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BIGOT HUSKY  
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G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION #2

Hq. Task Force 343  
APO #758  
5 May 1943.

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION:

a. Assumption.

See Estimate #1, 20 April 1943.

b. Over-all Strength and Neighboring Troops.

See Estimate #1, 20 April 1943.

(1) TUNISIA.

Axis forces in Tunisia, as of 24 April 1943, were estimated to be about 155,000, consisting of 110,000 Germans and 45,000 Italians. The 110,000 Germans are estimated to be made up of 83,000 combatant troops, 14,000 anti-aircraft personnel, and 13,000 service troops. The 45,000 Italians are estimated to consist of 27,000 combat troops, 5,000 anti-aircraft and coast defense personnel, and 13,000 service troops.

Italy has two very reduced Infantry Divisions in Tunisia; and remnants of three others. They are organized as follows:

- 1st (Superga) Division (much reduced).
- Bersaglieri D'Africa (Young Fascists) Division (much reduced).
- 80th (Spezia) Division (Remnants).
- 16th (Pistoia) Division (Remnants).
- 131st (Centauro) Division (Remnants).
- XX and XXI Corps Artillery (Remnants).

The following German divisional units, comprising the 5th Panzer Army under Col. General Jurgen Von Arnim, are in Tunisia:

- 10th, 15th, and 21st Panzer Divisions (reduced strength).
- Hermann Goering Division (much below strength).
- 334th Infantry Division (much below strength).
- 90th Light Infantry Division (much below strength).
- 164th Light Infantry Division (much below strength).
- Manteuffel Division (a small provisional formation).
- 999th Africa Division (four battalions).
- 19th Anti-Aircraft Division.
- 20th Anti-Aircraft Division.

It is estimated that the enemy still disposes of some 115 German and 35 Italian tanks, as of April 24. The serviceability of the Italian tanks may be estimated at about 30%, while the serviceability of the German tanks may now be as high as 66%.

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(2) SOUTHERN ITALY.

See Estimate #1, 20 April 1943.

Revise paragraph 4 with the following:

152nd (Piceno) Division which is responsible for coast defense in the LECCE area, had been described as a territorial defense division but may now be considered a first line unit

In paragraph 5 the following changes should be made:

- (2) 4th (Livorno) Division  
33rd Infantry Regiment (minus 1st and 3d Bns.)  
34th Infantry Regiment (minus 1st and 3d Bns.)  
28th Artillery Regiment (minus 1st, 3d, 4th and 5th Bns.).

- (4) 152nd (Piceno) Division  
235th Infantry Regiment  
236th Infantry Regiment (in SARDINIA)  
336th Infantry Regiment  
152nd Artillery Regiment

Three Coast Defense Divisions.

(3) SARDINIA.

The 236th Regiment of the 152nd (Piceno) Mobile Division has been located in SARDINIA in addition to the two mobile divisions and two coastal divisions previously reported, increasing the total number of troops to approximately 65,000. This increase gives sufficient evidence, at the present time, that the garrison has been reinforced with additional troops making it probable that the former garrison of the Island may be maintained.

(4) CORSICA.

See Estimate #1, 20 April 1943.

(5) SICILY.

The total Italian garrison is now estimated at 165,000 which is made up as follows: See Estimate #1, 20 April 1943, with the following revisions:

(a) Army Ground Troops.

3½ divisions and corps and army troops, totaling 90,000 men. Recent evidence has revealed that the following units of the 4th (Livorno) Divisions located in the Rome area have now reached SICILY:

- 1st and 3d Bns. of the 33d Infantry Regiment  
1st and 3d Bns. of the 34th Infantry Regiment  
1st, 3d, 4th and 5th Bns. of the 28th Artillery Regiment

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Indications have been given that whatever mobile troops were located in the Northeastern part of the Island have now been moved West toward the North Central section.

(c) Reinforcement Prior to Allied Assaults.

See Estimate #1, 20 April 1943. The only change which has occurred is the late arrival of the 4th Division.

The total estimated garrison on "D" Day is, therefore:

Six Italian Divisions.

Two German Divisions, of which one will have been evacuated from TUNISIA and may not be fully equipped or armed.

The equivalent of five Coastal Divisions (84 battalions) which may or may not be mobile.

2. DISPOSITIONS AND ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

a. Enemy Air Capabilities.

See Estimate #1, 20 April 1943.

b. Enemy Naval Capabilities.

See Estimate #1, 20 April 1943.

c. Enemy Ground Capabilities.

(1) General.

See Estimate #1, 20 April 1943.

(2) Against Force 343

a. Assumptions.

(1) That this operation takes place simultaneously with the operation of 545.

(2) That enemy troops are in position as indicated in battle order as of 25 April 1943.

(3) That no augmentations take place in the area.

(4) That the entire Italian 4th Division is in the area LICATA (G9434) - CALTANISSETTA (H0577) - FAVARA.

(5) That all Infantry troops are alerted.

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b. Enemy Dispositions.

(1) Troops of coastal divisions at the following locations are estimated as purely defensive occupying previously prepared positions for beach defense at the water's edge: ISPICA (N8199), POZZALLO (N7592), RAGUSA (H6515), GELA (H2230), BUTERA (H1744), LICATA, AGRIGENTO (G6257), PORTO EMPEDOCLE (G5855), REALMONTE (G5357), RIBERA (G3678), SCIACCA (G1879). Those at ISPICA and SCIACCA do not immediately affect the 343 operation. The others in the order from east to west, RAGUSA to BUTERA, are capable of opposing the landing against beaches 64 - 68, and those from BUTERA to include REALMONTE are capable of opposing the landings on beaches 70 - 73. This will place an immediate strength of coastal units against GROC and HOOK of 6650, and against ENSA of 6050. The nature of the troops of the 54th Division in the area COMISO (H5516) (Infantry), RAGUSA (Mortar, Anti-Tank and Anti-Aircraft), MODICA (Infantry and Portee Artillery), indicates probable available motor transport for a portion of the command. The motorized elements are capable of opposing the landing against Beaches 65 to 68 by H+8, and dismounted elements thereof, are capable of making themselves felt by D+1. The units of the 54th Division, in the area BUCCHERI (H7536) (Infantry), GRAMMICHELE (H5747) (Infantry), CALTAGIRONE (H4649) (Artillery), are located on commanding terrain on the principal ridge line, extending southeast-northwest, and are, in all probability, there to occupy an organized defensive position. The remainder of that division at NISCEMI (H3439) (Infantry) is, in all probability, a force to assist in the defense of the airport in that vicinity. The COMISO (H5416) force indicated above occupies commanding terrain overlooking the airport to the north and, although capable of supporting the troops on beach defense, is probably a defensive organization for that airport. The force at CALTAGIRONE (H4749) (Artillery 75 mm howitzers) may be used as a mobile fire reserve to support the defensive positions along the ridgeline. The small force (Headquarters) at PALLAZOLLO ACREIDE (H8030) is considered an administrative unit for purposes under consideration.

The Army and Corps troops reported in the vicinity of RAGUSA are, by their nature, indicated to be armed with coast defense weapons and, being mobile, are capable of supporting the defenses from previously prepared positions anywhere against the GROC - HOOK assault by H+8, unless occupying an alert position at H-Hour elsewhere. The Army and Corps troops in the vicinity of the airfield north of COMISO are considered local defense, in addition to an estimated 2000 German air ground troops at that field. Additional Army and Corps troops at COMISO are also estimated as airfield defense. The Army and Corps troops at VITTORIA (H4717) are estimated to have the same mission as the similar unit of large caliber guns at RAGUSA. The same applies to Army and Corps troops at S. CROCE CAMERINA (H4603). The disposition of the four guns, 149/35, at RAGUSA; the four guns, 149/35, at VITTORIA; and the eight guns, 149/35, at S. CROCE CAMERINA, and the lack of others of this type in the southeast, indicates that the RAGUSA detachment is separately located for commitment to the south or east; and the VITTORIA detachment to the west and northwest. Army and Corps troops on the ridge from VIZZINI (H6741) (east) to S. MICHELE (H3854) (west), consisting principally of heavy caliber guns, indicate a Corps and Army reserve to be committed in

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any direction for an initial coastal defense or long range defense of the predominating terrain feature (the northwest - southeast ridge). It should be noticed that there are at least 36 guns of 149/35, 12 guns of 105/28 and 60 guns of 100/17 in this general area. Although the eastern assault will, no doubt, attract some of these weapons, it must be estimated that at least 50% will be available to support the defense against GRCG and HOOK assaults by H-12, unless occupying an alert position elsewhere.

(2) Against Beaches 70-73, troops of the 26th (Mountain) Division, in the vicinity of CALTANISSETTA (Infantry), S. CATALDO (G9976) (Infantry and Artillery), SERRADIFALCO (G8973) (Artillery), CANICATTI (G8762) (Infantry), FAVARA (Infantry), ARAGONA (G6668) (Artillery), MONTAPERTO (G6059) (Infantry), AGRIGENTO (Artillery), occupies commanding terrain on a general ridge line extending from northeast to southwest. Some significance must be attached to the fact that all of these units, in addition to being on commanding terrain, are on a principal roadnet, and thus must be considered as being able to support a defense to include CANICATTI to the south, and those to the west thereof can immediately support a beach defense from PORTO EMPEDOCLE by H+8 hours and assist in the defense of LICATA, 50% by H+8 and 10% by D+1. It is presumed that this division is a support division, and significance must be attached to the fact that previous reports indicate that artillery units are motorized and consist chiefly of mortars and howitzers. Other units of this division are not considered as an immediate factor in the defense against this operation.

Army and Corps Troops: Again in this area - CALTANISSETTA - CAMPOBELLO (G9351) - AGRIGENTO - PORTO EMPEDOCLE - are found a large number of large caliber guns, with the larger calibers (150 mms) in the first two places and 90 mms in the latter two. As these large caliber guns are situated on a principal highway, it is estimated they are thus a mobile reserve for either seacoast defense or long-range fire. Troops at AGRIGENTO and PORTO EMPEDOCLE are considered seacoast defense installations and can become a support to the defense against any action in the vicinity of LICATA by H-12 hours. Significance must be attached to the concentration of artillery of various types and calibers, some being probably dual purpose, at CALTANISSETTA, which are available as a mobile fire support unit against the LICATA and GELA (H2230) beaches by D+1.

