotillas Nine and Ten.

LGT Group Thirty-One, less LCT 80,207,208,214 plus LCT 276,305,311,33

MGD Firstilla Threnty Sizi (British) (Twelve LCTs)

HMS PRINCESS ASTRID

HMS PRINCE LECPOID

(c) 86.3 Escort Sweeper Group, Commander Block, USNR.

SEER

SENTINEL

POs 543,545,546,550,559,562,626 SOs 497,498,503,506,508,522,526,530,532,533,534,535,638, 639,649,651,655,666,695,696,697,770,771,977,978,979. YMS' 3, 13, 15, 20, 21, 78.

(d) 86.4 JOSS Assault Force, Major General Truscott, U.S.A.

U. S. Army Third Division (reinforced) and attached units.

(e) 86.5 Train.

MORENO

INTENT

RESOLUTE

(f) 86.6 Force Flagship

BISCAYNE (FF)

(g) 86.9 Joint Loading Control, Captain Zimmerli, U.S. Navy.

#### (a) Information.

(1) The area of the Western Naval Task Force is bounded:

On the North, by the parallel of thirty-eight degrees north; On the West, by the meridian of twelve degrees east; On the southwest, by a line drawn one one zero degrees from POINT SPADILLO (PANTELLARIA)

On the Southeast, by a line drawn two two five degrees from RELIGIONE POINT (SICILY).



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HON/JOSS/109

JOSS Operation Plan No. 109-43

- (2) Enemy ports which eventually will come under the control of UNITED STATES forces are PORTO EMPEDOCLE, MARSALA, TRAPANI, and PALERMO. Other ports on the southern coast may be occupied during the early phases of the operation in order to maintain our military forces. Maintenance of our military forces will be undertaken also through the port of STRACUSE as soon as that port is captured and made available to our shipping.
- (3) Fighter coverage will be provided by the North African Coastal Command during movements through the TUNISIAN WAR CHANNEL, and by the Malta Air Command during the northern approach on D minus one day, and by the North African Tactical Command operating from PANTELLARIA early on D day.

#### (b) Assumptions.

- (1) That the initial landing will take place during darkness;
- (2) That strong submarine, E-boat, and air attacks are to be expected;

(3) That mines may be encountered;

- (4) That no harbors will be available and that initial landings must be over beaches;
- (5) That weather conditions will permit landing through the surf on designated beaches;
- (6) That false beaches will not preclude the landing ships and craft from landing on the true beaches.
- 2. This force will firmly establish the JOSS Assault Force in positions ashor on the Island of SICILY by simultaneous attacks on beachheads near LICATA at H hour of D day, in order to assist in seizing and holding SICILY as a base for future operations.

#### 3. (a) Cover and Support Group.

Cover JOSS Attack Force against hostile surface forces. Destroy hostile naval units. Destroy hostile shore batteries, LICATA area. Provide own air spot. Furnish gunfire support; Annex F.

#### (b) Landing Craft Group.


Land troops, equipment, and supplies in accordance with Landing Attack Plan at H hour of D day. LCS support the assault waves. Use rockets and smoke as directed. Upon completion, carry out Follow-Up Plan, Annex J. Destroy hostile air, submarine or E-boat units.

#### (c) Escort Sweeper Group.

Support and protect landing craft. Carry out continuous antisubmarine patrol. Destroy hostile air, submarine or E-boat mnits. Sweep ahead of formation and in beach areas for moored mines.

#### (d) JOSS Assault Force.

Execute Landing Attack Plan, Annex G, at H hour of D day.



### SECRET

HON/JOSS/109

JOSS Operation Plan No. 109-43

(e) Train.

Establish pontoon causeway at beach at first light, Annex P. Salvage landing craft. Assist in harbor work.

(f) Force Flagship.

Operate as directed by Commander JOSS Attack Force.

(g) Joint Loading Control.

Organize and control the berthing of landing craft, the loading of troop supplies and vehicles, the movement of landing craft between loading positions and anchorages, for the Assault, Follow-Up and maintenance and supply of the JOSS Attack Force. Assist in the Follow-Up, Maintenance and supply of all Task Forces of the Western Naval Task Force.

- (x)(1) This Operation Plan is effective at zero zero zero GCT, thirty June nineteen hundred forty-three.
- (2) D day will be signalled. H hour is zero two four five.
- (3) The assault is to be pressed home with relentless vigor regardless of loss or difficulty. I direct that this be brought to the attention of every participant in this operation regardless of rank or rating.
- (4) Take every available measure to ensure.
  - (a) earliest warning of submarine attack, and
  - (b) destruction of hostile submarines.
- (5) Take special precautions to ensure early recognition of friendly aircraft. United States aircraft have their white star enclosed in a yellow circle.
- (6) Base on BIZERTE and TUNIS.
- (7) Employ smoke for defense against enemy action and to screen own operations.
- (8) Comply with instructions in Annexes.
- 4. Approach Plan in accordance with Annex A.
  Sortie plans in accordance with Annexes B and S.
  Doctrine and Instructions for Approach and Landing Attack in accordance with Annex D.
  Cruising Dispositions in accordance with Annex E.
  Fire Support in accordance with Annex F.
  Landing Attack in accordance with Annex G.
  Information and Intelligence in Annex I.
  JOSS Follow-Up in accordance with Annex J.
  Return to Embarkation Ports in accordance with Annex K.
  Logistics in accordance with Annex L.
  Evacuation of wounded in accordance with Annex M.



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HON/JOSS/109

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JOSS Operation Plan No. 109-43

5. Use Communication Plan, Annex C.

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Rendezvous: A. CASABLAHCA
                                                           M. SOUSSE
                     B. GIBRALTAR
                                                           N. TRIPOLI
                     C. ORAN
                                                           O. LINOSA
                     D. ARZEW
                                                           P. LAMPEDUSA
                     E. ALGIERS
                                                           Q. PANTELLARIA
                     F. BOUGIE
                                                           R. MALTA
                                                       S. SYRACUSE
                     G. PHILIPPEVILLE
                     H. BONE
                                                           T. RELIGIONE POINT
                     I. BIZERTE
                                                           U. CAPE SCALAMBRI
                     J. CAPE MARINA
                                                           V. SCOGLETTI
                     K. TUNIS
                                                           W. GELA
                     L. CAPE BON
                                                           X. LICATA
                  Y. Lat. 36° 53'
Z. Lat. 36° 07'
BJ. Lat. 36° 41'
CJ. Lat. 36° 54'
JA. act. 36° 40'
JB. Lat. 36° 30'
JC. Lat. 36° 42'
                                                   N. Long. 13° 50' E.
N. Long. 13° 30' E.
                                                   N,
                                                           Long. 12° 52' E.
                                                   N.
                                                           Long. 120 00' E.
                                                           Long. 12° 00' E.
                                                   N.
                  JB. Lat. 36° 30' N. Long. 12° 56' E.

JC. Lat. 36° 42' N. Long. 13° 50' E.

KC. Lat. 37° 09.4' N. Long. 10° 06! E.

KD. Lat. 36° 51.6' N. Long. 11° 05.7' E.

KE. Lat. 36° 51.6' N. Long. 11° 14' E.

KF. Lat. 36° 31.2' N. Long. 11° 00' E.

NK. Lat. 34° 09' N. Long. 13° 49' 30" E.

NR. Lat. 35° 57' N. Long. 13° 45' E.

NS. Lat. 36° 00' N. Long. 14° 00' E
                  KD. Lat. 37° 09.4' N.

KE. Lat. 36° 51.6' N.

KF. Lat. 36° 31.2' N.

NK. Lat. 34° 09' N.
                  NR. Lat. 35° 57' N. Long. 13° 45' E. NS. Lat. 36° 00' N. Long. 14° 00' E.
                  NU. Lat. 37° 15' N. Long. 10° 25.5' E. RA. Lat. 36° 04' N. Long. 14° 07' E.
                                                         Long. 140 00' E.
                  RB. Lat. 36° 09' N.
                  RC. Lat. 36° 15' N. Long. 14° 00' E.
                  RD. Lat. 36° 12' N. Long. 13° 53' E.
                  RE. Lat. 37° 00'
                                                  N. Long. 13° 56' E.
                  RF. Lat. 36° 50'
                                                           Long. 13° 56' E.
                                                  N.
                  RG. Lat. 37° 17' N.
                                                           Long. 10° 42' E.
                  RH. Lat. 36° 49' 30" H. Long. 11° 22' E. RI. Lat. 37° 00' H. Long. 14° 00' E
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
Make action reports in accordance Commander U.S. Naval Forces' Confidential Letter One CHARLIE LOVE dash Borty Three and Commander Amphibious Force's Confidential Instructions CHARLIE Four dash Forty-Three. Make reports of serious damage to ships in accordance with Commander U.S. Naval Force's Confidential Letter Two CHARLIE LOVE dash Forty-Three.

Commander JOSS A tack Force (Commander Task Force Eighty-Six) in BISCAYNE.

The short title of this Operation Plan is HON/JOSS/109.



Richard L. Conolly, Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy, mmander JOSS Attack Force.



JOSS Operation Plan No. 109-43

# UNGLASSIED

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#### ANNEXES

- Approach Plan (Operation Plan No. 110-43) (HON/JOSS/110).
- Bizerte JOSS Sortie Plan (Operation Plan No. 111-43) (HON/JOSS/111).
- C. Communication Plan (Operation Plan No. 112-43) (HON/JOSS/112).
- D. Doctrine and Instructions for Approach and Landing Attack
- (Operation Plan No. 113-43)(HON/JOSS/113) Cruising Dispositions (Operation Plan No. 114-43)(HON/JOSS/114).
- Fire Support Plan (Operation Plan No. 115-43)(HON/JOSS/115).
- Landing Attack Plan (Operation Plan No. 116-43)(HON/JOSS/116).
- Bizerte Sousse LCI Sortie Plan (Operation Plan No. 117-43) (HON/JOSS/117
- Information and Intelligence Annex (Operation Plan No.118-43)(1901) (HON/JOSS/118).
- JOSS Follow-Up Plan (Operation Plan No. 119-43) (HON/JOSS/119). J.
- K. Return to Embarkation Ports Plan (Operation Plan No. 120-43)( (HON/JOSS/120).
- Logistic Plan (Operation Plan No. 121-43) (HON/JOSS/121). L.
- Medical Plan (Operation Plan No. 122-43) (HON/JOSS/122). Μ.
- N.
- 0. Pontoon Causeway Plan (Operation Plan No. 125-43)(HON/JOSS/125). P.
- Q. R.
- Sousse LCI Sortie Plan (Operation Plan No. 128-43) (HON/JOSS/128).

#### DISTRIBUTION:

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S. H. HAHN.

Acting Flag Secretary.

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WESTERN NAVAL TASK FORCE, JOSS ATTACK FORCE, U.S.S. BISCAYNE, FLAGSHIP

HON/JOSS/117

# 1800:

JOSS Sortie Plan Bizerte-Sousse LCI Unit No. 117-43

ANNEX HOW TO JOSS ATTACK FORCE OPERATION PLAN NO. 109-43

# TASK ORGANIZATION .

Tunisia JOSS Fast Conyoy, Commander Sabin, U.S. Navy. (a)!\86\111

> LCI Flotilla Two less LCI 32, LCI Flotilla Four less LCI 86, 88, 95, 96.