Approximately 50% of the Italian 4th Infantry Division has been identified in the general area CALTANISSETTA - LICATA - FAVARA. This division, consisting at full strength of approximately 14,000 men, may be entering this area as a reserve division to take over some of the installations of the 26th Mountain Division, and as such becomes a serious threat against the beaches of LICATA at H-Hour and can seriously interfere with any movement contemplated along the coastal road to the northwest by the ENSA force.

From the locations of the troops in the area of operations of Force 343, it can be remarked that strong elements are located on the commanding ground to the east, to the north, and to the northwest of the assault landings. The result will be an attempt to contain the landings within this natural semi-circle, and will provide the defenders with strong defensive positions on the high ground.

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CAPABILITIES AGAINST FORCE 343.

In order to determine the capabilities against each of the attacking forces, that is ENSA and GROG -- HOOK, it is necessary to consider the enemy capabilities as a whole because of the restricted area in which Force 343 will operate: a crescent-shaped coastal plain approximately 15 to 20 miles deep bounded by predominating ridge lines and faced by approximately 45 miles of shore-line (from Beach 65 to 73, inclusive). With this in mind the following are considered enemy capabilities against Force 343:

(1) To defend at the waters edge.

(2) To defend on the ridge-lines running perpendicular to the coast, especially on the eastern side, to canalize any advance inland.

(3) To defend along the ridge-line: RAGUSA - VIZZINI - CALTAGIRONE - MAZZARINO - RAVANUSA - CAMPOBELLO.

(4) To defend at the waters edge and counter-attack to the east from a general line from LICATA - RAVANUSA.

Capability No. 4 is selected for adoption because the port and four airfields are of the utmost strategic importance and can only be defended satisfactorily at the waters edge.

The counter-attack from the northwest is logical because of the concentration of the mobile Army and Corps troops in the vicinity of CALTANISSETTA.

The terrain lends itself to counter-attack from the northwest and the rivers would not form a serious obstacle at this time of the year because they are reported dry.

Recapitulation of enemy strengths opposing various landings:

ENSA

ARAGONA

H+8

|        |       |     |
|--------|-------|-----|
| Troops |       | 600 |
| M/G    |       | 4   |
| Arty   | 75/13 | 8   |
| M/T    |       | 60  |

PORTO EMPEDOCLE

H to H+8

H+8 to D+1

|        |     |     |
|--------|-----|-----|
| Troops | 850 | 500 |
| M/G    | 6   | 6   |
| Arty   | 12  | 12  |
| M/T    | 46  | 48  |

MONTAPERTA

D+1

|         |     |
|---------|-----|
| Troops  | 880 |
| M/G     | 48  |
| Mortars | 1   |
| M/T     | 1   |

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ENSA (Continued)

| <u>FAVARA</u> | H+8 | D+1 |
|---------------|-----|-----|
| Troops        | 575 | 575 |
| M/G           | 24  | 24  |
| Arty 47/32    | 3   | -   |
| Mortars       | 12  | 9   |
| M/T           | 33  | -   |

| <u>AGRIGENTO</u> | H to H+8 | H+8 to D+1 |
|------------------|----------|------------|
| Troops           | 1100     | 1000       |
| Recruits         | --       | 3300       |
| M/G              | 6        | 12         |
| Arty 100/22      | 12       | --         |
| 90/53            | --       | 20         |
| 75/13            | --       | 4          |
| Mortars          | --       | --         |
| M/T              | ?        | 96         |

| <u>PALMA DI MONTECHIERA</u> | H   |
|-----------------------------|-----|
| Troops                      | 800 |
| M/G                         | 48  |
| Arty 47/32                  | ?   |
| M/T                         | ?   |

| <u>SERRADIFALCO</u> | H+8 |
|---------------------|-----|
| Troops              | 430 |
| M/G                 | 6   |
| Arty 100/17         | 12  |
| M/T                 | 50  |

| <u>S. CATALDO</u> | H+8  | D+1  |
|-------------------|------|------|
| Troops            | 1730 | 1730 |
| M/G               | 51   | 51   |
| Arty 47/32        | 6    | --   |
| Mortars           | 21   | 21   |
| M/T               | 94   | --   |

| <u>GALTANISSETTA</u> | H+8  |
|----------------------|------|
| Troops               | 5600 |
| M/G                  | 58   |
| Arty 149/35          | 4    |
| 100/17               | 12   |
| 47/32                | 24   |
| h.h.h.               | 16   |
| Mortars              | 39   |
| M/T                  | 206  |

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ENSA (Continued)

| <u>LICATA</u> | H    | H+8   | D+1 |
|---------------|------|-------|-----|
| Troops        | 5500 | 11000 |     |
| M/G           | 198  | 300   |     |
| Arty          | 30+  | 75    |     |
| Mortars       | 44   | 135   |     |
| M/T           | 130  | 325   |     |

(Assumed that 45% of 7th Division is available at H-Hour).

CAMPOBELLO H+8

|        |        |     |  |
|--------|--------|-----|--|
| Troops |        | 200 |  |
| M/G    |        | 2   |  |
| Arty   | 149/35 | 4   |  |
| M/T    |        | 16  |  |

CANICATTI H+8 D+1

|         |       |      |      |
|---------|-------|------|------|
| Troops  |       | 1080 | 1080 |
| M/G     |       | 54   | 54   |
| Arty    | 47/32 | ?    | ?    |
| Mortars |       | 9    | 9    |
| M/T     |       | 6+   | —    |

| TOTALS AT:   | H      | H+8   | D+1  | TOTALS |
|--------------|--------|-------|------|--------|
| Troops       | 6300   | 26850 | 9065 | 42215  |
| M/G          | 246    | 573   | 195  | 1014   |
| Arty         | 149/35 | 24    | —    | 24     |
|              | 105/28 | 36    | 20   | 56     |
|              | 75/13  | 20    | 4    | 24     |
|              | 47/32  | 36    | —    | 36     |
| A.A. & Mixed | 30+    | 115   | 12   | 157    |
| Mortars      | 44     | 237   | 60   | 341    |
| M/T          | 130    | 1114  | 155  | 1399   |

GROG - HOOK

| <u>CALTAGIRONE</u> | H      | H+8  | D+1 | Defense |
|--------------------|--------|------|-----|---------|
| Troops             |        | 1540 |     |         |
| M/G                |        | 8    |     |         |
| Arty               | 149/35 | 4    |     |         |
|                    | 75/13  | 12   |     |         |
| M/T                |        | 87   |     |         |

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GROG - HOOK (Continued)

GRAMMICHELE H

H48

D-11

Defense

|             |      |
|-------------|------|
| Troops      | 1650 |
| M/G         | 54   |
| Arty 149/35 | 12   |
| 47/32       | 3    |
| Mortars     | 21   |
| M/T         | 81   |

VIZZINI

|        |     |
|--------|-----|
| Troops | 500 |
| Arty   | 12  |
| M/T    | 40  |

COMISO AIRPORT & COMISO

|            |      |
|------------|------|
| Troops     | 1320 |
| M/G        | 92   |
| Arty 47/32 | 3    |
|            | 24   |
| Mortars    | 32   |
| M/T        | 112  |

VITTORIA

|             |      |
|-------------|------|
| Troops      | 1000 |
| M/G         | 50   |
| Arty 149/35 | 4    |
| 47/32       | ?    |
| M/T         | 164  |

MODICA

|             |      |      |
|-------------|------|------|
| Troops      | 1500 | 1520 |
| M/G         | 36   | 36   |
| Arty 100/17 | 12   | --   |
| 75/13       | 12   | --   |
| Mortars     | --   | 18   |
| M/T         | 98   | --   |

SCOGLITTI

|            |     |
|------------|-----|
| Troops     | 800 |
| M/G        | 48  |
| Arty 47/32 | ?   |

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GROG - HOOK (Continued)

| <u>GELA</u> | H    | H+S | D+1 | Defense |
|-------------|------|-----|-----|---------|
| Troops      | 3645 |     |     |         |
| M/G         | 154  |     |     |         |
| Arty        | 284  |     |     |         |

S. GROCE CAMERINA

|        |      |
|--------|------|
| Troops | 1300 |
| M/G    | 52   |
| Arty   | 84   |
| M/T    | 53   |

GELA AIRDROME & NISCEMI

|            |  |      |
|------------|--|------|
| Troops     |  | 1320 |
| M/G        |  | 68   |
| Arty 47/32 |  | 3    |
| Mortars    |  | 32   |
| M/T        |  | 49   |

BUCCAERI

|            |  |     |
|------------|--|-----|
| Troops     |  | 880 |
| M/G        |  | 48  |
| Arty 47/32 |  | 3   |
| Mortars    |  | 21  |
| M/T        |  | 11  |

RAGUSA

(To East)

|             |     |      |     |
|-------------|-----|------|-----|
| Troops      | 400 | 3700 | 200 |
| M/G         | 2   | --   | 2   |
| Arty 149/35 | --  | --   | 4   |
| 47/32       | 8   | --   | --  |
| A.A.        | 8   | --   | --  |
| Mortars     | --  | 18   | --  |
| M/T         | 47  | --   | 16  |

S. MICHELE

|             |     |
|-------------|-----|
| Troops      | 750 |
| M/G         | 6   |
| Arty 105/28 | 12  |
| M/T         | 90  |

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GROG - HOOK (Continued)

| TOTALS AT:  | H    | H48  | D41  | Def.   | TOTAL |
|-------------|------|------|------|--------|-------|
| Troops      | 5745 | 7340 | 5220 | (3520) | 18305 |
| M/G         | 254  | 156  | 36   | ( 208) | 446   |
| Arty 149/35 | --   | 20   | --   | --     | 20    |
| 105/28      | --   | 24   | --   | --     | 24    |
| 75/13       | --   | 24   | --   | --     | 24    |
| 47/32       | --   | 114  | --   | ( 9)   | 114   |
| A.A. & Mxd  | 56   | 20   | --   | (24)   | 76    |
| Mortars     | --   | 21   | 36   | (85)   | 57    |
| M/T         | 53   | 459  | --   | (172)  | 512   |

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G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION #1

Hq. Task Force 343  
APO #758  
20 April 1943

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION:

a. Assumption.