86.1121 Screen, Commander Block, USNR.

SEER PC 543, 550, 559, 562

# 1. (a) Information.

- (1) The port of SUUSSE has been designated as the final staging port of all LCI(L)s of the WESTERN NAVAL TASK FORCE.
- (2) LCI(L)s have been assigned to other Task Forces and Task Groups of the WESTEN NAVAL TASK FORCE as follows:

Reserve Group - LCI Division Five

LCI Division Six less LCI 76

16 British LCI(L)s

Dime Attack Force - LCI Division One

LCI Division Three

LCI Division Four

LCI Seventy-Six

Cent Attack Force - LCI Division Two

- (3) LCI(L)s of other Task Forces and Task Groups will arrive TUNIS by July one, nineteen hundred forty three.
- (4) Commander Task Group Eighty point Six (Reserve), Commander Task Force Eighty-One (Dime), and Commander Task Force Eighty-Five (Cent) have been directed by Commander WESTERN NAVAL TASK FORCE to organize their LOI(L)s with escorts into an appropriate convoy, capable of maintaining fourteen knots/
- (5) When directed by Commander Task Force Eighty-Six (Joss), LCI(L) convoys of Task Group Eighty point Six, Task Force Eighty-One, and Task Force Eighty-Five will sail from TUNIS and rendezvous with the TUNISIA JOSS Fast Convoy (Task Force Eighty-Six) in position NAN UNCIE, Latitude three seven dash one five North and Longitude one zero.dash two five point five East and proceed to SOUSSE.
- (6) Special air coverage will not be available.

#### (b) Assumptions.

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HON/JOSS/117

JOSS Sortic Plan Bizerto-Sousse LCI Unit No. 117-43

ANNEX HOW TO JOSS ATTACK FORCE OPERATION PLAN NO. 109-43

This Unit will sortic from BIZERTE, TUNISIA, and upon clearing BIZERTE will form Cruising Disposition, proceed via the TUNISIAN WAR CHANNEL to rendezvous with KOOL, DIME and CENT LCIs which sortie from TUNIS and proceed SOUSSE.

#### (a) Tunisia JOSS Fast Convoy. 3.

Get underway and proceed out of swept channel in order of Beach Units: RED, GREEN, YELLOW, BIVE, RESERVE. Distance three hundred fifty yards. Leading ship pass through Point XRAY at zero hour. Upon passing through Point ZEBRA, take course for Point KING CHARLIE in TUNISIAN WAR CHANNEL, and form cruising disposition of Beach Units, left to right. Rendezvous with Cent, Dime and Kool LCI(L) convoys at point NAN UNCLE. Arrive off SOUSSE prior nineteen thirty.

# (b) Screen.

Get underwat and pass through Point XRAY at minus forty minutes. Thereafter screen convoy.

- (x)(1) This Plan is effective at zero zero zero one, three July, but date of departure from BIZERTE will be designated by dispatch. hour is zero five one five.
- (2) Point XRAY is Latitude thirty-seven degrees, sixteen minutes north; Longitude nine degrees, fifty-two point five minutes east.
- (3) Point ZEBRA is Latitude thirty-seven degrees, seventeen point five minutes North; Longitude nine degrees, fifty-five minutes east.
- (4) Point KING CHARLIE is Latitude thirty-seven degrees, seventeen point six minutes north; Longitude ten degrees, zero six minutes East.
- (5) Point NAN UNCLE is Latitude thirty-seven degrees, fifteen minutes North, Longitude ten degrees twenty-five point five minutes East.
- (6) Use maximum speed to keep closed up.
- (7) Take every available measure to ensure:
  - (a) Earliest warning of submarine or air attack,
  - (b) destruction of hostile submarines or aircraft.
- (8) Prepare for departure from SOUSSE on Dog minus two.
- (9) While at soa during daylight, maintain battery continuously in Condition of Recliness Two except when in Condition One.
- (a) Fuel all LCIs to four thousand gallons. Water all LCIs to seven 4. thousand gallons. Provide a normal magazine fill. Provision for Naval personnel for seven days; and provide soup and coffee for Army per sonnel on board. Carry one drum lubricating oil. Land all non-essential manageral and special properties and special properties which shall be issued by LCI Type •Commander

LCB/A16-3 Serial: 0019 Op





HON/JOSS/117

JOSS Sortio Plan Bizerte-Sousse ICI U. t No. 117-43

ANNEX HOW TO JOSS ATTACK FORCE OPERATION PLAN NO. 109-43.

- (b) Upon receipt of sailing notice, all ships shall paint a five-foot square on each side of the Pilot House of the color of their beach. RESERVE Units shall paint a black square. A white vertical bar one foot in width shall be painted through the middle of all squares.
- (c) Troops are to be disembarked at SOUSSE for a period of one day.
- 5. Use Communication Plan, Annex CHARLIE to JOSS Attack Force Operation Plan One Hundred Nine dash Forty-Three.

Rendezvous is at Point NAN CHARLIE.

Commander JOSS Attack Force in BISCAYNE.

The short title of this order is HON/JOSS/117.

R. L. CONOLLY, Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy, Commander JOSS Attack Force.

# DISTRIBUTION:

List 1

NOIC Sousse (3)

FOIC Bizerte

S. H. HAHN,

Acting Flag Secretary.

LCB/A16→3 Serial: 0022 Op



WESTERN NAVAL TASK FORCE, JOSS ATTACK FORCE, L.S. BISCAYNE, FLAGSHIP.

BIZERTE, TUNISIA, June 22, 1943; 1800.

JOSS Salvage Plan No. 123-43 ANNEX "NAN" TO JOSS ATTACK FORCE OPERATION PLAN NO. 109043.

# TASK ORGANIZATION

(a) JOSS Offshore Salvage Unit, Commander Imlay, U.S.C.G.R.

MORENO RESOLUTE INTENT

(b) JOSS Shore Side Salvage Unit, Lieutenant Ennis, USNR.

Assigned LCVPs and tractor.

# 1. (a) Information.

(1) Large numbers of landing craft will be required to beach on unfavorable beach gradients in carrying out Operation HUSKY.

# (b) Assumptions.

- (1) A number of landing craft will be unable to retract without assistance.
- (2) The Shore Regiment will make available dukws and tractors to assist off-shore salvage efforts.
- 2. This unit will salvage JOSS landing craft commencing with daylight on D day.

# 3. (a) JOSS Offshore Salvage Unit.

MORENO. As directed on D day the MORENO wdeliver her pontoon causeway. As soon as this is successfully completed, MORENO commence salvage efforts. As soon as the RESERVE unit has landed troops and supplies and the convoy and escort is organized for return to BIZERTE, Commander JOSS Salvage Unit will shift from his flagship, LCI 87, to the MORENO.

RESOLUTE. Salvage craft on RED Beach and when LICATA is captured assist in opening net booms and clearing port.

INTENT. Salvage craft YELLOW beach.

#### (b) JOSS Shore Side Salvage Unit.

Land at daylight or as soon as enemy and resistance at beachhead is overcome and commence salvage work. Concentrate on LCVP that still have power, rudder and propellers available.

(x) (1) Gather together such equipment that will be required to expedite salvage work and as may be obtainable prior to sortie.



HON/JOSS/123

JOSS Salvage Plan No. 123-43 ANNEX "NAN" TO JOSS ATTACK FORCE OPERATION PLAN NO. 109-43 (Cont'd)

(2) Comply with the following directive from ComNavNAW:

"A stranded boat is to be refloated and put back in service as early and as quickly as possible. If it is impossible to return the boat to service in time to permit its further use in the current operations, the following is to be done:

- a. Strip the boat of all useful equipment and material.
- b. Boat crew reports to the nearest Beachmaster who, at his discretion is to put them to useful employment such as replacing boat crew casualties, or return them to their ships or to other naval commands afloat.
- c. In no case are boat crews of stranded boats to be allowed to become "stragglers". They are to be kept employed to advantage."
- 4. (a) Fuel and water to capacity.
  - (b) Provision for two weeks.
  - (c) Other ships and landing craft of the JOSS Attack Force assist the salvage unit by providing them with essential supplies or gear upon request.
  - (d) All LSTs are available for returning disabled LCWP to BIZERTE in case their davit heads are not all full with their own boats.
- 5. Use Communications Plan, Annex CHARLIE to JOSS Attack Force Operation Plan One Hundred Nine dash Forty-Three.

Commander JOSS Attack Force in U.S.S. BISCAYNE.

The short title of this order is HON/JOSS/123.

RICHARD L. CONOLLY, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Commander JOSS Attack Force.

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List 1

Acting Flag Secretary.

LCB/A16-3 Serial 0015 Op



HON/JOSS/121

JOSS Operation Plan No. 121-43.

. BISCAYNE, FLAGSHIP.

BIZERTE, TUNISIA, June 20, 1943; 1800.

ANNEX "LOVE" TO JOSS ATTACK FORCE OPERATION PLAN NO. 109-43.

I. WATER.

- (a) Drinking water shall be rationed as necessary by all landing craft.
- (b) Landing craft shall water as provided in their Sortie Plans and subsequently as directed in the JOSS Follow-Up Plan.
- (c) The ten LSTs listed below shall provide themselves with sufficient hose having a quick-closing valve on shore to discharge water one hundred feet inland from the shore line when the LST is unloading cargo over a three hundred. fifty foot pontoon causeway. These ISTs shall be prepared to discharge ten thousand gallons of water on the Assemble Landing and larger quantities on each subsequent Follow-Up depending on whether discharge takes place alongside of a dock or over a favorable beach gradient. Any modifying instructions in this latter regard will be transmitted to Commander Joint Loading Control by Commander JOSS Attack Force.

LST	318		IST	383
	326			385
	327	•		386
	332			387
	347			388


- (d) All LSTs and larger craft shall water LCTs at every opportunity.
- (e) All LSTs shall fill water drums or cans carried in LCTs, LCMs or LCVPs.
- (f) Each ship and craft shall fill the canteens of the assault troops immediately prior to disembarkation.

#### 2 PROVISIONS, CLOTHING AND SMALL STORES

- (2) Provisions: Landing craft shall provision as provided in Sortie Plan and JOSS Follow-Up Plan.
- (b) Clothing and Small Stores: Emergency stocks of clothing and small stores requisitioned on May 1, 1943, have not arrived in the area, but may be available at Bizerte and Tunis laber.

#### 3. DRYDOCKING FACILITIES.

- (a) Drydocks other than Pontoon Dry Docks:
  - (1) The demand for drydocking ships in the Mediterranean is far in excess of available facilities. Drydocking will be arranged, therefore, only in cases of extreme emergency and for such periods as may be necessary.
  - (2) Requests for drydocking shall be sent by despatch to Commander JOSS Attack Force, who will take any necessary further action.
- (3) The use of the small drydock at AATB Tunis will be controlled by Commander Advance Bases and Training Group, Tunisia.



HON/JOSS/121

JOSS Operation Plan No. 121-43. ANNEX "LOVE" TO JOSS ATTACK FORCE OPERATION PLAN NO. 109-43 (Cont'd)

(b) Pontoon Drydocks:

250-ton
(1) One/dry dock is available at Bizerte for dry docking LCI(L)s, LCT(5)s, and ship-borne landing craft,
One 150-ton drydock is available at Bizerte for drydocking PTs and ARBs.

(2) Requests for the use of pontoon dry dock shall be sent by despatch via Task Force Commanders to Commanding Officer, Advanced Amphibious Training Base, Bizerte.

# 4. SHIP REPAIR FACILITIES.

- (a) Ship repair facilities are overtaxed and repair requests must be restricted to emergency items of military necessity.
- (b) Repair facilities normally available as adjuncts to dry docking facilities and naval bases are augmented in Mors el Kebir, Oran and Algiers by local private concerns. The quality of the work is generally good. Due to recent damage in Tunisia, it is likely that the facilities at Ferryville will be limited and that none of the graving docks at that port will be available.
  - (c) Repair ships will be stationed as follows:

U.S.S. DELTA (AR9)
U.S.S. VULCAN (AR5)
U.S.S. ACHELOUS (ARL 1)
H.M.S. WATLAND
H.M.S. VINDICTIVE
H.M.S. MAIDSTONE
Algiers

Note: USS VULCAN is assigned primarily as a tender and repair ship for CLs and DDs. Spare propellers for DDs have been requested and will be stored at Gibraltar and at Casablanca. Specific data may be obtained from Naval Commander Western Task Force.

(d) In addition to the main repair bases, the following small repair bases on shore at locations named are available for types of ships and craft as follows:

UNITED STAT	res_	NAVY	<u>-</u>								
BIZERTE	,	PC,	SC, Y	MS, L	ST, LC	I(L);	, LCI	(5),	PT	and	AVR.
ARZEW					ST, LC	$I(\Gamma)$	and	LCT (	5).		
BENI SAF		PC,	SC an	d YMS							
TUNIS	)										
TENES	(			•				0	L		
CHERCHEL	)		Manor	repa:	irs to	Tano	aing	crai	G .		
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HON/JOSS/121

JOSS Operation Plan No. 121-43.

ANNEX "LOVE" TO JOSS ATTACK FORCE OPERATION PLAN NO. 109-43 (Cont'd)

# 4. SHIP REPAIR FACILITIES (Contid)

ROYAL NAVY
MALTA, BOUGIE, DJENDJELLI, BONE, FERRYVILLE, SOUSSE and SFAX
are equipped to effect repairs to ISTs and landing craft.

Minor repairs can be made also at PHILLIPVILLE and TRIPOLI.

Note: U.S. Navy PT Base No. 12 for Motor Torpedo Boat Squadron FIFTEEN is located at Bizerte.

Royal Navy Motor Torpedo Boat Squadron Bases are located at Bone and Malta.

# 5. MAINTENANCE OF LANDING CRAFT IN VICINITY OF GELA

- (a) Following the assault and for an indefinite period thereafter, merchant ships and coastal vessels will be unloaded while lying off beaches in the vicinity of GELA.
- (b) LCT(5)s from JOSS Attack Force are being made available to assist in the unloading of ships at GELA.
- (c) All diesel-powered ships operating in the vicinity of GELA and all landing craft engaged in unloading ships shall fuel to capacity from LSTs at every opportunity when LSTs are present.
- (d) During periods when LSTs are not available for fueling smaller landing craft, a reserve supply of 400 tons of Diesel Oil will be available for this purpose. This reserve supply with necessary piping or hose, pumps and fittings will be provided by Commander Advanced Base Group, and depending on circumstances will be stored in tanks erected near the beaches at GELA or in tanks erected on pontoon barge(s) moored off such beaches.
- (e) To insure continuous operation and maintenance of landing craft operating in the GELA area the following items with necessary personnel will be provided by Commander Advanced Base Group, and will serve to augment the landing craft emergency repair facilities and personnel of the Shore Party:
  - (1) Mobile Repair Unit (as modified)
  - (2) Unit for hoisting landing craft stranded on beaches.
  - (3) Spare parts including spare propellers.
  - (4) Tools.
  - (5) Lubricating oils and greases,
  - (6) Distilled water for batteries.
  - (7) Fresh water for engine cooling.
  - (8) One (1) 250-ton pontoon drydock may be transferred from Bizerte to Gela or Licata should conditions warrant.



LCB/A16-3 Serial 0015 Op



HON/JOSS/121

JOSS Operation Plan No. 121-43.

ANNEX "LOVE" TO JOSS ATTACK FORCE
"OPERATION PLAN NO. 109-43 (Cont'd)

# 5. MAINTENANCE OF LANDING CRAFT IN VICINITY OF GELA (Cont'd)

- (f) When requested, and as may be practicable, Commander Task Force 86 will transfer to Commander Advanced Base Group, LCVPs, LCS(S) and LCT(5)s with their crews, together with pontoon causeways and such other material as may be required for the operation of captured ports.
- (g) Bulk gasoline storage is to be erected by the Army near GELA. Commander Advanced Base Group will designate an officer for liaison with the Army in connection with this project. It is expected that shore tankage and pipe lines will be completed by D plus fourteen and that tankers will discharge quantities of 100 octane and 80 octane gasoline as required by the Army. Forces afloat in the GELA area shall render assistance to gasoline tankers as may be necessary.

# 6. AMMUNITION.

(a) Ammunition for CLs, DDs, and for landing craft is available at the Advanced Amphibious Training Base, Bizerte or Advanced Amphibious Training Base, Tunis.

The short title of this order is HON/JOSS/121.

RICHARD L. CONOLLY, Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy, Commander JOSS Attack Force.

DISTRIBUTION:

List 1.

Acting Flag Secretary.

DINGEREN

LCB/A16-3 Serial: 006 Op



WESTERN NAVAL TASK FORCE, JOSS ATTACK FORCE, U.S.S. BISCAYNE, FLAGSHIP.

BIZERTE, TUNISIA, June 20, 1943; 1800

HON/JOSS/111

JOSS Sortie Plan
Bizerte-JOSS Units
No. 111-43

ANNEX "BAKER" TO JOSS ATTACK FORCE OPERATION PLAN NO. 109-43.

# TASK ORGANIZATION

(a) 86.121 Tunisia JOSS Medium Convoy, Commander Nelson, U.S. Navy.

86.1211 Landing Craft, Commander Morris, U.S. Navy.

LST Group Two less LST 381 LST Group Three less LST 4 LST Group Six LST Division Seven LGI 32.86.88.95. 96

86.1212 Screen, Commander Huber, U.S. Navy.

Destroyer Division TWENTY-SIX PC 545, 546, 626 SC 497, 498, 503, 506, 508, 522

86.1213 Mine Sweepers, Lieutenant Taylor, U.S.N.R.

YMS 3, 13, 15, 20, 21, 78

(b) 86.122 <u>Turmisia JOSS Slow Convoy</u>, (Commander Destroyer Squadron THIRTEEN)

86,1221 Landing Craft, Lieut.Comdr. Freese, U.S.N.R.

LCT Flotilla Nine
LCT Flotilla Ten
LCT Group Thirty-one less LCT 80, 207, 208, 214
plus LCT 276, 305, 311, 332
LCT Flotilla Twenty-Six (British - 12 LCT(4))
MORENO
RESOLUTE
INTENT

86.1222 Screen, (Commanding Officer, USS BUCK)

BUCK SENTINEL SC 526, 532, 533, 534, 535, 638, 639, 649, 651, 530 655, 666, 695, 696, 697, 770, 771, 977, 978, 979. LCG(L) British (Eight) LCF(L) British (Nine)

(c) 86.123 Tunisia JOSS Ranger Convoy, Rear Admiral Dubose, U.S. Navy.

86.1231 Cruisers, Captain Wilkes, U.S. Navy.

BIRMINGHAM BROOKLYN LCB/A16-3 Serial: 006 Op

# UNGLASSIFIED

BIGOTES TO THE

HON/JOSS/111

JOSS Scrtie Plan <u>Bizerte-JOSS Units</u> No. 111-43

ANNEX "BAKER" TO JOSS ATTACK FORCE OPERATION PLAN NO. 109-43 (Cont'd)

86.1232 Landing Ships. (Senior Officer Present, Royal Navy)

HMS PRINCESS ASTRID

HMS PRINCE LEOPOLD

HMS PRINCESS CHARLOTTE (Temporary assignment only)

HMS PRINCE CHARLES

86.1233 Screen, (Commander Destroyer Division Twenty-Five)

Destroyer Division Twenty-Five.

# 1. (a) Information

- (1) Except for the <u>Tunisia JOSS Ranger Convoy</u>, the JOSS Attack Force has been assembled in the BIZERTE Area for the purpose of loading troops and supplies for Operation HUSKY.
- (2) Air coverage of four to six planes will be furnished by the North African Coastal Command (U.S.) during movements through the TUNISIAN WAR CHANNEL, and by the MALTA Air Command (British) during D minus one day.
- (3) KMF Eighteen, a convoy of nine ships proceeding to the eastward, is expected to pass CANI ROCKS just before daylight on D minus two and NCF One, a convoy of thirty combat loaders, is scheduled to be off CANI ROCKS at zero six hundred on D minus two. Both are proceeding via the TUNISIAN WAR CHANNEL.
- (4) Mines may exist inside the three-fathom line, along the coast of BIZERTE ROADS between longitude ten degrees east and CAPE ZEBIB.


#### (b) Assumptions

- (1) Enemy submarines may be present.
- (2) Enemy air attacks may develop.
- (3) Enemy mines may be encountered.
- 2. These units will sortie from BIZERTE, TUNISIA, and upon clearing BIZERTE will anchor in BIZERTE ROADS over night and then get underway, form Cruising Dispositions and proceed via the TUNISIAN WAR CHANNEL and designated routes to a rendezvous with the Tunisia JOSS Fast Convoy off MALTA.

# 3. (a) Tunisia JOSS Medium Convoy.

Landing Craft. Get underway and proceed out of harbor through swept channel as soon as loading of personnel is completed on D minus three and as far as is practicable, in order of Beach units: RED, GREEN, YELLOW, BLUE, RESERVE. Distance five hundred yards. Upon arrival at Point ZEBRA proceed to assigned anchorage in BIZERTE ROADS. Maintain watch on deck and be ready to get underway on ten minutes notice. At zero five hundred on D minus two underway by Beach Units and form Cruising Disposition SUGAR. Keep to southward of the TUNISIAN WAR CHAMNEL until formed up or convoy NCF One has passed to the eastward.

LCB/A16.3 Serial: 006 Op



UNGLASSIED

HON/JOSS/111

<u>JOSS Sortie Plan</u>
Bizerte-JOSS Units
No. 111-43

ANNEX "BAKER" TO JOSS ATTACK FORCE OPERATION PLAN NO. 109-43 (Contid)

Screen. Get underway and proceed out of harbor through swept channel in order - Destroyers, PCs, SCs. Leading ship pass through Point XRAY at twelve hundred, D minus three. Distance three hundred fifty yards. Upon arrival at Point ZEBRA, patrol on the northern and eastern sides of the LST anchorages. Maintain ample patrol throughout the night in welldefined lanes. Prior to Sortie Coordinate patrol lanes after twenty hundred D minus three with Commander Screen of TJM Convoy and Commander Screen of Ranger Convoy. Units not assigned patrols may be anchored, ready to get underway on ten minutes notice. Screening unit keep to the eastward of the eastward boundary of the BIZERTE swept channel and to the southward of a line drawn due east and west from CANI ROCKS. Do not anchor in the TUNISIAN WAR CHANNEL. Keep well clear of the TUNISIAN WAR CHANNEL between zero two hundred and the passage of the KMF Eighteen and NCF One convoys on D minus two. At zero four forty-five, D minus two, get underway by Beach Units and form Screen of Cruising Disposition SUGAR. Keep to the south side of the TUNISIAN WAR CHANNEL until formed up or convoy NCF One has passed to eastward.

Mine Sweepers. Get underway and proceed out of harbor through swept channel. Leading ship pass through Point XRAY at eleven hundred, D minus three. Distance three hundred fifty yards. Upon arrival at Point ZEBRA proceed to assigned anchorage in BIZERTE ROADS. Maintain readiness to get underway on ten minutes notice. At zero five hundred, D minus two, underway and take position in Cruising Disposition SUGAR. Keep to southward of TUNISIAN WAR CHANNEL until formed up or convoy NCF One has passed to eastward.