This estimate is based on the continued defense of Tunis and Bizerte by the German and Italian forces now operating in Tunisia. To date, no indications of organized withdrawal from the North African theater have been observed. It is also assumed that operations against Sicily will not begin prior to 60 days after the Tunisian campaign is terminated.

b. Over-all Strength and Neighboring Troops.

The Italian forces in Southern Italy and the Mediterranean Islands consist of a group of armies composed of the Seventh Army (Southern Italy), the Sixth Army (Sicily), the XIII Corps (Sardinia), and the VII Corps (Corsica), under the command of the Prince of Piedmont.

Known German forces in this theater are those listed below under "Tunisia". It is estimated that approximately 24,000 German Air Force ground personnel are, at the present time, manning the airfields and their defenses in Sicily. The presence of other German troops in Southern Italy, Sicily, Sardinia, or Corsica are unknown at this time. It is estimated that approximately 5,000 German troops in transit from the mainland to Tunisia may be expected to be in Sicily when the North African campaign is over.

(1) TUNISIA.

Axis forces in Tunisia, as of 14 April 1943, were estimated to be about 160,000, consisting of 110,000 Germans and 50,000 Italians. More recent defeats have inflicted heavy losses on Axis forces.

Italy has insignificant remnants of 2 infantry divisions in Tunisia; and 1 complete infantry division. They are organized as follows:

- XXX Corps - 1st (Superga) Division (complete)
- 16th Pistoia Inf. Division (incomplete)
- Young Fascist Division (incomplete)

Rommel's Afrika Panzer Army in Tunisia is now combined with von Arnim's 5th Army, under the latter's command.

The following German divisional units are now in Tunisia:

- 10th Panzer Division (incomplete)
- 15th Panzer Division (incomplete)
- 21st Panzer Division (incomplete)
- Goering Airborne Division (incomplete)
- Manteuffel Infantry Division
- 90th Light Infantry Division (incomplete)
- 334th Infantry Division
- 164th Light Infantry Division (incomplete)
- 999th Africa Division (elements)

The tank strength estimated total is 100 tanks, as of April 14. What percentage of these are Italian and what are German is not known at this time, but the complete destruction of the single Italian Armored Division indicates that the Italian tank strength is now practically zero.

(2) SOUTHERN ITALY

The 21st (Sardinian Grenadiers) Division has returned from YUGOSLAVIA to its home station, ROME. It is possibly intended to replace the 4th (Livorno) Division. Identifications of the latter have been reported in SICILY. Although the "Sardinian Grenadiers" Division is reputedly composed of picked personnel, it did not particularly distinguish itself in the Greek War nor, more recently, against the Yugoslav guerillas. In view, however, of its battle experience, it must be rated as one of the more seasoned of Italy's divisions. Depot elements have been sent with other miscellaneous units to CORSICA.

Recent identifications suggest the possible presence in the BARI area of remnants of the 52d (Torino) Division. It is believed that this formation was largely destroyed in RUSSIA, but a nucleus of it may still exist; composed of survivors from the Eastern front and depot units from the home country.

104 (Mantova) Autotrasportabile (literally "motor-transportable") Division has moved from PIEDMONT to the COSENZA - NICASTROL area in CALABRIA. Little is known of this unit, which was formed a year ago. It has not yet seen active service. The term "autotrasportabile" merely implies an infantry division organized in such a way as to enable it to be transported when allotted motor transport from Corps or Army pool. It does not indicate permanent motorization. In view of the moderate fighting value of more experienced Italian divisions, it is unlikely to be of high quality.

There are no other first line divisions in Southern ITALY. 152 (Piceno) Division is responsible for coast defense in the LECCE area. This is described as a Territorial Defense Division. Its training is believed to be inadequate, and it may be considered to be very little different from the three Coastal Divisions which are located respectively in the SALERNO - CATANZARO - REGGIO CALABRIA area. Coastal Divisions are static units to which are allotted vulnerable stretches of coastline. In addition, there are considerable numbers of Independent Coastal Battalions and Coastal Regiments, similarly responsible for local coastal defense.

The garrison of Southern ITALY is, therefore, composed of:

Three Italian Infantry Divisions (one of which may have moved):

- (1) 21st (Sardinian Grenadiers) Division
  - 1st Infantry Regiment
  - 2nd Infantry Regiment
  - 13th Artillery Regiment
  - 4th Blackshirt Legion
- (2) 4th (Livorno) Division
  - 33rd Infantry Regiment
  - 34th Infantry Regiment
  - 28th Artillery Regiment
- (3) 104th (Mantova) Division
  - 113th Infantry Regiment
  - 114th Infantry Regiment
  - 11th Artillery Regiment

Survivors of one further Infantry Division:

- 52nd (Torino) Division
  - 81st Infantry Regiment
  - 82nd Infantry Regiment
  - 52nd Artillery Regiment

Four Coast Defense Divisions: one of which is the 152nd (Piceno) Division, consisting of the 235th Infantry Regiment, 236th Infantry Regiment (detached from Division), 336th Infantry Regiment, and 152nd Artillery Regiment.

Though strong numerically - possibly 300,000 - 350,000 men - the garrison of Southern ITALY can barely be considered adequate for defense pur-

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poses; even the first-line divisions are probably not of the highest quality, and the remaining units consist mainly of low category and depot troops. Large forces are necessary to guard the long and vulnerable coastline, in close proximity to which run the main north-south road and rail communications, despite the fact that in many areas the defense is naturally helped by the very difficult and mountainous terrain.

Disposition of units in Southern ITALY at the present time allows for no central mobile reserves. The main line of resistance is expected to be the coast itself, followed by a secondary position stretching from the sea to inland rugged terrain, obstructing the natural passageway northward along either the east or west coasts.

(3) SARDINIA.

The 44th (Cremona) Division has recently been transferred to CORSICA, leaving only two mobile and two coastal divisions on the island. There is no evidence, at the present time, that the garrison of SARDINIA has been reinforced with additional troops; however, it is not improbable that the former strength of the island may be maintained. Although the garrison is at present surprisingly small (60,000), the defense is facilitated by the general difficulties of the terrain and by the virtual neutralization of the greater part of the eastern half of the island, owing to its lack of communications with the main centers.

The mobile divisions are the 30th (Sabauda) Division, consisting of the 45th Infantry Regiment, the 46th Infantry Regiment, the 16th Artillery Regiment, 176th Blackshirt Legion; the 31st (Calabria) Division, consisting of the 59th Infantry Regiment, the 60th Infantry Regiment, the 40th Artillery Regiment, and the 177th Blackshirt Legion.

(4) CORSICA.

The garrison of CORSICA is now made up of the 44th (Cremona) Division, consisting of the 21st Infantry Regiment, 22nd Infantry Regiment, 7th Artillery Regiment, and the 90th Blackshirt Legion; and the 20th (Friuli) Division from the Italian mainland, consisting of the 87th Infantry Regiment, the 88th Infantry Regiment, the 35th Artillery Regiment, and the 88th Blackshirt Legion; plus miscellaneous depot units. Italian morale is low, and the occupying troops are reported to walk in fear of the inhabitants. These feelings are understandable in view of the taste of Corsicans for the vendetta and the aversion they have always shown to Italian propaganda regarding their Italian origin.

The garrison is apparently split up into small groups occupying the main towns and centers of communication. There are few mobile reserves. Apart from the erection of road blocks, the Italians have done little to improve the defenses of the island or to supplement the dismantled guns taken over from the French. The total garrison now amounts to some 46,000 men.

(5) SICILY.

The total Italian garrison is estimated at 153,000, which is made up as follows:

(a) Army Ground Troops.

Three divisions and corps and army troops, totaling 78,000 men. These divisions are distributed in three main concentrations, in the Western, Central and Southeastern parts of the island. There are apparently few first-line troops in the MESSINA area (northeast part of the island). Included in the corps and army troops are two battalions of French 11-ton R 35 tanks, and one battalion of light Italian L 6 tanks; each battalion is equipped with about 50 tanks. None of the mobile divisions has actually been in combat, and all have done a protracted period of garrison service in the island.

Recent evidence suggests that elements of the principal components of the 4th (Livorno) Division located in the ROME area have now reached SICILY.

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The following identifications have been received:

8 Co. 33 Inf. Regt. (CALTANISSETTA), 20 Feb.  
7 Co. 34 Inf. Regt. (FAVARA)  
4 Tp. 28 Arty. Regt. (In SICILY)  
152 Autoreparto (CALTANISSETTA)  
11 C.C.R.R. (MESSINA)

A battery of self-propelled artillery has been identified with this Artillery Regiment. All batteries of the Artillery Regiment are reported to be mechanized.

(b) Coast Defense Organization.

About 75,000 men, organized in 84 Static Infantry Battalions and various artillery and machine gun units, whose duties consist of beach defense, guarding of vulnerable points, and dealing with the initial shock of invasion. Though their standard of equipment and training have recently been improved, they are still inferior in both respects to the Army Ground Troops.

Known fixed defenses (see special overlay attached to sub-force Hq. copies only) indicate that very formidable defenses are installed around the ports and airfields. Emplacements and machine gun positions have been constructed at vulnerable points on the coast. Information at the present time indicates a lack of depth to the coastal defenses; however, it may be expected that improvement of these beach defenses and coast watching will be increased as a result of our occupation of North Africa. Detail studies (now in progress) of aerial photographs may reveal secondary defensive lines back from the coast. Supplementary overlays showing installations located will be furnished sub-task forces as they become known. The probability of obstacles, defended road blocks, mines, and observation points must be considered part of the enemy's defensive plan. There have been no reports of beach mines or of under-water obstacles.

(c) Reinforcement Prior to Allied Assaults.

For the past several years, there has been no increase in the number of first-line divisions in SICILY, but it is estimated that at present three or four Italian divisions could be made available to reinforce the garrison. It is, however, improbable that such a large force would actually be employed because of the difficulty of maneuvering in broken country with poor communications; in addition, it is expected that Germany will assist with such units as might have been evacuated from TUNISIA.