# (b) Tunisia JOSS Slow Convoy.

Landing Craft. LCTs assigned to RED, GREEN and YELLOW Beaches get underway and proceed out of harbor through the swept channel in order of Beach Units, RED, GREEN and YELLOW. Leading LCT pass through Point XRAY at seventeen hundred, D minus three. Distance two hundred fifty yards. Upon arrival at Point ZEBRA proceed to assigned anchorage in BIZERTE ROADS. At zero five thirty, D minus two, underway and form Cruising Disposition CHARLIE. Leading LCT shall maintain a speed not less than seven knots until east of longitude ten degrees east before slowing to five knots to permit rest of LCTs to form up in the Cruising Disposition. LCTs assigned to BLUE and RESERVE Beach Units get underway so as to pass through Point XRAY at zero five thirty, D minus two. Upon arrival Point ZEBRA form Cruising Disposition CHARLIE. Tugs proceed out with LCTs. MORENO test out towing pontoons in LAG DE BIZERTE well in advance sortie.

Screen. Get underway and proceed out of harbor through the swept channel in order Destroyers, LCF(L), LCG(L), AMs, and 10 SCs. Leading escort unit pass through Point XRAY at twenty hundred, D minus three. Distance three hundred yards. LCF(L) and LCG(L) anchor in assigned berths in BIZERTE ROADS. Maintain ample patrol on the western side of the LCT and LST Anchorage in well-defined lanes. Prior to sortic coordinate patrol lanes after twenty hundred D minus three with Commander Screen of TJM Convoy and Commander Screen Ranger Convoy. Units not assigned patrol may be anchored. Commander JOSS Slow Convoy at discretion may have the AMs and designated SCs sortic last in order to assist in clearing harbor of LCTs and keeping them closed up.



HON/JOSS/111

JOSS Sortie Plan Bizerte-JOSS Units No. 111-43

ANNEX "BAKER" TO JOSS ATTACK FORCE OPERATION PLAN NO. 109-43 (Cont'd)

# (c) Tunisia JOSS Ranger Convoy.

Cruisers. Proceed with NCF One convoy, as may be directed by Commander CENT.

Landing Craft. Get underway and proceed out of BIZERTE HARBOR. Distance five hundred yards. Leading LSI(L) pass through Point XRAY at thirteen thirty. Anchor in assigned berths in LST anchorage in BIZERTE ROADS. Underway at zero four forty-five to join NCF One convoy as it passes CANI ROCKS.

Screen. Two destroyers proceed with NCF One convoy from ORAN. Other two destroyers which will be in BIZERTE get underway and proceed out of harbor through swept channel. Leading destroyer pass through Point XRAY at ten thirty D minus three. Patrol LST anchorages in BIZERTE ROADS. Prior to Sortie Coordinate patrol lanes after twenty hundred D minus three with those of Commander Screen for TJM convoy and TJS convoy. Screen landing craft when they get underway on D minus two to join NCF One convoy. Join screen of NCF One as directed.

- (x) (1) This Operation Plan is in effect at zero zero zero one, three July.
  - (2) D day will be signalled.
  - (3) Take every available measure to ensure, (a) earliest warning of submarine or air attack, and (b) destruction of hostile submarines or aircraft.
  - (4) Use maximum speed to keep closed up.
- (a) Fuel all escort sweeper craft to capacity.
  - (b) Fuel all LSTs to thirty thousand gallons. Water LSTs 318, 326, 327, 332, 333, 347, 383, 386, 387, 388 to twenty-five thousand gallons. Water all remaining LSTs to fifteen thousand gallons. Provide a normal magazine fill. Provision for Naval personnel for seven days; for embarked Army personnel for three days. Land all non-essential material and supplies and bring landing craft to beach draft in accordance with special instructions which shall be issued by LST Type Commanders.
  - (c) Fuel all LCTs to capacity. Each LCT carry in addition to tank capacity four barrels of fuel oil. Each LCT carry one drum of lubricating oil. Water all LCTs to capacity of water tanks and fill one ballast tank with potable water. Provision for Naval personnel for seven days for twenty-two officers and men. Provide coffee and soup for embarked Army personnel. Transfer from LCT relief crews one additional officer and four additional enlisted men of appropriate rates prior to departure.
  - (d) Upon receipt of sailing notice all ships paint a five-foot square on each side of the pilot house of the color of their beach. RESERVE units the paint a black square, white vertical bar one foot in width shall be painted through the middle of the square.



HON/JOSS/111

JOSS Sortie Plan Bizerte JOSS Units No. 111-43



ANNEX "BAKER" TO JOSS ATTACK FORCE OPERATION PLAN NO. 109-43 (Cont'd)

- (e) While at sea during daylight LSTs maintain battery continuously in Condition of Readiness Two, except when in Condition One.
- 5. Use Communication Plan, Annex CHARLIE to JOSS Operation Plan One Hundred Nine dash Forty-Three, Use Zone Baker time.

Commander JOSS Attack Force in USS BISCAYNE.

The short title of this order is HON/JOSS/111.

Richard L. Conolly, Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy, Commander JOSS Attack Force.

# DISTRIBUTION:

List 2

FOIC Bizerte (5)

SOIS

AATB Bizerte (5)

AATB Tunis (5)

Com.AAB&TG Tunisia (5)

S. H. HAHN,

Acting Flag Secretary.



Headquarters Force 343 A.P.O. 758, U.S. Army 20 June 1943

10626

a din

Annex No. II to FO No. 1

#### INTELLIGENCE ANNEX

Maps: OPN Map (Annex I) to FO #1.

# 1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

- a. See G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation #4 (to be issued by Y-day) as supplemented by Air Intelligence Estimate, Hq XII ASC, 14 June 1943 issued as G-2 General Information Bulletin No. 18, 18 June 1943, Hq 343.
  - b. See Battle Order of Sicily (to be issued by Y-day), this Headquarters.
  - c. See collation map of defenses correct to 19 June 1943, this Headquarters.

# 2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

# a. NAVY.

- (1) Status of alertness of enemy Navy? Submarine, PT boats, Seibel ferries activities?
- (2) Details of location, calibers, etc., enemy land and shore batteries? Firing efficiency?
- (3) Underwater defenses, mines, wiring, etc. How are mines controlled?

#### b. GROUND FORCES.

- (1) Identifications, troops weapons, calibers? Nationality and units? General status of equipment? Status of local maintenance reserves?
- (2) Sabotage, demolition, mines, booby-traps, wire? Location of mine fields and road blocks? Condition of utilities (railway, electrical, telephone and telegraph, water)? Water pollution? Condition of wells, springs and streams?
- (3) Location of troop reserves? Location of reinforcements? (Prisoners of war and civilian reports).
- (4) Military attitude (type and quality of resistance)? Civilian attitude? Gas masks being worn by civilians or military?
- (5) Location and type of armored trains? Tanks encountered, type, German or Italian?
- (6) Air activity? (Type, time, number, direction of flight, and results achieved)?





- (7) Status airfields and airfield supplies and equipment? Results of our bombings prior to and during operation?
  - (8) Terrain and road information for map correction?

# c. AIR AND AIRBORNE.

- (1) Nature and type of enemy air activity?
- (2) See 2 <u>b</u>. (1); 2 <u>b</u>. (6); 2 <u>b</u>. (7).
- (3) Location of unmapped terrain features (lakes, rivers, defiles).

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- (4) Troop movements on roads, direction, type and wolume? Emphasis on movements to East and South. (Road congestion, military and civilian, by location). Location of armored trains and tank units?
- (5) Intensity and type of antiaircraft fire?
- (6) Enemy water movements (time, number and direction, emphasis on activity in Straits of Messina).

# d. METEOROLOGICAL.

- (1) Forecasts as to visibility, humidity, high and low pressure areas, wind directions and velocity. Temperatures.
- (2) Effects of forecasts on streams, employment of chemical smoke and actual smoke due to burning, and visual observation?

#### 3. RECONNAISSANCE AND PHOTOGRAPHIC MISSIONS.

- a. Visual air observation and spot photo sorties by XII Air Support Command through Air Support Party channels. One mission (two sorties) reserved for JOSS, two missions (four sorties) reserved for SHARK daily until noon, unless this Headquarters otherwise advised, as if and when available.
- b. Air Reconnaissance photographic sorties by PRU detachment, NAPRW, under direct control of AC of S, G-2 Force 343. Requests direct to AC of S, G-2 Force 343 through channels, (not through Air Support Parties). See G-2 General Information Bulletin #22, 20 June 1943, Hq 343.

# 4. MEASURES FOR HANDLING PRISONERS AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS.

During initial phase of operations prisoners and captured documents will be examined and disposed of by Sub-Task Force Headquarters. (See Annex #1 to Intelligence Plan, 22 April 1943, Hq Task Force 343.) Important information will be transmitted at once. See letter, this Headquarters, same subject.

# 5. MAPS, PHOTOGRAPHS AND MOSAICS.

Maps will be issued as provided in Annex No. 4 to G-2 Intelligence Plan, this Headquarters, 27 May 1943. See also amendment 21 June 1943, Hq 343, to Annex #4 of G-2 Intelligence Plan.

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# 6. MISCELLANEOUS

- a. C.I.C. See G-2 General Information Bulletin #21, 19 June 43, Hq 343.
- b. Photo Reconnaissance and Interpretation Plan. See G-2 General Information Bulletin #14, 14 June 43, Hq 343.
  - c. "J" Service. See letter 1 June 43, Hq 343, same subject.
  - d. P.W.I. See Intelligence Plan referred to in 4 above.
- $\underline{e}$ . Interpreters. None will be provided from Hq 343. See paragraph IV, G-2 General Information Bulletin #11, 12 June 43, Hq 343.

# 7. REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION.

- a. A summary G-2 report will be submitted by Sub-Task Forces daily covering the preceding 24 hour period to 2400B and will reach this Headquarters by 0800B the day following day reported upon, or as seen thereafter as practicable.
- <u>b.</u> Important information pertaining to enemy action against our forces will be transmitted by the most expeditious means to this Headquarters in brief form as spot returns.
- c. Yellow Smoke Grenades will be used by attacking units to designate, "Friendly troops are here".

PATTON, Commanding.

GAY Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

Annex.

KOCH,





22 April 1943.

# INTELLIGENCE PLAN

# OPERATION "BICOT - HUSKY"

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# ANNEXES:

- 1. INTERROGATION OF FRISONERS OF WAR
- 2. COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE
- 3. PUBLIC RELATIONS
- 4. MAP DISTRIBUTION PLAN.







22 April 1943.

#### INTELLIGENCE PLAN

#### OPERATION "BIGOT - HUSKY"

# 1. Summary of the Situation.

- a. See G-2 Estimate No. 1, Headquarters Force 343, dated April 20, 1943.
- <u>b.</u> The above is supplemented for division and higher headquarters by (1) Strategic Engineering Study No. 31. The Island of Sicily, Beaches, Part I; (2) Strategic Engineering Study No. 31, The Island of Sicily, Beaches, Part II; (3) Strategic Engineering Study No. 50, Terrain Intelligence, Sicily.
- <u>c</u>. G-2 Estimate No. 1 is supplemented to include major divisional (sub-task force) units by:
- (1) Outline of intelligence information for West Sicily (prepared by G-2, Hq. 343) (Black Book).
- (2) (a) I.S.I.S. Report on Sicily, CB. 4096H; (b) I.S.I.S. Report on Sicily, CB. 4096H (Plans), Part I; and, (c) I.S.I.S. Report on Sicily, CB. 4096H (Plans), Part II.
  - (3) Gazetteer of Sicily.
- 2. Mission: To assault the western portion of Sicily and capture it as a base for further operations.

\* \* \* \* \* \* \* \*

Incidental thereto, the following are initial major objectives:

- (1) The seizure and securing of the airfield at Castelvetrano, the landing field north of Sciacca, and the capture of the Port of Palermo and adjacent airfields.
  - 3. Essential Elements of Information.

See Intelligence Annex to Field Order No. 1, to be issued at appropriate time.

#### 4. Coordination of Intelligence Activities.

- <u>a.</u> Coordination of intelligence activities will be effected by this headquarters (Force 343) with higher headquarters (Force 141), and adjacent headquarters (Force 545), and Naval and Air Services.
  - b. Coordination of intelligence activities between Headquarters





Force 343 and components of this force (Headquarters VI Corps, Ensa, Fish, Grog, Hook, 3d Division, 36th Division, 45th Division, 2d Armored Division, and 82d Airborne Division, or substitutes) will be normal in channels of command as sub-task forces are constituted.

- 5. <u>Intelligence Agencies</u>, <u>U. S. Army</u>. Normal intelligence agencies in Corps and lower echelons will be augmented by G-2 activities provided for this operation, as follows:
  - a. Prisoner of War Interrogation Teams.
  - b. Signal Intercept Intelligence Services (Radio Intelligence "J"; intercept of friendly radio; and "Y"; intercept of enemy radio).
  - c. Interpreters.
  - d. Translators (at Hq. 343 only).
  - e. Counter-intelligence agencies.
  - f. Public Relations.
  - g. Psychological Warfare Operatives.
  - h. Field Censorship,
- 6. <u>Intelligence Personnel</u>. Fersonnel and special equipment for activities listed in paragraph 5, above, are being provided by this or higher headquarters. Tables are listed under respective activities.

See Paragraph 9 - Prisoner of War Interrogation Teams.

- 10 Signal Intelligence Services.
- " 11 Air Warning Service.
  - 12 Interpreters.
- " 13 Translators.
- " 14 Counter-Intelligence Agencies.
- " 19 Public Relations.
- " 20 Psychological Warfare.

#### 7. Intelligence Training.

- a. Continuous intelligence training of all commands is directed. Enemy Battle Order, organization and tactics will be stressed, as well as an understanding of British Intelligence practices, particularly with reference to abbreviations, variance in nomenclature, conventional symbols and signs, map and coordinate systems. Instruction to all ranks must include thorough familiarity with the British Grid System, in location and description.
- <u>b.</u> Intelligence will habitually be evaluated by source and information as (1) Reliable, (2) Credible, or (3) Doubtful. (See Sec. V. FM 30-5.)
- $\underline{\mathbf{c}}_{ullet}$  The following are equivalents used in classification of documents:

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#### BRITISH

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED equals MOST SECRET

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL





- d. Forms shown in FM 101-5, relating to G-2 activities, will be used as applicable (see AR 345-105).
- 8. Intelligence Funds. Intelligence funds will be furnished to Corps and Division G-2's for purchase of information and other G-2 needs in amounts to be determined and issued at a later date. Intelligence officers of all echelons, down to include divisions, will forward to the A.C. of S., G-2, Hq. Force 343, an estimate of intelligence funds required for this operation as soon as practicable.

# 9. Interrogation of Prisoners of War.

See Annex #1.

#### 10. Signal Intelligence Services.

- a. A "Y" service (equivalent to radio intelligence service, U. S. Army) will be provided. This service is a strict enemy radio intercept and is regulated and coordinated with the Chief Signal Officer, Hq. Force 343, by A. C. of S., G-2, Hq. Force 343.
- <u>b.</u> For proper filtering of traffic intercepted and for deciphering special codes employed by this service, a British cipher team, in strength unknown, will be available for Hq. Force 343, and Hq. VI Corps.
- $\underline{c}$ . Missions and requests for this service for radio surveillance and monitoring of enemy stations or organizations will be requested through  $\Lambda$ . c. of S., G-2, Hq. Force 343.
- d. A small security section for the Headquarters VI Corps is being arranged from personnel of the 57th Signal Battalion.
- e. A "J" service will be provided. This is purely a collecting service whose mission is to report information concerning our own troops, and only such information about the enemy as concerns our tactical dispositions.

#### 11. Air Warning Service.

- $\underline{\mathtt{a}}_{\bullet}$  . The Air Corps is responsible for the coordination of all air warning systems.
- b. During the assault, and as long as ships are lying off the beaches, Radio Direction Finder cover for convoys will be provided. This will be supplemented as soon as possible by warning sets on the beaches.
- .  $\underline{c}$ . As soon as the airdromes are captured, warning sets will be installed.
- d. Stations will be sited as early as possible to provide control for night fighters over the beaches and ships. Provision will also be made to give long-distance warning against low flying attacks from the sea.





- e. Long-distance cover against high flying attacks will be provided during the later stages of the operation.
- f. Wireless Observer Units will be deployed as soon as possible. in order to supplement the Radio Direction Finders.

# 12. Interpreters.

- a. Italian speaking interpreters will be available prior to the commencement of the operation and will be distributed on the following general basis:

  - (1) Hq. Force 343 4 officers, 6 enlisted men.
    (2) Hq. VI Corps 4 officers, 6 enlisted men.
    (3) All divisions 10 officers, 15 enlisted men (each).
    (4) Hq. 343 for Consorship 3 officers.
    (5) Hq. 343 for Psychological Warfare 3 officers.

NOTE: The assignment to divisions is based on 2 officers and 3 enlisted men per regiment, or similar unit.

- b. No transportation is being furnished.
- c. These individuals are not to be confused with Interrogation of Prisoners of War teams, but are linguists only.
- 13. Translation Section. A translator section will operate directly under the A. C. of S., G-2, Hq. Force 343, and is to be provided for that headquarters only, consisting of:

Italian - 1 officer, 3 enlisted men. German - 1 officer, 3 enlisted men. (Attached to 45th Division for travel from U. S.)


Transportation to be furnished: One 3/4-ton weapon carrier.

14. Counter-Intelligence Plan. (See Counter-Intelligence Annex #2.)

# a. General.

- (1) The counter-intelligence annex comprises:
  - (a) Operation of counter-subversive control.

  - (b) Counter-sabotage.
    (c) Operations of counter-intelligence detachments. field security detachments, and port security detachments.
  - (d) Priority of security missions.
  - (e) Censorship.
  - (f) Signal Security measures.
- (2) Counter-subversive activities will be regulated through division G-2's; counter-sabotage initially by assignment of tactical missions through tactical troops.



# b. Preliminary Cover Plan.

(1) General.



- (a) Higher headquarters are operating a Preliminary Cover Plan designed to:-
  - (i) Retard the reinforcement of Sicily by German troops.
  - (ii) Reduce air and naval attacks on HUSKY shipping from D minus 7.
  - (iii) Keep the Italian Fleet to the east of the Straits of Messina.


After the preliminary phase, Force 141 will be responsible for tactical deception plans.

- (b) The Cover Plan provides a false date for "D" Day and false destinations for the assault forces. On each occasion, when an officer is informed of the real date, he will, at the same time, be told the cover date. Similarly, officers will be told of the cover destinations at the same time as the real destinations. The cover dates or destinations will not be told to anyone who does not know the real dates or destinations.
- (c) In cases where administrative preparations clearly indicate the real destinations (e.g., issue of maps, local currency, etc.), special cover arrangements are being made. In all other cases, administrative preparations will be based as far as possible upon the false destinations
- (d) The cover date for the first assault ("X" Day) will be D plus 14.
  - (e) Cover destinations of Assault Forces of Force 343 are:

ENSA - SARDINIA
FISH - SARDINIA
GROG - CORSICA
HOOK - CORSICA
82d Airborne Div. - CORSICA

# (2) Navy-Air.

- (a) Close watch will be kept on the Italian Fleet during and prior to the assault. Until its disposition is known, no detailed plan can be drawn up. It may amount to two Photo Reconnaissance Units (PRU) sorties per day ever five ports for a fortnight or more before the assaults.
- (b) Sea reconnaissance, both by day and night, in the Tyrrhenian Sea and North Ionian Sea will be necessary to insure the early detection of Italian Fleet movements, so that no opportunity of attrition by air or sea strike may be missed.
  - (c) Every effort will be made to harry the Italian Fleet



in harbor by bombing and, if possible, to drive them up the Adriatic.

(d) Intense patrols by day and night will be carried out along the convoy routes, and the bombing of known U/Boat bases is planned. This action will be maintained at high intensity for as long before HUSKY as possible.


# (3) Army-Air.

- (a) Frior to, and during the operation, an intensive air offensive will be developed against Germany, North Italy, and other parts of Europe from the U.K., with the object of containing as many Axis aircraft as possible in areas away from the Mediterranean.
- (b) With the same intention, a limited air offensive will be developed against Crete, the Dodecanese, and in the Aegean area.
- (c) During the preparatory period, before the assault is launched, heavy bombers will be mainly employed in attacks against important industrial, civil and military targets in Southern Italy. A proportion of the effort will be directed against the main ports and towns, with the object of breaking Italian morale and of interfering with the movement of shipping and supplies. This bombing offensive will be augmented by heavy attacks against Northern and Central Italy.
- (d) As any action against the beaches prior to the assault would jeopardize surprise, it is unlikely that the air forces will be called upon to bomb the beach defenses.

# (4) Attacks on Communications.

The activities of SOE, OSS, and Small Scale Raiding Forces will be coordinated by H.Q. Force 141, to achieve the following objects:


- (a) Interruption of road and rail communications in the South of Italy and N.E. of Sicily; destruction of installations for quick transportation of troops and material across the STRAITS of MESSINA.
- (b) Interruption of the coastal road and railway between MESSINA and CATANIA, and between MESSINA and CEFALU.
- (c) Interruption of the lateral roads and railways across the island roughly on the line PORTO EMPEDOCLE CEFALU.
- (d) Action to cause alarm and despondency by attacks on headquarters or in L of C areas and by spreading alarm and panic among the civil population.
  - (e) Sabotage of aircraft on airfields.
  - (f) Interference with enemy's R.D.F. activity.





# (5) Ground Troops.

- (a) All are enjoined to the structest secrecy on all matters affecting Operation "HUSKY". See memorandum to "XO" and "YO" officers, Headquarters I Armored Corps, Reinforced, 20 April 1943, for sample of similar directive to be issued by each division.
- (b) In all training, it will be assumed that the encmy is aware of a projected operation, and every means will be used to prevent the knowledge of ultimate place and date of the operation from leaking out.
- (c) It is recommended (dependent upon training dates established and unknown at this time) that troops be confined to their areas for the purpose of practicing the mechanics of the operation, beginning on or about D-45. They will be limited in knowledge to that actually and necessarily required for the success of the operation.
- (d) All commanders are directed to execute measures called for in this preliminary cover plan with the same vigor and realism as in the actual operations.
- (e) Camouflage measures and discipline will be strictly observed; dispersion, cover, and concealment will be continuously inspected to insure efficiency.
- (6) The "Cover Plan" is in no vay intended as "Inside Information" to be passed deliberately to those who are not authorized to know the real dates and destinations.
- 15. Air Observation Plan. An observation squadron will serve Force 343 from the African theater.
- a. Prior to D-Day, observation missions will be flown as required but will be limited to suit the requirements of the preliminary cover plan.
- b. D to D/2, limited observation missions will be requested over the Western area for determining reactions to the assault in the East.
- c.  $\underline{D/2}$  to  $\underline{D/5}$ , unrestricted observation missions to the capability of available craft over the western portion of Sicily in order to determine the composition, strength, and movement of enemy forces to the south and east.
  - d. D/5 Onward, missions flown will be determined by the situation.
  - 16. Photo Reconnaissance Unit Plan.
- a. At this time (22 April 1943), requests for the following prints, mosaics and reports have been made:
- (1) Photographic cover of the entire western part of the island at small scale (1/50,000), from the coordinates (600400), Sheet 250, on the north coast to (380660), Sheet 266, on the south coast.