The probable scale of reinforcement prior to "D" Day is, therefore, estimated at:

- (i) Two Italian Divisions, with up to 50 tanks.
- (ii) Additional German elements, including MARSCHE battalions and some armor, possibly making the equivalent of one division, with about 50 tanks.
- (iii) The provision of further equipment and transport for the present garrison, aimed in particular at raising the standard of the coastal units to that of the field forces.

At the close of the Tunisian campaign, considering the probable effect of naval and air action, the Axis may succeed in withdrawing up to 20,000 personnel with personal equipment but without many vehicles or tanks. In this event, SICILY may be strengthened by the equivalent of one German division, not fully mobile. Closer than this, it is impossible to estimate.

The total estimated garrison on "D" Day is, therefore:

Five Italian Divisions.

Two German divisions, of which one will have been evacuated from TUNISIA and may not be fully equipped or armed.

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The equivalent of six coastal divisions (84 bat-  
talions), which may or may not be mobile.

## 2. DISPOSITIONS AND ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

### a. Enemy Air Capabilities.

As of July 1943, based on assumptions that Russia is active and has gained, since April 1943, modest successes in addition to those achieved prior to that date, and that losses are normal in the interim, it is estimated that the Axis Air Order of Battle for the Central Mediterranean (to include Italy, Sardinia, and Sicily, and close by islands, as viewed from sustained fighting value), are as follows:

|                             | <u>German</u> | <u>Italian</u> | <u>Total</u> | <u>Maximum Combined Effort<br/>For a Few Days Per 24-<br/>Hour Period<br/>In Sorties</u> |
|-----------------------------|---------------|----------------|--------------|--|
| LRB(Long Range Bombers)     | 250           | 90             | 340          | 125 - 150  |
| BR(Bomber Rcn.)             | 40            | --             | 40           | Intensive, & if inadequate,<br>use other types to augment.                               |
| DB(Dive Bombers)            | 80            | --             | 80           | 80 - 100   |
| GA(Fighter Bombers)         | 50            | --             | 50           | 85   |
| SEF(Single Engine Fighters) | 190           | 225            | 415          | 250  |
| TEF(Twin Engine Fighters)   | 80            | --             | 80           | 40 - 50  |
| Army Coop.                  | 10            | 25             | 35           | (Not accounting for success-<br>ful paratroop operations in<br>Sicily or by Russia.)     |
| Coastal                     | <u>--</u>     | <u>60</u>      | <u>60</u>    |  |
|                             | 700           | 400            | 1100         |  |

Serviceability estimated at 50-60%.

Primary targets will probably be Allied convoys and ports, with subsidiary effort against Allied airdromes.

### b. Enemy Naval Capabilities.

It is estimated that based on past performances, it is unlikely that any substantial reduction of the Italian Navy can be achieved except by air and submarine action. It is considered possible, but improbable, that land reinforcements may, from time to time, be attempted, moving at night through Palermo and Catania.

### c. Enemy Ground Capabilities.

#### (1) General.

##### a. Assumptions.

Enemy air reconnaissance of the North African coastline will reveal our preparations for movement. Continued bombing from the air will, undoubtedly, alert the entire forces for an expected attack. Surprise can only be achieved through the time and location of our attacks. But it must be presumed that hostile troops are alert, and that all beach installations are manned.

##### b. Concentration of Forces.

#### (1) Coastal Divisions.

These are generally disposed around the island for coastal defense. The divisions are not mobile. It is therefore believed that they are incapable of performing any but a mobile reserve force mission. However, it is reported that the artillery units of these divisions may be motorized.

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(2) Mobile Reserves.

These are divided into three forces, disposed as follows:

(a) Western Support Units.

28th (Aosta) Division, in the area CASTELVETRANO-SALEMI-S. NINFA. Role: Mobile reserve against an enemy landing in the western section of the island.

(b) Southeastern and Eastern Support Units.

54th (Napoli) Division in the area MODICA-CALTAGIRONE-VIZZINI. Role: Mobile reserve against a landing in the southeast section of the island.

(c) Central Support Units.

26th (Assiata) Division in the area CALTANISSETTA-FAVARA-CANICATTI. Role: Probably as a mobile force against a landing on the south coast. Note: The identification of components of the 4th Livorno in this area indicates that this division may be centrally located to carry out the mission of additional support in any direction.

(2) South Coast Landing.

a. Assumptions.

It is assumed that Army and Corps troops in the vicinity of (1) the landing field north of SCIACCA, (2) at the airfield at CASTELVETRANO, (3) on the high ground at S. MARGHERITA, support installations in those areas, and that it is possible, though not probable, that the howitzers located at POGGIOREALE may be part of an Army or Corps mobile reserve.

Likewise, it is assumed that the coastal defense units in the vicinity of CASTELVETRANO may or may not be reserve for beach defenses or defenses entirely for the protection of the airfield at CASTELVETRANO.

The coastal defenses in the vicinity of SALEMI are regarded as area defenses rather than as supporting troops, and that the reserve of the area are the forces of the 28th Division, generally in the area SALEMI-S. NINFA-PARTANNA.

It is assumed that the disposition of troops are as known to be at this time and that there is no shift between "D" Day landings in the southeast and the "ENSA" landing on D+2.

It is assumed further that the Army and Corps troops known to be in the vicinity of MARSALA are defensive for the seaplane alighting area in the port but that the troops of the 28th Division may be available to reinforce troops on beach defense to the southeast. This force then becomes a possible reinforcement for Beach 88.

It is assumed that the corps troops to the east of the beach zone - namely, in the vicinity of AGRIGENTO - FAVARA - ARAGONA - PORTO EMPEDOCLE, are basically installed for the protection of the port proper and probably to act as a reserve for coastal protection either to the east or to the west. The latter is discounted slightly because of lack of motor transportation, unless unknown pools are available.

With the location of the 26th Division, which is a mountain division, in the high ground in the vicinity of CALTANISSETTA, it is believed that the reaction to the D-Day landing will cause this force to move east, if any movement in a supporting nature is contemplated. Inasmuch as most of the units of this division are disposed to the west of the location of the Division Command Post, some reinforcement, to the west, particularly of artillery, may be expected. This division is uniquely equipped, mostly with howitzers and mortars, and as such would probably reinforce installations in the high ground to the west of their location rather than as initial beach and beach-head defenses.

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The known locations of the coastal defense units in the general area bounded on the east by SCIACCA and on the west by MAZZARO DEL VALLO, both inclusive, based on terrain and road network, indicate the established defenses of the beaches proper.

It is presumed that other defensive positions have been prepared but are not occupied and will, if necessary, be occupied by troops from the reserve. It is not known if any of these positions are immediately on the coast.

The estimated enemy forces opposing "ENSA" are as follows:

|                 | <u>H HOUR</u><br>(Alerted) | <u>H + 8 HOURS</u><br>Reinforcements | <u>H + 16 HOURS</u>              |
|-----------------|----------------------------|--------------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| <u>AT Beach</u> |                            |                                      |                                  |
| Coastal Troops  | 2300 (a)                   |                                      |                                  |
| " M.G.          | 240                        |                                      |                                  |
| " Arty.         | 8                          |                                      |                                  |
| Mortars         | none*                      |                                      |                                  |
| <u>SCIACCA</u>  |                            |                                      |                                  |
| Troops          |                            | 1700 (b)                             |                                  |
| Arty.           |                            | none*                                |                                  |
| H.G.            |                            | 96                                   |                                  |
| Mortars         |                            | 18 45 mm                             |                                  |
| <u>SALEMI</u>   |                            |                                      |                                  |
| Troops          |                            | 880 (c)                              |                                  |
| H.G.            |                            | 48                                   |                                  |
| Arty.           |                            | none*                                |                                  |
| Mortars         |                            | 18 45 mm                             |                                  |
| <u>S. NINFA</u> |                            |                                      |                                  |
| Troops          |                            | 300 (d)                              |                                  |
| H.G.            |                            | 8 Hvy.<br>25 Lt.                     |                                  |
| Arty.           |                            | none*                                |                                  |
| Mortars         |                            | 6-10                                 |                                  |
| <u>PARTANNA</u> |                            |                                      |                                  |
| Troops          |                            | 800                                  |                                  |
| H.G.            |                            | none*                                |                                  |
| Arty.           |                            | 12 ? Cal.                            |                                  |
| Mortars         |                            | none*                                |                                  |
| Tanks (47 mm)   | 50 (e)                     | 50 (f)                               |                                  |
| <u>MARSALA</u>  |                            |                                      |                                  |
| Troops          |                            | 880 (g)                              | (880) (g)                        |
| H.G.            |                            | 39 Lt.<br>9 Hvy.                     | ( 39 Lt.)<br>( 9 Hvy.)           |
| Arty.           |                            | none*                                | none                             |
| Mortars         |                            | 18 45 mm                             | 18 45 mm                         |
| <u>Totals</u>   | <u>H HOUR</u>              | <u>H + 8 HOURS</u><br>Reinforcements | <u>TOTAL AT</u><br><u>H + 16</u> |
| Troops          | 2300                       | 4560                                 | 6860                             |
| H.G.            | 240                        | 225                                  | 465                              |
| Arty.           | 8+                         | 12                                   | 20+                              |
| Mortars         | none*                      | 60-64                                | 60-64                            |
| Tanks           | 50                         | (50)                                 | 50                               |

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NOTES:

\* indicates that none have been identified in the area considered.

(a) In the vicinity of SCIACCA, troops of the 26th Mountain Division, consisting of 1200 men, 39 light machine guns, 9 heavy machine guns, 18 45 mm mortars, and 7 trucks, are known to exist. As indicated before, the artillery of this division is believed to be in the process of being motorized, but the presence of this unit indicates such missions, probably along the inaccessible places on the coastline. Aerial photographs indicate existence of such terrain features both east and west of SCIACCA. These troops may or may not be considered as reinforcing the beach defense.

(b) For central reserve, H+8 hours by marching, for Beach 84; proportionately longer for others. No motor transportation known to be available.

(c) These are known to be motorized and are able to reach any of the assigned beaches in that period of time via the general route initially to the east and south.

(d) Reinforcement from this group would, in all probability, consist of automatic weapons and mortars, other personnel remaining in the general area of the high ground, on which it is now situated, for secondary or depth defenses.