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- (2) Photographic cover at scale 1/12,000, and coastal report of the coastline from TERMINI, Reference (740320), Sheet 250, on the north coast to LICATA, Reference (940330), Sheet 271, on the south coast. This photography covers the coastline of Western Sicily. Coverage of selected coastal strips (landing beaches and vicinity) to a distance 5 miles inland monthly until June 1st, and every ten days thereafter, for the purpose of noting changes in beach and inland defenses.
- (3) Photographic coverage and report on the road and railroad net in western Sicily at medium scale, (1/18,000). This coverage will augment known details of road construction, bridges, etc.
- (4) Photographic coverage and reports of all the airdromes in the area at scale of 1/12,000, every two weeks until June 1st and weekly thereafter. Report will cover description of airdromes and changes in defenses and layout.
- (5) Selected prints and mosaics of all landing beaches, as well as entire area from CASTELVETRANO and SCIACCA airdromes to the south coast.
- (6) Selected prints and mosaics of all airdromes, important cities and towns, in the western part of the island.
- . (7) Selected prints and mosaics of landing places and objectives of airborne troops.
- $\underline{b}_{\bullet}$  Coverage of critical areas will continue to be made as the situation demands.

# 17. Espionage.

Espionage will be undertaken only by the Commanding General, Head-quarters Force 343, through the agencies provided by higher headquarters. Lower echelons will not engage in espionage without prior approval of G-2, Force 343.

- 18. <u>Liaison</u>. Liaison officers qualified to handle both operations and intelligence will be exchanged as follows:
- a. One officer between Hq. Force 343, Hq. Force 141, and, upon direction, with Hq. Force 545.
- b. One liaison officer will be furnished to Hq. Force 343 by each of its sub-task forces by 1 May 1943. This officer may also be used as a courier.

#### 19. Public Relations.

See Annex 3.



20. Psychological Warfare. Psychological Warfare personnel functions directly under control of the A. C. of S., G-2, Hg. Force 343, and will be attached to and consist of:

# Hq. Force 343:

# Personnel

# Equipment

# "D" Day

4 officers
3 interpreters (officers)

1 4x4 1/4-ton truck 500 lbs. lcaflets

# D/10

3 officers 1 driver 1 loudspeaker set (2600 lbs.)

1 la-ton truck

# D**/**30

3 officers 2 clerks

1 broadcasting set (6000 lbs.)

1 2½-ton truck

2 crerks

Both personnel and equipment will be furnished by Hq. Force 141.

Activities and assignments to lower echelons will be governed by future directives.

# 21. Maps, Acrial Fhotographs, and Relief Models.

# a. Supply.

Each headquarters will have an adequate supply of maps of areas with which they are concerned, as well as cover plan maps. Ground troops will be supplied through this headquarters according to distribution in Annex  $\mu$ . Stringent economy is enjoined. (Annex  $\mu$  will be distributed when ready.)

# b. Aerial Photography.

During the operation, continuous day and night missions are contemplated.

Requests for specific missions not covered in 16a, above, will be submitted to h. C. of S., G-2, Hq. Force 343.

# c. Relief Models.

- (1) Relief models are in production of Beaches 1, 2 and 3, 4 and 5, 6, 7 and 8, 84 and 85, 86 and 87, 88, scale 1:5000, and one of the entire western area, scale 1:50,000. These will be available about 30 April 1943 and will be automatically distributed to units concerned.
  - (2) Photographic views of the 1:5000 relief models have been







requested on a basis of 100 photographs per beach, taken with the sea-level perspective, 1/2 to 1 mile at sea, and perpendicular to the beach, and also vertical photographs of an approximate scale of 1/5000.

# d. Hydrographic Charts.

Hydrographic charts will be furnished without request to each sub-task force.

#### 22. Topographic Data.

<u>a.</u> Errors in existing maps will be noted and forwarded immediately to the  $\Lambda$ . C. of S., G-2, Hq. Force 343, for immediate dissemination and for future map revision by the Task Force Engineer Officer.

#### b. Geodetic Data.

Geodetic data and large scale maps of high accuracy, as well as samples of captured maps, will be forwarded to  $\Lambda_{\bullet}$  C. of S., G-2, Hq. Force 343.

#### 23. Reports.

#### a. Spot Reports.

Sub-task forces will transmit important information pertaining to enemy action against our forces by the most expeditious means to this headquarters in brief form as spot reports. This headquarters will make necessary dissemination and distribution, both within the staff and other tactical units immediately concerned. Great care will be observed in the dissemination by lower units to determine the method of receipt so as not to compromise codes or ciphers which may have been involved in transmittal. All such messages will be paraphrased from the original text.

#### b. Informal Periodic Reports.

In addition to periodic reports required below, informal periodic reports in the form of summaries will be transmitted as of 1200A daily by sub-task forces.

# c. Intelligence Summary.

This headquarters will, twice daily, as of about 0900A and 1600A, transmit to next higher and lower echelons, an intelligence summary, accompanied by an interpretation, where justifiable.

#### d. Weather Reports.

(1) Long-range forecasts will be available for consultation in the office of the A. C. of S., G-2, Hq. Force 343, daily, being received at about 1500 hours.

(2) In addition, based on 24-hour period forecast received brief reports for the following 24-hour periods will be disseminated to sub-task forces.

# e. Periodic Reports.

- (1) G-2 periodic reports, following the general form 16, FM 101-5, Staff Officers Field Manual, will be submitted daily as of 2400 hours, and will be transmitted by the most expeditious means. Spot Reports and informal Periodic Reports referred to above will represent the activities during similar period, and the G-2 Reports will be considered as the complete record of the 24-hour activities.
- (2) As far as applicable, G-2 reports will cover, including air and naval information:
- (a) Lines of contact, front lines, or areas held by the enemy.
- (b) Estimated strength, composition, disposition and attitude of major enemy elements.
  - (c) Identifications.
  - (d) Evidences of chemical warfare.
  - (e) Number of prisoners taken, and their attitude.
- (f) Attitude of civil population, sabotage or 5th column activities.
- (g) Enemy air activity, nationalities and strength; main areas of enemy fighter and bomber activities; enemy air reconnaissance; airborne and paratroop efforts.
  - (h) Enemy naval activity affecting land operations.
- (i) Condition of sea during landing operations, and effect on immediate future landings.
  - (j) Meteorological conditions.

# 24. Lessons Learned From American Army Operations in Tunisia.

- a. An S-2 of an armored unit in the II Army Corps has made the following comments about their own mistakes, which we present here so that there is no excuse for our making similar mistakes:
- (1) Evidently, attacks were made without sufficient reconnaissance information; especially flagrant was the lack of terrain information. Heavy losses were incurred in battle due to reliance on faulty maps. Adequate reconnaissance would have brought these defects to light.
- (2) <u>Violation of radio security</u>. Even prior to our entry into action, by listening to the division command net, we were able to follow the complete action of this division, as well as keep posted regarding its dispositions and intentions, all of which were freely given in the clear.



It was proved in this operation that seed themselved elements is much less than has been considered, and consequently greater reliance must be placed upon the use of telephone and messengers in order that security will not be violated on the radio. Naive personnel codes and attempts at secrecy are utterly worthless and can be broken down by the enemy as easily as by the intended recipient.

- (3) We habitually lost contact. The enemy is still able to keep contact with us when he wishes and to break off at his own pleasure. In future operations, we should maintain contact at all times, particularly throughout the hours of darkness, in spite of enemy desires.
- (4) <u>Dissemination of Information</u>. This S-2 reports that they failed to receive immediate accurate intelligence information from higher headquarters and could not, from hour to hour, correlate the enemy operations on our front with his efforts elsewhere. All enemy intelligence received, except by liaison officers, was over 24 hours late.
- (5) Evaluation of Information. Evaluation must be performed before the information is transmitted to higher headquarters. Time and again, incorrect information received misled higher headquarters in the Tunisian operations. Remember that in battle the noise and the confusion lead to exaggeration of the facts. Intelligence is evaluated information.
- (6) Control of Civilians in Battle Area. Our forces were prone to permit civilians in this case, Arabs to move back and forth between the lines almost at will. This permitted the enemy to acquire knowledge of strength and dispositions that he would ordinarily have had to pay dearly to obtain. Civilians must be kept behind the lines at all times, and those wandering from the enemy side must be treated as prisoners of war.
- (7) Search of Prischers. Prisoner of war interrogators found prisoners still carrying concealed weapons. Personnel capturing prisoners must make a thorough search for all weapons.
- (8) <u>Liaison</u>. Practically all G-2's and S-2's interviewed have complained of the lack of information from adjacent units, which indicated inadequate liaison. Liaison is a definite command responsibility.

OSCAR W. KOCH

Colonel, G.S.C.,

A. C. of S., G-2

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION:

Same as for G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation No. 1 - 20 April 1943.



# ANNEX NO. 1

# INTERROGATION OF PRISONERS OF WAR

- 1. The following distribution of prisoner of war interrogation teams will be made by this headquarters with the source as shown. As now composed, each team consists of 2 officers and 4 enlisted men. Consideration should be given by G-2's of subordinate units to the advantages to be gained from regrouping of personnel to provide for two like teams of mixed language qualifications.
  - a. Hq. Task Force 343:
    - 1 German team
    - 1 Italian team

(from African theater)

- b. Hq. VI Corps:
  - 1 Gorman team
  - 1 Italian team

(from African theater)

- c. 3d Infantry Division:
  - 1 German team
  - 1 Italian team

(from African theater)

- d. 2d Armored Division:
  - 1 German team
  - l Italijan team

(from African thoater)

- e. 36th Division:
  - 1 German team
  - 1 Italian toam

(from African theater)

- f. 45th Division:
  - 1 German team
  - 1 Italian team

(Accompanying Division from U. S.)

- g. 82d Airborne Division:
  - 1 German team
  - 1 Italian team

(Accompanying Division from U. S.)

2. Organizational equipment for each team will be furnished through this headquarters without request, and is scheduled to arrive at the organization at the same time as the teams. This equipment consists of:

••• ] •••





- 1 truck, 3/4-ton 4x4, with 1/4-ton trailer, 2 wheel, per two teams.
- 2 trucks: 1/4-ton lx4
- 1 portable typewriter
- 1 Spoak-O-Biche
- 1 small wall tent
- 2 Delta Powerlite lanterns
- 3. Teams are not to be used for missions which do not utilize their special training and qualifications,
- 4. Teams are to be considered under the direct administrative control of the A. C. of S., G-2. Hq. Force 343, who, through the Assistant G-2 in charge of Prisoner of Var Interrogetors, will adjust their distribution in accordance with changing circumstances and requirements. They are assigned to lower units for coverage purposes, which is interpreted to mean they are available for the use of the G-2's of lower echelons, but must be so accommodated and so disposed as to fulfill missions when assigned by higher headquarters, serving the command as a whole rather than the unit to which attached.
- 5. G-2's to whom teams are attached <u>must</u> inform the officer in charge of the Essential Elements of Enemy Information desired, so that these may be stressed in interrogation. Interrogating officers should be thoroughly familiar with the tastical situation and also the tactical plan pertaining to the echelon of command for which they are functioning.
- 6. Interrogation of Allied personnel who have escaped from the enemy will be promptly accomplished and reported upon as for prisoners of war. with obvious modifications.
- 7. The following method of handling prisoners to obtain maximum information will be employed:
- g. Upon capture, prisoners will immediately be searched and then separated into three groups: Officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted men. Maximum information is obtained from noncommissioned officers who would remain silent in the presence of their own officers. (German and Italian corporals, of beth grades, are not noncommissioned officers. Separate old and young Germans old ones talk more easily.)
- <u>b.</u> Officers, only, of the units making capture will briefly interrogate prisoners of war (tactical squeeze), and then only on tactical subjects of immediate concern to the unit itself.
- c. Immediately after the interview by officers of capturing units, prisoners will be dispatched (through command channels, if desired) to Division or Combat team prisoner of war enclosures, which should be located in the vicinity of the Surgeon's collecting station. There they will be met by prisoner of war interrogation teams. It cannot be over-emphasized that the quacker these prisoners can be reached by the interrogation teams, the greater the result obtained.





- $\underline{d}$ . Time and place of capture of both prisoners and documents are of primary importance. This information, in writing, must accompany prisoners, and may be in the form of a message, carried by the guard.
- e. There will be no food, water, or gifts of cigarettes, no offers of money, etc., in trade for personal equipment or property, no talking among prisoners, and no talking (other than official) between our troops and prisoners, until interrogation at division collecting points has been completed. Prisoners will be stripped of such iron rations and water which they may have.
- $\underline{\mathbf{f}}_{ullet}$  Military police and prison guards will assist the interrogation teams at prisoner of war enclosures at all times.
- g. Medical personnel will report the presence of wounded prisoners to the appropriate intelligence section or to the chief interrogator of the attached team, and deliver documents taken from them, properly identified as to the prisoner from whom taken. They will also report statements made by the prisoners if the statements appear to be of military value.
- h. Documents of all kinds must be removed from prisoners, wrapped in hat or coat, and sent in the possession of a guard with the prisoners. Documents must be inspected quickly in order that none of vital importance, e.g., an operation order, be delayed. S-2's of lower echelons will sift documents and forward all useful or doubtful items through Division G-2 to Headquarters Force 343, marked "Attention: G-2".
- i. Documents found by graves registration units will be marked with the soldier's name, organization, and place where found, and then turned over to the nearest intelligence officer or interrogator for proper disposition.
  - j. Identification tags will not be removed from prisoners.
- k. Under no circumstances will unauthorized persons remove clothing, equipment, or personal possessions from prisoners of war. Prisoners will be permitted to retain steel helmets, gas masks, identification tags, insignia of rank, decorations, money, and objects of personal value.









22 April 1943.

#### WINEX NO. 5

#### COUNTER INTELLICENCE

- 1. Counter-Intelligence personnel and equipment are attached to the headquarters indicated, with original source as shown:
  - a. (1) Hq. Task Force 343:
    - 1 Field Security Detachment 2 officers, 11 enlisted men.
    - 2 Port Security Detachments 2 officers, 11 enlisted men each.
      - (From U. S. through Hq. Force 141)
    - (2) Hq. VI Corps:
      Furnished from detachments listed under Hq. Force 343.
    - (3) 3d Infantry Division and 2d Armored Division: (Each)
      1 Counter-Intelligence Corps Detachment of:
      1 officer and 5 enlisted men.
      (From African theater)
    - (4) 45th Infantry Division:

      1 Counter-Intelligence Corps Detachment of:

      1 officer, 5 enlisted men (to accompany division from U. S.)
    - (5) 36th Infantry Division:

      1 Counter-Intelligence Corps Detachment of:

      1 officer and 5 enlisted men (to be transported from U. S. with 82d Airborne Division)
- <u>b</u>. Transportation will be furnished without requisition upon arrival in this theater, as follows:
  - (1) Hq. Force 343:
    9 1/4-ton 4x4's.
    3 3/4-ton weapons carriers.
  - (2) Each division, per CIC team:
    2 1/4-ton 4x4's.
    1 3/4-ton weapons carrier.
  - 2. Counter-Intelligence Corps Detachments Plan.





- a. Operating with personnel indicated above, Counter-Intelligence missions provide for counter-sabotage, and counter-subversive security.
- $\underline{b}$ . The detachments assigned will generally follow the assault and proceed immediately to designated points for the execution of previously assigned mission.
- (1) These missions will include the enforcement of security measures and counter-intelligence discipline and the investigation of positive and suspected disaffection, sabstage, espionage, and subversion, within or affecting the military establishment.
- (2) These missions will not include the replacing or assumption of responsibility for operations with which the Provost Marshal is charged; tactical or combat intelligence; or counter-subversive activities.
- c. Counter-Intelligence Corps personnel will be given every cooperation in carrying out these missions. Although cooperating entirely with headquarters to which attached, they will not be requested to perform missions which will interfere with their missions assigned by this headquarters. Requests for their use for specific missions of concern to G-2 of sub-task forces will be referred to A. C. of S., G-2, Task Force 343, through Intelligence channels.
- d. All troops will be informed by suitable memoranda from Sub-Task Force Headquarters that the jurisdiction of Counter-Intelligence Corps personnel in the U. S. theater of operation encompasses all persons, military, naval and civil, American or foreign, in the theater. Jurisdiction in a theater beyond the responsibility of this headquarters will be as prescribed by the commander-in-chief of the joint theater. Credentials and badges of agents of the Counter-Intelligence Corps will be honored at all times. Absolute power of arrest is vested in these agents unless abrogated by direction of higher authority.
- e. Field security detachments and port security detachments will operate directly under control of G-2, Headquarters Force 343, with detachments as delegated to G-2, Hq. VI Corps.

#### 3. Counter-Sabotage Plan.

a. To prevent the enemy's destruction of useful utilities, transportation, and manufacturing facilities, vigorous counter-sabotage measures will be instituted inc idental to the landing and occupation of our troops. Vital facilities will be assigned as tactical missions to assault troops in order to provide for their early capture and the prevention of destruction. To facilitate these missions, all units will report serious incidents, such as fires, explosions, strikes, riots, attempted riots, wrecks, etc., as spot reports, through intelligence channels, to A. C. of S., G-2, Hq. Force 343, by the most rapid means of communication. Vital areas will be restricted in accordance with military government proclamations to be published.

#### 4. Counter-Subversive Control.

a. Within the military establishment, the basic unit of the counter-subversive system, as prescribed in CS system instructions, AFHQ,



1 February 1943, is the regiment, the air squadront or the structions talion. The counter-subversive system will confirm to those instructions and remain in active operation, organized and up to prescribed strengths in all basic units at all times.

<u>b.</u> Final authority and control of counter-subversive measures to be taken in regard to civil population, rests with the Commanding General, Hq. Force 343. Actual operation of the CS system among the civil population is a function of the Counter-Intelligence detachments, operating under control of this headquarters. Instructions to cover specific counter-subversive activities will be directed to G-2's of sub-task forces through intelligence channels.

## 5. Priority for Security Measures.


- <u>a.</u> Priority for security measures will be determined by G-2 and G-3, Hq. Force 343, based on recommendations from representatives of interested staff sections of this headquarters, and specific requests from the Commanding Generals of sub-task forces.
- <u>b.</u> Priorities will be established and included in the tactical plan in three priorities: (a) Facilities <u>vital</u> to the mission, (b) facilities <u>essential</u> to the mission, (c) all others. These will be published as Annexes to Field Orders, as required.

#### 6. Censorship.

- a. The following personnel and equipment will be provided by Hq. Force 141, and attached to Hq. Force 343, and will be distributed among sub-task forces according to employment anticipated.
  - (1) 2 field press censors.
  - (2) 3 civilian mail censors.
  - (3) 3 telephone and telegraph censors.
  - (4) 3 interpreters (officers).
  - (5) 3 clerks.

Equipment: 2 1/4-ton 4x4's.

- b. Mail censoring, as announced in Circular 39, Headquarters NATOUSA, dated 21 March 1943, will obtain.
- $\underline{\mathbf{c}}_{ullet}$  Consoring of civilian mail in occupied territories will be as prescribed in proclamations to be issued.
- $\underline{d}_{\bullet}$  Dispatches of war correspondents will conform to the provisions of FM 30-26 and FM 30-28.
- 7. a. Signal Security Measures will obtain as announced in Signal Operation Instructions (SOI), issued by Signal Officer, Force 343.
- $\underline{b}_{\bullet}$  To prevent goniometric location of Command Posts by the enemy radio sets will be dispersed at least 800 yards, and connected thereto by telephone.






#### ANNEX NO. 3

#### PUBLIC RELATIONS

1. Public Relations functions directly under control of the A. C. of S., G-2, Hq. Force 343, and personnel, except those marked with asterisks, and equipment, which will be provided by Hq. Force 141, will be attached to and will consist of:

	PLAN					
<u>a</u> .	HQ. FORCE 343	î 1				
	D Day	1	D/10 to D/20			
approximate for the second		1 1 1 1 1	*1 Public Relations Officer 12 Enlisted Men (includes drivers 12 Correspondents 2 3/4-ton C&R 1 3/4-ton truck; 2 motorcycles.			
<u>b</u> •	SUB-TASK FORCE ENSA	<u> </u>	SUB-TASK FORCE FISH			
	D Day	1	D Day			
	1 Public Relations Officer 1 Enlisted Man 1 Correspondent 1 1/4-ton 4x4		1 Public Relations Officer 1 Enlisted Man 1 Correspondent 1 1/4-ton 4x4			
<u>d</u> .	SUB-TASK FORCE GROG-HOOK D Day	i I I				
	1 Public Relations Officer *1 Enlisted Man 1 Enlisted Man 1 Correspondent 1 Radio Broadcaster 1 Photographer 2 1/4-ton 4x4's.					

<sup>\*</sup> The two officers and two enlisted men marked with asterisks will be the Public Relations Section, Force 343; others attached from Force 141. The plan calls for a total of 5 officers and 17 men.







- e. The Fublic Relations Section will be responsible for the control of correspondents in accordance with the provisions of Field Manual  $30-26\pi$  It will insure that news matter does not joopardize security or political objectives, operating in that regard under conditions set forth by military censorship.
- f. All correspondents will be accredited by proper authority, and such authority will be demanded by all echolons upon initial contacts.
- g. Moss, quartering, and supply will be the function of the Headquarters Commandant, of the headquarters being served, and correspondents will be afforded the same accommodations as officers, paying incidental expenses.
- h. Commanders will receive correspondents with the assumption that they seek to report the truth about their observations, and free-frankness rather than everly-guarded speech is encouraged.
- <u>i</u>. Commenders are enjoined to lend all proper cooperation compatible with the military effort. Considerable freedom is permissible in providing facts as all copy will be censored by higher authority prior to release.
- j. As far as practicable, correspondents will be allowed freedom of action so long as it does not interfere with the tactical situation. Thus, it may be a distinct advantage by having correspondents accompany assault echelons in the case of a dawn attack, whereas, it would be of negligible value to have photographers accompany such assaults until daylight.
- <u>k.</u> Policy:- Accredited correspondents may be kept informed of situation by A. C. of S., G-2, of units to which attached, with the understanding that such orientation is for background and proper appreciation of the operations, but not for publication.