(e) About 50 tanks, equipped with 47 mm guns are reported in the vicinity of MZZARO, which, based, on the road network, may act as a mobile reserve to oppose any action against the beaches in the area under consideration.

(f) Not cumulative but can reach Beach 87 and eastwards by this time.

(g) The organic motor transportation with this element is probably administrative only, but by utilization of the motor transport of Army and Corps' troops, in emergency this entire force could be moved to Beach 88 by H + 8 hours, and to Beach 87 by H + 16 hours.

CAPABILITIES AGAINST THE ENSA FORCE.

(1) To defend on the beach proper.

(2) To hold the beach lightly withdrawing to defend along the general line of high ground through CALTABELLOTTA - M. CIMANI - MONTEVAGO - PANTANNA - SALEMI.

(3) After being driven from the beaches to effect the maximum delay with the high ground in capability (2) to be the final defensive position.

Capability (1) is indicated for adoption because of the nature of the terrain immediately to the north; the location of strategic objectives such as airfields, and landing fields, the loss of important ports, fixed installations, and a governing roadnet.

Capability (3) will follow subsequently with utmost use being made in the employment of road blocks and other forms of such defenses, rather than an organized defensive position.

Organizational procedure can be anticipated in Capabilities (1) and (3). It may be anticipated that the enemy's plans provide for development from (1) to (3) with procedure organized to the status of S. O. P.

(3) North Coast Landing.

(a) Assumptions.

It is assumed that Army and Corps troops in the vicinity of TRAPANI support installations and beach defenses on the western coast of the Island; but may be available as a counter-attacking force against a landing expected on the shores of the GOLFO DI CASTELLAMARE.

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It is assumed that Army and Corps troops in the vicinity of PALERMO support installations and beach defenses in that area; with a secondary role as a mobile reserve to counter-attack against any landings effected immediately east or west of PALERMO.

It is assumed that the western support units in the area CASTELVEFRANCO - SALEMI - S. NINFA are available for counter-attacking against landings on either the north or south coast in the general area west of the line TERMINI - AGRIGENTO.

However, it is assumed that the "EMSA" landing will cause employment of some of the troops of the 28th Division in a counter-attacking role. It is reasonable to presume that by D+5, the enemy's reaction to our landings on D and D+2 will be a general movement to the south and southeast. In that case, few, if any, troops of the western support units will be available for use against "FISH-GROG-HOOK".

It is assumed that troops on the west and north coasts have been alerted but that no movement has occurred by D+5 in expectation of further landings. Hence, troops located at PALERMO will be intact in operations against "HOOK"; and reserves from TRAPANI will not be moved until after the "FISH-GROG-HOOK" assault has been launched.

It is also assumed that the "EMSA" landing has been successful and on schedule according to plan.

The estimated enemy forces opposing "FISH" and "GROG" are as follows:

|                  | <u>H</u><br>(Alerted) | <u>H + 8</u><br>Reinforcements |               |                         |
|------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------------|---------------|-------------------------|
| <u>At Beach</u>  |                       |                                |               |                         |
| Coastal Troops   | 2170                  |                                |               |                         |
| " H.G.           | 78                    |                                |               |                         |
| " Arty.          | 24                    |                                |               |                         |
| Mortars 45 mm    | 9                     |                                |               |                         |
| <u>ALCAMIO</u>   |                       |                                |               |                         |
| Troops           |                       | 950                            |               |                         |
| H.G.             |                       | 16                             |               |                         |
| Arty.            |                       | 12                             |               |                         |
| Mortars          |                       | none*                          |               |                         |
| <u>PARTINICO</u> |                       |                                |               |                         |
| Troops           |                       | 950                            |               |                         |
| H.G.             |                       | 96                             |               |                         |
| Arty.            |                       | unknown                        |               |                         |
| Mortars          |                       | none*                          |               |                         |
| <u>TOTALS</u>    |                       |                                | <u>TOTALS</u> |                         |
| Troops           | 2170                  | 4020 <sup>an</sup>             | 1900          | 6190 <sup>an</sup> 4070 |
| H.G.             | 78                    | 190 <sup>an</sup>              | 112           | -268 <sup>an</sup> 190  |
| Arty.            | 24                    | 36 <sup>an</sup>               | 12            | -60 <sup>an</sup> 36    |
| Mortars          | 9                     | 9 <sup>an</sup>                | 0             | -18 <sup>an</sup> 9     |

\* Indicates none have been identified in the area considered.

The reserve from TRAPANI should be at or near CALATAFINI by H+16, composed of all or part of the following:

| <u>TRAPANI</u> |        | <u>TOTAL</u><br>H+16 |       |
|----------------|--------|----------------------|-------|
| Troops         | 10,500 | 16,690 <sup>an</sup> | 14570 |
| Recruits       | 1,500  | 1,500                |       |
| H. G.          | 500    | 768 <sup>an</sup>    | 690   |
| Arty.          | 46     | 52                   |       |
| Mortars        | 6      | 51 <sup>an</sup>     | 45    |

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The estimated enemy forces opposing "HOOK" are as follows:

|                 | <u>H</u> | <u>H+8</u> |
|-----------------|----------|------------|
| <u>At Beach</u> |          |            |
| Troops          | 2100     |            |
| M.G.            | 144      |            |
| Arty.           | unknown  |            |
| Mortars 45mm    | 18       |            |

PALETMO

|          |       |
|----------|-------|
| Troops   | 7850  |
| Recruits | 9000  |
| M.G.     | 340   |
| Arty.    | 70+   |
| Mortars  | none* |

RAGHERIA

|              |       |
|--------------|-------|
| Troops       | 1200  |
| M.G.         | 48    |
| Arty.        | none* |
| Mortars 45mm | 18    |

TOTALS

|          | <u>H</u> | <u>H+8</u><br><u>Reinforcements</u> | <u>TOTAL</u><br><u>H+8</u> |
|----------|----------|-------------------------------------|----------------------------|
| Troops   | 2100     | 11,150                              | 13,250                     |
| Recruits | none*    | 9,000                               | 9,000                      |
| M.G.     | 144      | -532 <sup>an</sup> 388              | -676 <sup>an</sup> 532     |
| Arty.    | unknown  | 70+                                 | 70+                        |
| Mortars  | 18       | -36 <sup>an</sup> 18                | -54 <sup>an</sup> 36       |

\* Indicates none have been identified in the area considered.

CAPABILITIES AGAINST THE "FISH" FORCE.

- (1) Defend at the landing beaches.
- (2) Hold the beaches lightly to afford time for occupation of defensive positions on high ground inland.
- (3) Utilize defensive positions in (2) as successive delaying positions in a withdrawal to the heights on the general line west of CASTEL-AMARE - CALATAPINI to provide time for maneuver of the TRAPANI forces to counter-attacking positions.

Capability (1) must be presumed as indicated against the landing on Beach 1, where a determined defense must be expected.

Capability (2), in combination with Capability (3), is indicated against landings on Beach 2 and 3 because of the small number of troops reported in this area as beach defenses. It must be presumed that some of the western support units will be available to oppose this landing at or before arrival at the main road leading west from ALCANTO. In addition, a strong counter-attack must be expected from the west (troops from TRAPANI).

CAPABILITIES AGAINST THE "GROG" FORCE.

- (1) Defense at the beaches.
- (2) Utilize beach defense as initial delaying positions in withdrawals to the high ground on the line PARTINICO - CARINI, where a determined defense must be expected, allowing counter-attack from the south on the exposed flank delivered by troops from the western support units.

It is presumed that a combination of capabilities (1) and (2) is

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likely. Forces available for immediate beach defense are considered inadequate for a prolonged defense. Hence, the enemy will probably be forced to retire to the high ground in the vicinity of PARTIPIO, where it must be assumed, he will interpose himself between "CLOC" and the objective. Some reinforcement must be expected from the PALERIO area.

CAPABILITIES AGAINST THE "HOOK" FORCE.

- (1) Defend at landing beaches.
- (2) Defend the beaches lightly; succeeded by withdrawals to the mountains west, south and east, of PALERIO.

In view of the importance of the port and air installations in this area, capability (2) is considered unlikely.

It must be presumed that a desperate defense of the beaches, as in capability (1) will be met, in view of the importance attached to the locality and the large number of troops available for its defense.

*Oscar W. Koch*  
 OSCAR W. KOCH  
 Colonel, G.S.C.  
 A.C. of S., G-2.

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Ref. No. Q. 797

Copy No. 39

24 June 1943.

G-2 GENERAL INFORMATION BULLETIN #24

Review of Military Censorship Regulations  
as published by Force 141, 18 June 1943.

The undermentioned additional censorship regulations will come into effect from the date of receipt of this letter. Existing censorship regulations will remain in effect, the more important items of which are recapitulated in Section I below. Additional instructions are shown in Section II, which may later be withdrawn, wholly or in part, depending on circumstances.

All troops must be impressed with the necessity for perfect security throughout this operation. This is particularly important before D Day and during the initial stages.

SECTION I - REMINDERS

1. It is forbidden to make use of any civil postal service as a means of sending personal mail. Only the facilities of the Army Post Offices will be used for posting mail.
2. The use of codes, ciphers and shorthand or any other form of secret writing is forbidden.
3. No reference will be made to any matter which might be of value or comfort to the enemy, be detrimental to the war effort, disparage the forces, or prejudice the foreign relations of the Allies. The following list indicates the more important forbidden subjects. Common sense will indicate others.
  - (a) Distinguishing signs of forces, units, baggage, transportation, etc.
  - (b) Plans and forecasts, or orders for future operations, whether known or merely surmised.
  - (c) The location, identity, movement or prospective movement of any troop formations, ships, aircraft, etc.
  - (d) Unit or force strength, arrival or lack of reinforcements.
  - (e) The use, condition, or probable extension of utilities or transportation facilities.

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- (f) Effect of any action of the enemy.
- (g) Particulars of arms or equipment.
- (h) Position or details of billets, camps etc.
- (i) Reports of atrocities, unless released by appropriate authority.
- (j) Descriptions of any tactical engagement prior to official release or before a lapse of two weeks after such engagement.

4. Prohibited enclosures:

- (a) Official military or civil documents, orders, reports, maps and enemy documents or items of any kind.
- (b) Uncensored or local publications.
- (c) Phonograph (gramophone) records.
- (d) Any other enclosures of military value.

SECTION II - ADDITIONAL RESTRICTIONS

- 1. No geographical location whatever will be disclosed.
- 2. Clippings from local newspapers, postage stamps, and foreign currency or coins will not be sent through the post.
- 3. Picture postcards will not be mailed, or otherwise dispatched.
- 4. Correspondence with local inhabitants outside Africa is forbidden.
- 5. No exposed films or prints will be mailed or otherwise dispatched.

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- 2 -

b. Radio from landing field on Cape Bon to CP, 343, after initial interrogation of the pilot.

c. Radio from the landing field to CP, 343, after interrogation and initial interpretation of the photograph, if taken, by photo interpreters at the landing field.

d. Photographs, if taken, will also be flown to Photo Interpretation Section, Hq. 343, located at La Marsa, where they will be interpreted, and a further final report, if anything new is discovered, will proceed through normal channels from the Rear CP, 343, to Forward CP, 343.

4. Pre-Planned Missions.

a. See overlay\* for missions requested by Hq. 343 to XII A.S.C. at Corps and Division Headquarters.

b. See memorandum\* this Hq., dated 19 June 1943, on air observation to Commanding General, XII Air Support Com'd, showing the actual missions requested.

c. All units, in making their requests, will make certain that the mission they require is not included amongst the daily missions shown in letter, this Hq., 19 June 1943.

d. Night observation missions as shown in letter 19 June referred to above.

III. PHOTOGRAPHIC RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS.

1. Administrative Procedure.

The North African Photographic Reconnaissance Wing will fly four missions per day from La Marsa airfield. Hq. Task Force 343 Photographic Interpretation Unit and the Photo Laboratory will be established at this field. Photographs will be developed, interpreted, and the information radioed to the Forward CP as fast as received. It is estimated that an average of six hours will be required for the whole process.

2. Pre-Planned Missions.

a. See overlay dated 20 June for routine missions at CPs of Corps and Divisions.

b. See Annex to G-2 Bulletin #22, this Hq., 17 June 1943, listing sorties that will be flown automatically.

IV. NIGHT PHOTOGRAPHIC MISSIONS.

Any shift of troops disclosed in the late afternoon photographic missions will be followed by night photography.

- 2 -

\* Copy attached

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V. MAPS

1. The map to be used for identifying targets throughout the task force will be the 1/100,000 map of HORRIFIED. Missions requested will be further identified by the use of the British grid system.

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ANNEX TO G-2 BULLETIN #22

17 June 1943

1. PHOTOGRAPHIC RECONNAISSANCE UNIT - ROUTINE MISSIONS.

a. D Day.

(1) Flown after 1400B. Three sorties commencing at 5000 yards inland from AGRIGENTO - ARAGONA to general line POZZALLO - RAGUSA - VIZZINI, all exclusive.

b. D/1.

(1) Flown in morning. Three sorties commencing at 5000 yards inland from AGRIGENTO - ARAGONA to general line POZZALLO - RAGUSA - VIZZINI, all exclusive.

(2) The fourth sortie D/1 to be flown after 1400B, parallel to coast to overlap inland morning sortie further north.

c. D/2. Early Mission.

(1) Two parallel; northern one to embrace and include highway VIZZINI - CALTAGIRONE - PIAZZA ARMERINA - CALTANISSETTA - AGRIGENTO - PORTO EMPEDOCLE.

(2) The third sortie from LICATA on the coastal road to CASTELVETRANO.

d. D/3.

(1) Same as first flight, D/2, along general route VIZZINI - CALTANISSETTA AGRIGENTO.

(2) Main highway CALTANISSETTA, road junction LERCARAFREDDI, then south on secondary road to AGRIGENTO.

(3) Main highway AGRIGENTO - PALERMO.

e. D/4.

(1) One sortie CALTANISSETTA - ENNA - LEONFORTE - SPERLINGA - PEFALATA toward TERMINI IMMERSE.

(2) Three sorties each originating at AGRIGENTO:

(i) North through LERCARAFREDDI, thence east on main highway toward CALTANISSETTA.

(ii) CALTANISSETTA - AGRIGENTO thence northwest on main road toward PALERMO.

(iii) AGRIGENTO toward CASTELVETRANO.

f. D/5.

Same as e above (D/4).

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- 4 -

19 June 1943

      B

(C O P Y)

SUBJECT : Request for Observation Missions.

TO : Commanding General, XII Air Support Command.

1. Daily observation missions to locate troop movements are requested.

a. Observations on D-day are listed in order of priority below. On D+1 and each day thereafter eliminate the first two missions below and perform the balance in the same priority. See overlay. Night missions nightly beginning night of D+1, D+2, are shown on the same overlay.

1. Request visual reconnaissance of beach from LICATA to POZZALLO supplemented by low oblique photo strip if feasible. Required: landing progress and approximate depth of penetration of our troops between points designated. Report mission not later than 1000B. This mission to be flown D-day only.

2. Repeat No. 1 mission at 1100B. Report required not later than 1300B, D-day.

3. Request visual reconnaissance - road CANICATTI - CAMPOBELLO - LICATA as to any enemy concentrations or troop movements south, giving size and type (foot, motorized, armored, etc). Take oblique photo strip of all enemy observed. Report by 1100B. Photos to have first priority.

(The above reconnaissance will be applicable to the following missions as to information and time of reporting.)

4. Request visual reconnaissance of the PIAZZA ARMERINA - GELA road movement South.

5. Request visual reconnaissance of the RAGUSA - COMISO - VITTORIA road, as far west as the ACATE river. Report any movement West.

6. Request visual reconnaissance of the AGRIGENTO - PALMA DI MONTECHIARO - LICATA road. Report any movement Southeast.

7. Request visual reconnaissance of the S. MICHELE - CALTAGIRONE - GRAMMICHELE - VIZZINI road. Report any movement East or West.

8. Request visual reconnaissance of the CANICATTI - SERRADIFALCO - S. CATALDO - CALTANISSETTA - PIAZZA ARMERINA road, East or West

9. Request visual reconnaissance of the SCIACCA - RIBERA - PORTO EMPEDOCLE road, Southeast.

10. Request visual reconnaissance of the main road running Northwest from AGRIGENTO through RAFFADALI - S. STEFANO. Report any movement to the South.

- 4 -

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b. Night Observation.

(1) D Day: (night of)

- (a) Road junction at H-330450
- (b) Road junction at H-276376
- (c) Road junction at G-940345
- (d) Road junction at H-538175
- (e) Road at western edge of VITTORIA - H-465182.

(2) D/1, D/2, D/3, D/4: (nightly)

- (a) Road junction at eastern edge of PALMA DI MONTECHIARO - G-795438.
- (b) Road junction at CAMPOBELLO - G-925508.
- (c) Road junction at CANICATTI - G-865623.
- (d) Road junction at CALTANISSETTA - H-050770.
- (e) Road junction at H-328645.
- (f) Road junction at H-330450.
- (g) Road junction at H-465485 - CALTAGIRONE.
- (h) Road junction at H-670410 - VIZZINI.
- (i) Road junction at H-625265 - CHIARAMONTE.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

/s/ W. G. CALDWELL,  
Lt. Col., A.G.D.  
Adjutant General.



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5-179.

HEADQUARTER I ARMORED CORPS, REINFORCED  
A.P.O. #758

10483

Copy No. 00035

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Auth: CG, A.C.  
Init:   
Date: June 43~~

19 June 1943

G-2 GENERAL INFORMATION BULLITIN NO. 20

The following information is extracted from AFHQ G-2 Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 42, for the week ending 12 June 1943.

1. The Italian Islands.

a. PANTELLERIA.

Sustained aerial bombardment of the island of PANTELLERIA was commenced shortly after the close of the TUNISIAN campaign. The weight of attack was progressively increased and during the days immediately preceding the surrender reached an extremely heavy intensity and concentration. Port installations and coastal batteries were also periodically bombarded by the Royal Navy. On 8 and again on 10 June the island was invited to surrender but ignored the summons. Shortly before noon, however, on 11 June, when the air and naval bombardments were at their peak, a white cross of surrender was shown on the airfield and a white flag was hoisted on Semaphore hill. At the same time radio messages were put out offering surrender in view of a shortage of water. Advance landing parties arrived off the town and harbour of PANTELLERIA at 1200 hrs. and encountered slight opposition from shore defences on one of the beaches despite the surrender signals that had already been shown elsewhere. This was probably due to the fact that the order to surrender had not been received by all units at the moment when the landings began. All opposition had ceased by 1244 hrs. and no resistance was offered to our mopping-up operations and collection of prisoners.

According to present reports 11, 135 Italian service prisoners have been taken, including naval and militia personnel and probably also air force. The military garrison had been estimated at rather more than 10,000. No fresh units other than those appearing in the order of battle have been identified but it transpires that the combat elements of the garrison were organized into the Pantelleria Mixed Brigade. As had been anticipated, naval and militia as well as military personnel were found to be manning coast defence guns. Twelve French R 35 tanks were found in hangars. One tank company had been assumed on the island but in view of the generally unsuitable terrain it was thought that the vehicles had possibly been dug in in the vicinity of the airfield although photography had not actually identified them. It is, however, evident that the enemy had intended to use them for local defence of the aerodrome. A number of food, gasoline and ammunition dumps have been located but no details are available concerning these nor the quantities of equipment captured.

28 German prisoners including one officer were taken. These appear to have been manning airfield defences. On learning that the island was to surrender they made an unsuccessful attempt to escape by sea.

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No details are yet available concerning general conditions in the island. Water shortage in the town of PANTELLERIA had evidently been acute for three days before the surrender but as the water situation is now reported to be in hand it is probable that, although certain water supplies were almost certainly destroyed by bombing, the main difficulty was that of distribution during the almost continuous air raids. The effects of such intensive saturation bombing both on the defences and on general conditions are being reviewed.

b. LAMPEDUSA.

The island was subjected to continuous air and naval bombardment after the fall of PANTELLERIA and surrendered at 1945 hours on 12 June. It is reported that about 4,000 service prisoners have been taken.

c. LINOSA.

The island surrendered on the morning of 13 June and 140 service prisoners have been taken off.