5 May 1943.

#### INTELLIGENCE PLAN NO. 2 (FOR SOUTHEAST SICILY)

#### NOTE:

Intelligence Plan, Operation "BIGOT - HUSKY", 22 April 1943, is changed for operation of this Task Force in southeast SICILY, as indicated below.

- 1. Summary of the Situation.
  - a. See G-2 Estimate No. 2, Headquarters Force 343, dated 5 May 1943.
- c. (1) Additions to this book are being prepared and will be forwarded to original distribution before 10 May 1943.
- 2. <u>Mission</u>. To assault that part of Southeast Sicily which lies between the Port of Licata and the perennial river Irminio and to capture the area for a base for further operations. Incidental thereto, the following are initial major objectives.
- (1) The seizure and securing of the air landing field and port of Licata.
  - (2) The major airfield at Olivo.
  - (3) The major airfield north of Comiso.
  - (4) The air landing field at Biscari.

#### 14 b. Preliminary Cover Plan.

Add following paragraphs:

- (f) In particular, cases herecur where efficers have to initiate arrangements which tend to disclose the destination of a particular assault force. Knowledge of the cover destination assists such officers to judge which training or administrative preparation are dangerous to security. If they fit in with the cover destinations, action can proceed unhampered, but if they do NOT fit the cover, then reference should be made to the Security Authorities before action is taken. For example, if Italian interpreters have to be trained with assault forces, they should be trained with those forces whose cover destination is SARDINIA and not those whose cover destination is FRANCE or GREECE. The same thing applies to such subjects as maps, medical instructions, sand models, training schemes, etc. So long as the officers in charge bear in mind that all those should be designed with an eye to the false destination, there is little chance of security being compromised.
- (g) Certain officers will have the responsibility for planning, training troops, and making administrative arrangements. It is their duty:-

(i) To restrict any knowledge of the genuine date or



(ii) When the moment has arrived, at which such information must be broken down, to pass on both the real and cover details.

#### 15. Air Observation Plan.

Delete sub-paragraphs b, c, d.

<u>b.</u> After D-Day, unrestricted observation missions to the capability of available aircraft for the purpose of determining the composition, strength and movement of enemy forces in a direction which will interfere with the accomplishment of our mission.

#### 16. Photo Reconnaissance Unit Plan.

- $\underline{a}_{ullet}$  Requests for the following prints, mosaics and reports are being made:
- (1) Photographic c over of the area of concern to Task Force 343, at a scale of 1/50,000.
- (2) Photographic cover at scale of 1/8,000, and interpretation report of the coastline from N 9487 to G 5654. Subsequent coverage of selected coastal strips within the above area to a distance 5 miles inland every ten days until June 1, and every 5 days thereafter, for the purpose of noting changes in beach and inland defenses.
- (3) Photographic coverage and report on the road and railroad net in Sicily at medium scale (1/18,000). This coverage will augment known details of road construction, bridges, etc.
- (4) Fhotographic coverage and reports of all the airdromes in the area at scale 1/8,000 1/12,000, every ten days until June 1, and every five days thereafter. Reports will cover description of airdromes, and changes in defenses.
- (5) Selected prints and mosaics of all landing beaches as well as entire area within the following coordinates: N 6094 MODICA (H6807) GIARRATANA (H7128) GRAMMICHELE (H5647) CALTAGIRONE (H4649) MAZZARINO (H2057) CAMPOBELLO (69351) PORT EMPEDOCLE (G5854).
- (6) Selected prints and mosaics of all airdromes, important cities and towns in the area.
- (7) Selected prints and mosaics of alighting areas and objectives of airborne troops.
- $\underline{b}_{\bullet}$  Coverage of critical areas will continue to be made as the situation demands.
- 20. <u>Psychological Warfare</u>. Information and Censorship Section of higher headquarters will issue a directive about 15 May 1943, on this subject.

#### 21. Maps, Aerial Photographs, and Relief Models.

 $\underline{c}$ . (1) Four relief models have been requested on a scale of 1/5,000 of beaches as follows:

One of Beach 64 and 65

" " 66

" " " 67 and 68

" " 69, 70, 71, 72, 73.

Also an over-all model, scale 1/50,000 of Eastern area.



# ANNEX CHANGES GENCE.

### 6. Censorship.

a. The directive in regard to this censorship personnel will be issued about 15 May 1943.

AC of S, G-2

#### DISTRIBUTION:

Same as G-2 Estimate of Enemy Situation #2 - 5 May 1943.



Reg.No: 10613

HEADQUARTERS FORCE 343 A.P.O. 758

Ref. No. Q-767 Copy No.

::::::::::::: CRET Force 343 : : Auth : Init June 1943 : Date

21 June 1943

#### AMENDMENT TO ANNEX NO. 4, G-2 INTELLIGENCE PLAN

- 1. The following additions to map distribution provided for in Annex No. 4, G-2 Intelligence Plan, this headquarters, 27 May 1943, are published for information and guidance:
- a. A 1/500,000 scale map, with MAFOG grid overprint, will be issued to anti-aircraft and Radar units. AAA assault units will be supplied by Force engineers simultaneously with other maps. AAA follow-up units will be supplied through 34th and 2626th AAA Brigades.
- b. 82d Airborne Division will receive coverage of both the JOSS and CENT-DIME areas which, in addition to coverage of immediate area of operations also provides limited coverage of adjacent areas; and 200 extra copies of the 1/100,000 map covering the entire island.
  - c. City plans which will be available are:

Initial issue - zone of immediate operations - ACRIGENTO and PORTO EMPEDOCLE, LICATA, GELA.

Beach Reserves - TRAPANI, SYRACUSA, MESSINA, PALERMO, CATANIA.

- d. Sketches. Limited quantities of panoramic beach sketches and vertical map sketches are being distributed to units concerned.
- e. To provide for unforeseen eventualities, over-all coverage of SICILY will be added as an immediate reserve in the hands of sub-task force engineers on a basis of 100 copies of the 1/100,000 map, and 200 copies of the 1/250,000. This is in addition to the coverage of the entire island which will be available in map depots ashore after D/4.
- 2. a. Depots carrying reserve stocks will be located in Algiers and Constantine from D-14 to D-7, in Bizerte after D-7, and Oran after D-3.
- b. Small map depots, carrying a limited replacement stock of initalissue maps, will be set up on the beaches at DIME, CENT and JOSS on D-Day.
- c. Between D/ 4 and D/8, depots will be consolidated to form two depots in two towns within the beach head. One Depot will serve Cent and Dime, one will serve Joss and Kool. These depots will be reinforced as soon as possible by reserve stock held in Africa and will be moved as the situation requires.

Maps will be issued from these stocks on signed request of any unit officer.

Distr: "P"



KOCH, AC of S, G-2

CIP

27 May 1943.

#### G-2 INTELLIGENCE PLAN ANNEX NO. 4

#### MAP DISTRIBUTION

#### 1. General Coverage.

- a. Planning maps will be issued to Division or higher Headquarters covering all of HORRIFIED in every available scale.
  - b. Initial issue to troops will cover only the area of immediate operations.
  - c . Beach reserves will carry maps covering the balance of HORRIFIED.
- d. See attached index for details of coverage. See Appendix I for types of maps to be issued and for general plan of distribution.

#### 2. Basis of Issue.

a. See Appendix II for breakdown basis of issue to troops for each type of map. This applies to the initial issue prior to embarkation.

#### 3. Method of Distribution.

- a. All units will be completely mapped two days prior to embarkation, provided they are under restriction at that time. All separate commands within any one sub-task force will be responsible for their own breakdown distribution to lower units.
- b. Maps will be delivered to the distributing units by an armed guard under the supervision of an officer. Maps will be packaged 50 sheets to a roll. Rolls will in turn be baled and banded. Contents of each roll can be identified by a code number on the outside, referring to the Index number.
- c. This headquarters must be instructed as early as possible to which units bulk delivery will be made, in order to insure complete breakdown distribution two days prior to embarkation. Where a movement from one port to a final port of embarkation by ship is involved, those units will be mapped at the initial port.

#### 4. Distribution of Beach Reserve.

- a. On D Day a small map depot will be set up on the beach at DIME, CENT, and JOSS. It will carry a stock amounting to 20% of the initial issue of maps to take care of replacements for losses during the assault.
- b. On D plus 4, two permanent map depots will be established in the vicinity of DIME and of JOSS. Their map stock will include 80% of the initial issue, plus complete coverage of the rest of HORRIFIED in all scales. Troops will be furnished with maps only of their zone of immediate operations when they land. Hence it will be necessary to draw from the map depot for areas outside the zone indicated on the attached map index.
- c. To reduce the bulk of maps to a minimum, it is intended to confine the coverage of large scale maps furnished initially to the needs of each RCT. Only the Sub-Task Force Headquarters will receive complete coverage of the zone of operations in the 1:25,000 and 1:50,000 scale.

#### 5. Correction of Critical Maps.

a. On D plus 4, a survey platoon of the 66th Topographic Company will land at DIME to check by survey existing maps of critical areas.

ATTACHED:
Appendix I
Appendix II
Map Index.

KOCH AC of S, G-2





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#### G-2 INTELLIGENCE PLAN ANNEX NO. 4

#### APPENDIX I

MAPS

DISTRIBUTION

1/10,000 - Beach Mosaic

Initial Issue

Assault Units Per Co., Per Officer

Beach Reserve

100% of initial issue.

1/25,000 - G.S.G.S. 4228 (including blow-ups of 1/50,000)

Initial Issue

Zone of immediate operations

Field Artillery
2 Per Battery,
1 Per Officer.

Beach Reserve

Entire island

100% of initial issue 1/4 F M allowance for total troop strength.

1/25,000 - Defense Overprint

Initial Issue.

Zone of immediate operations

Assault Troops
Per Co.

Beach Reserve

All Zones of defense

Balance of Edition.

1/25,000 - Uncontrolled Mosaic

Initial Issue

Zone of immediate operations

All Units
Per Co.
Field Artillery
2 Per Battery
1 Per Officer

Beach Reserve

Zone of immediate operations Other areas available

100% initial issue 1/4 F M allowance for total troop strength





# 1/50,000 - G.S.

DISTRIBUTION

Initial Issue

Zone of immediate operations

All Units Per Co., per Officer.

Beach Reserve

Entire island

1/4 F M allowance for total troop strength

1/100,000 - G.S.G.S. 4164

Initial Issue

Zone of immediate operations

All Units Por Co., Per Officer

Beach Reserve

Entire Island

1/2 F M allowance for total troop strength

1/250,000 - Army/Air

Initial Issue

Entire Island

All Units 2 per Co.

Beach Reserve

Entire Island

1/500,000 - Road Map

Initial Issue

100% of initial issue

All Units

Per driven vehicle

Per Officer. 100% initial issue

Beach Reserve

1/1,000,000 - G.S.G.S. 2758 - Palermo

1/5,000,000 - NoG.M. - Central Europa and Mediterranean

Initial Issue

All Units

Per Battalion

100% of initial issue.

Beach Reserve

City Plans

Initial Issue

Cities within zone of immediate operations. All Units

Per Officer

Beach Reserve

All cities available

Balance of Edition.

Change Force names as follows:

ENSA to ENSA FRIME FISH to FISH FRIME CROG to DIME HOOK to CENT