2. Assembly and Movement of German Units in SOUTHERN FRANCE.

Numerous reports from a variety of sources in recent weeks have suggested a greater concentration of German troops in the general area BORDEAUX - HENDAYE - TARBES than could easily be accounted for by the presence of parts of 715 Infantry Division and rear elements of the Hermann Goring Division already located there.

Documents recently captured in TUNISIA indicate the formation by Wehrkreis XVII of two additional divisions in Southwestern FRANCE. The first of these appears to be a light or motorized division numbered 386. This formation has no connection with the former 386 Infantry Division disbanded in 1940. It is known to include a tank battalion and an artillery regiment of which the third Abteilung is A.A. The second new division is numbered 345 and is probably a normal infantry formation.

In addition to 386 and 345 Divisions there are some indications that one of the motorized divisions destroyed at STALINGRAD, possibly No. 29, may be re-forming in the same area.

There may thus have been the elements of five divisions in the vicinity of the Western end of the Franco-Spanish Pyrenean frontier. It is possible, however, that some of these units are now being moved, in view of apparently reliable reports to the effect that troops in the areas of MONT DE MARSAN, AIRE SUR ADOUR, TARBES and VIC EN BIGORRE are to be shortly transferred. One report suggests that ITALY is the destination of some of these troops.

3. Re-forming of the STALINGRAD Divisions.

Of the twenty divisions destroyed at STALINGRAD it is evident that ten or eleven are re-forming in FRANCE and BELGIUM. The remainder are probably also re-forming in RUSSIA, POLAND and the BALKANS; one of them, 384 Infantry Division, has already been identified again in the Southern sector of the Eastern front.

The divisions reforming in the West are as follows:

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|                       |                      |
|-----------------------|----------------------|
| 14 Panzer Division    | - NANTES area        |
| 16 Panzer Division    | - LAVAL area         |
| 24 Panzer Division    | - LISIEUX area       |
| 71 Infantry Division  | - OSTEND area        |
| 305 Infantry Division | -- BOULOGNE area     |
| 343 Infantry Division | - COTES DU NORD area |
| 371 Infantry Division | - PONTIVY area       |
| 76 Infantry Division  | - S. NAZAIRE area.   |

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In addition to the above, 46 Infantry Division is believed to be in BELGIUM, a motorized division possibly No. 29 may be in Southwestern FRANCE and 60 Motorized Division is thought also to be in the Southwest, its divisional sign having been recently reported by a French source at NIMES.

#### 4. Changes in the Italian High Command.

A document captured in PANTELLERIA indicates that the command of Sixth Army recently vacated by General ROATTA, now Chief of the General Staff of the Army, has been given to General GUZZONI.

The appointment of GUZZONI is surprising since he is 66 years of age and was put on the reserve over three years ago. He is an infantryman who in 1933 commanded the Sardinian Grenadiers Division. During the Abyssinian war he was Vice-Governor of ERITREA. He returned to ITALY in 1937 to take over XI Corps, which he left in the spring of 1939 to command the Italian expeditionary force which invaded ALBANIA. Though resistance was negligible, the operation was on the whole well planned and executed. On the conclusion of operations he was promoted Army General-Designate and appointed Commander in Chief, ALBANIA. Shortly afterwards he returned to ITALY and was put on the reserve. In November 1940, however, he became Under Secretary of State for War and Vice Chief of the Army Staff in succession to General SODDU, who went to ALBANIA to reorganize the Italian forces who were suffering severely at the hands of the Greeks. The campaign had thoroughly discredited the Italian Higher Command and its conclusion was followed by a shake-up intended to bring younger men to the fore. As a result GUZZONI was promoted Army General and went into retirement, from which he has now for the second time emerged.

Not much is known of his personality. His record would seem to indicate an experienced but not very inspiring commander. If GUZZONI has gone to SICILY it is perhaps of some significance that the new Army Commander is a soldier of long-standing professional reputation who has never, like ROATTA, been closely identified with the Fascist party.

#### 5. ITALY - Miscellaneous.

a. The following report purports to be from an Italian soldier who was in SICILY at the end of May: The damage to installations in the harbour and to the town of PALERMO is very severe. Troops leave the town during air raids and refuse to sleep there. Communications with the mainland have completely broken down. Railways in the island are seriously disorganized. Civilian and military morale is very low.

Comment: The reference to the break-down in communications with the mainland is probably connected with Allied bombing attacks on the MESSINA train ferries.


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b. A fairly reliable source gives an unconfirmed report that an Italian Home Guard is being organized and that exercises are being held throughout the country against invasion from the sea and air, in particular against gliders.

Comment: It is highly probable that the many local defence units in ITALY are being hastily organized to meet the threat of invasion.

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e. Passes and seal should always be kept secure against unauthorized possession or use.

f. The date stamp sets (three different outline shapes to a set), are issued so that security control can be facilitated by frequent changes in the shape used. The issue of cards, passes, badges, etc., to labor and unskilled workers has never proved satisfactory. If the skin is too dark for an impression, some portion of the clothing may be stamped for the day of work.

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2. Estimated Changes Now to D Day.

- a. It is impossible to estimate accurately how many Axis planes will be destroyed on the ground and in the air by our bombers and fighters between now and D day, but every effort will be made to tempt their fighters to come up and engage in combat.
- b. It is impossible also to estimate accurately the general conditions that will exist on the German-Russian front by D day, which will determine how many planes the Axis can bring down from the theatre to the Mediterranean. Every effort will be made, however, to hold many German fighters in France and Germany by means of a steadily increasing concentration of American and British bombing attacks from our bases in England.
- c. It is well established, however, that the German Air Force has had a very hard winter, particularly in the Western Desert and in Tunisia, that her overall air strength has been declining, and that she has been scraping the bottom of the barrel of her reserves, with particular difficulty in providing enough trained crews for replacement. It is doubtful, therefore, that she can bring in many air reinforcements from her Western Front, and it is also known that her air strength in such areas as the Balkans has already been reduced to a bare minimum. In the area of Greece, Crete, and the Dodecanese Islands, for instance, latest reports show a total of only 160 aircraft of all types with a serviceability ratio of under 50%. Adequate servicing has been a growing difficulty in all theatres.
- d. To be conservative, it is best to estimate that more Axis aircraft will be brought in from the Russian and other fronts, than will be destroyed by our air forces between now and D day. Germany also will try to spring some surprises. For instance, she may have upwards of 50 torpedo bombers with trained crews operating in the past out of Norway against Russian-bound convoys, which she might decide to bring down to Grosseto, Italy, or Sardinian bases for operation against an invasion fleet. Obviously, the Axis is well aware of the great concentration of shipping and invasion barges in North African ports.

3. Reconciliation of "Estimates" with Latest Photo Cover.

- a. The following table of D day "Estimates" will show some discrepancies from the reports of the present location of Axis aircraft based on the latest photo cover. Axis fighter strength on the island has been building up from approximately 370 on May 13th, to 450 on May 21st, and 483 on May 31st, plus 27 in Reggio, or a total of 510. Further build-up before D day to 555 fighters and fighter-bombers would seem to be a fair estimate. Incidentally, distribution on the latest photographic interpretations showed 115 fighters on the three southern Sicilian fields, 129 in the Catania-Gerbini area in the East, and 239 on the Western Sicilian airfields, plus 27 on the toe of Italy at Reggio. All such fighter distribution however, can change over night.
- b. Photo reports show that JU 88's have been moving out of Sicily, reducing the total to 73, which is entirely logical in order to place their bomber

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strength at the effective range and better protection afforded by Southern Sardinia, and the Rome-Naples-Foggia-Taranto area. The reports also show only 21 long range ME 110 and 210 fighter and fighter-bombers still in Sicily. It is estimated below that there will be about 100 of these planes within effective range (280-350 miles) of our landings by D day.

- c. Photo reports show 80 miscellaneous and 42 unidentified planes in Sicily, which is not inconsistent with the following estimate of 300 less-important and non-combat types within the whole effective area. Most of the reconnaissance, coastal seaplanes, and miscellaneous types would normally operate back away from the zones of threatened invasion.

4. Estimate of Enemy Air Strength on D Day. (The following table includes only those planes expected to be within their effective operating range of our landing forces. It is arranged by types in the order of estimated importance):

|   | <u>ESTIMATED QUANTITY</u> |             |
|---|---------------------------|-------------|
|   | Total                     | Serviceable |
| a. Long Range German JU 88 Bombers                                    | * 290                     | 190         |
| b. Single Engine German ME 109 fighters                               | 200                       | 130         |
| c. Single Engine Italian fighters (Macchi 200, 202, 205, and RE 2001) | 300                       | 130         |
| d. German two engine ME 110 and 210 fighters                          | 100                       | 66          |
| e. Single Engine German FW 190 fighter-bombers                        | 55                        | 36          |
| f. Italian S.M. 79, and S.M. 84 torpedo-bombers                       | 50                        | 22          |
| g. German JU 88 and HE 111 bomber-recce                               | 35                        | 22          |
| h. Italian bomber-recce S.M. 79, S.M. 84 CZ. 1007                     | 80                        | 36          |
| i. Italian coastal Cz 501 and Cz 506                                  | 80                        | 36          |
| j. German JU 87 dive bombers  | 20                        | 14          |
| k. German ME 109 Army Co-op   | 10                        | 6           |
| l. Italian Army Co-op Ca 311, 312, and 313                            | <u>25</u>                 | <u>12</u>   |
| TOTALS  | 1245                      | 700         |

\* Includes perhaps 30-50 torpedo-bombers

5. Reduction of Italian Planes to German Equivalents.

- a. The above totals do not show a true picture, as they add German planes and Italian planes together, whereas it may safely be stated that all German types are superior to their counterpart in the Italian Air Force, and that many of the Italian types are obsolescent. Opinions will vary as to relative effectiveness, but for the purpose of this "estimate", an overall ration of 50% might not be far off; at least, it would be much closer to the facts than any figures which gave equal weight to Italian and German planes alike. This would reduce the above overall total of 1,245 planes to 977, of which 582 might be considered serviceable at any one time.
- b. Even these totals, however, should be further broken down to separate the effective combat types from the non-combat and miscellaneous, as follows:

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|  | <u>TOTAL</u> | <u>SERVICEABLE</u> |
|--|--------------|--------------------|
| (1) Bombers, fighters, and fighter-bombers | 800          | 490                |
| (2) Recce, coastal, and miscellaneous      | 177          | 92                 |

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
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RANGE OF ENEMY AIRCRAFT

FIGHTER - 110 MILES  
BOMBER - 340 MILES

X - (Center of Radius)  
Indicates S.B.  
Airdromes

*Extra*

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HEADQUARTERS FORCE 343  
A.P.O. 758

9-723

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Auth: CG, Force 343  
Init: *CMB*  
Date: 17 June 1943

17 June 1943

G-2 GENERAL INFORMATION BULLETIN NO. 17.

I THE MESSINA FERRY

Compiled from Force 141 Intelligence Summaries Nos. 2, 3 and 4 (30 May - 7 June 1943)

The MESSINA straits are the Sicilian life line across which the bulk of reinforcements of men and material will flow, supplemented by shipping to the Eastern ports of CATANIA, SYRACUSE and AUGUSTA. Traffic to PALERMO and TRAPANI will not be great unless the ports enjoy a long spell of immunity from attack.

Photo reconnaissance reveals that of the five train ferries available on 29 May, only one appeared to be serviceable. One was sunk at one of the MESSINA piers, a second was burnt out and still alongside at MESSINA, two more were under repair at TARANTO, while the fifth is apparently still active, and on 1 June was seen in transit between SAN GIOVANNI and MESSINA.

The breakdown of the ferry service is apparently being felt and causing some rail congestion at both sides of the Straits, as the following number of mixed rolling stock (excluding passenger cars) were seen on 29 May:-

|          |             |
|----------|-------------|
| MESSINA  | 440         |
| GIOVANNI | 350         |
| REGGIO   | <u>357</u>  |
|          | <u>1147</u> |

Railway activity at MESSINA was apparently stopped for several days (29 - 30 - 31 May) as a result of air raids, while on 29 May a main coast line railway bridge at REGGIO was seen to have been destroyed.

Photo reconnaissance shows that as a result of air attacks on 21 and 24 May on SAN GIOVANNI, both rail ferry termini at this port were put out of action. A building which believed to contain the mechanism for the ferry termini was completely destroyed.

However, damage to train ferries and ports can be at least partially made up by the use of lighters, which can ply from beach to beach across the Strait. Photo reconnaissance on 1 June showed 8 Siebel Ferries to have arrived at MESSINA while on 3 June 12 Siebels and 5 F-boats were observed along the coast between REGGIO and SAN GIOVANNI. The small amount of shipping seen in the Sicilian ports in recent weeks serves to support the view that the main supply is still across the Straits.

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II. ITALIAN COASTAL DEFENSE (Extracted from instructions for C.D. units, from Force 141 Intelligence Summary No. 4)

Sentries are authorized to give the signal of alert only in cases of extreme danger. In other cases the signal of alert will be given by the Commander of the Post. Should the sentry sight a formation of enemy ships approaching the coast, he must immediately call the Sergeant of the guard, who, after having ascertained the actual danger, will immediately give the alert, with green and red rockets. This signal is to be repeated every three minutes. The platoon leader is to be immediately informed and will send the information immediately to the Company Commander by every available means of communication.

When the sentry sees the alert signal fired by other shore patrol posts, he is to inform the Post Commander. The Commander after having ascertained that the alarm signal has been repeated, will answer by firing one green and one red rocket.

III. AMENDMENTS TO THE STANDARD DISTRIBUTIONS LISTED IN G-2 GENERAL INFORMATION BULLETIN NO. 15 SHOULD BE MADE TO INCLUDE 1 COPY FOR THE 1ST ENGINEER SPECIAL BRIGADE IN BOTH DISTRIBUTION "M" AND "N" AND THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL STANDARD DISTRIBUTION IS ADDED:

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HEADQUARTERS I AMBOLD CORPS, BELT F.  
P.O. #753

Ref. No. Q-665

16 June 1943.

Copy No. 00039

Q-2 GENERAL REPORT WITH NUMBER NO. 16.

I. ITALIAN COAST WATCHING PROCEDURES.

The following captured Italian document deals with coast watching in LIBYA but is of interest as furnishing a possible indication of Italian practice;

VI (LONTA) Group of MG Squadron (I Squadron)

Subject: Guard Posts.

1. Total number of guards watching the coast is 36, six for each post.
2. Location of posts: No. 1 - Homs road 22 km; No. 2 - Homs road 25 km; (Tower of OSTUNI); No. 3 - Homs road 29 km; No. 4 - Homs road 32 km; No. 5 - Homs road 38 km; No. 6 - Homs road 41 km;
3. Distance between sentries and guard posts.  
No. 1 - about 80 metres; No. 2 - sentries are in the post itself;  
No. 3 - about 7 metres; No. 4 - about 10 metres; No. 5 - about 20 metres; No. 6 - about 30 metres.
4. Communications - Runners. One Verey pistol for signalling at each post.
5. Arms available at each post. Machine gun and three rifles. Machine gun is in position near sentry.
6. Ammunition consists of 1100 rounds for each MG and six clips for each rifle. MG ammunition belts are kept in the proper boxes which are kept near the MG. Emergency equipment is in covers, and clips for rifles in pouches.
7. Instructions have been given to post commanders to keep in close touch with the sentries, and explain to them their responsibility for the security of the post and in particular, to train their men in the better handling of the weapons on issue to them.
8. Orders have been given to guards that no fires of any description will be lighted except in exceptional circumstances for signalling at night; that in the event of fires breaking out they will be extinguished with sand, water or any other means available.
9. Any orders that may be received from Group Headquarters are at once passed on and explained to post commanders and sentries.
10. Tasks - Inspect the stretch of coast from the 21 km to 42 km mark and all approaches from the sea in the area. Report immediately any possible landing in the area, and in the meantime engage the enemy. Landing will be signalled from the post which gives the alarm by two red rockets - danger signal - two green rockets will be sent up for danger past. Signals will be repeated at intervals until the O.P. in the tower of OSTUNI acknowledges them by sending up the same signals. In the event of the Verey pistols not working, fires will be lighted. From every O.P. periodical inspections will be made in the immediate neighborhood of the coastal area. Sentries will challenge anyone who approaches. The Post Commander will be summoned and will proceed to check identity by demanding the password.

Further, should any post sight possible enemy aircraft, squadron headquarters will be notified by quickest possible means (including emergency equipment). Squadron headquarters will at once pass the information to Group headquarters in accordance with the latter's instructions.

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(Equals British SECRET)

## II. ITALIANS IN THE ATTACK.

The following captured document illustrates a frequent Italian weakness failure to organize a defensive position after a successful advance.

### TO ALL OFFICERS

It often happens that an attacking unit, if it attains the objective without having to fight, or barely having to fight, not only passes beyond the objective, but sometimes stops at the objective, considering its action completed. Not only does this break the rules of discipline, but neglects the most elementary precautions of defense and safety, seeing that the men put themselves in full view and break ranks to gaze around, and spread out. The consequences that may derive from such inconceivable conduct are evident and comprehensible. It occurs at the very most critical and difficult phase of the action, when enemy reaction is to be expected more or less immediately, either in the form of gun fire or counter-attack.

The regulations in such a case are clear and explicit, and therefore I do not deem it necessary to quote their contents since they constitute the basis of technical professional training. I wish, however, to make quite clear certain tactical exigencies which should be kept in mind and practiced.

- (1) During the execution of the attack:
  - (a) Cover your exposed flank with the MG platoon.
  - (b) Keep flanking units in view and coordinate your fire with theirs.
  - (c) See that units don't get mixed up.
  - (d) Overcome the tendency to close up.
  
- (2) During rest periods:
  - (a) Keep the unit under control.
  - (b) Dispose units in the best positions for observation and fire.
  
- (3) When the objective is obtained:
  - (a) Proceed immediately and speedily beyond the objective and organize a defensive position (use your sappers).
  - (b) Maintain the greatest cohesion, keeping under cover from fire and view.
  - (c) Get your weapons into position.
  - (d) Re-form the reserves.
  - (e) Watch the flanks.

The above reveals implicitly the vital task of the section in infantry fighting, and therefore the application of the above is the specific job of the N.C.O.

Company and platoon commanders will insist, will insist, will insist (sic) on the above, not forgetting, of course, that the training of the individual soldier facilitates the carrying out of these elementary rules, which, if they do nothing else, avoid useless sacrifices.

*[Signature]*  
KOSH  
SAC of S, G-2

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HEADQUARTERS FORCE 343  
A.P.O. 758

Ref. No. Q 627  
Copy No. 00031

SECRET  
Auth: CG, Force 343  
Init: W  
Date: 1 June 1943

14 June 1943

G-2 GENERAL INFORMATION BULLETIN #14

PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE PLAN ON AND AFTER D DAY  
INTERPRETATION OF PHOTOGRAPHS

1. On D Day, a Photo Interpretation Unit composed of five officers and six enlisted men, a photographic laboratory, the 66th Topographic Company, and an Artillery Officer for selecting counter-battery targets, will be located in the vicinity of the airdrome where the flights of photographic reconnaissance aircraft are based (in the vicinity of Tunis).

2. By D Day, each division in the task force will have at its C.P., attached to the G-2 Section, a competent photographic interpreter.

3. It is planned to cover the period D to approximately D+4 with three routine photographic sorties; in general, one at daylight, one during the day, and one in the late afternoon. Special photo missions will be flown in the next flight after receipt.

4. An interpretation report should, under favorable circumstances, reach the headquarters of the unit making the request within six hours of initiating the request.

5. In addition to the foregoing, an Observation Squadron will be available for pin-point observation photography and visual reconnaissance. These flights will be flown upon receipt, subject to priority as determined by XII Air Support Command.

6. Requests for photographic sorties will be handled through channels as follows:

- a. JOSS to 343 (afloat) to Rear C.P. (ashore) to 3d Photo Group.
- b. CENT or DIME to SHARK to 343 (afloat) to Rear C.P. (ashore) to 3d Photo Group.
- c. There is no objection on the part of G-2, 343, for direct communication from JOSS, SHARK, CENT or DIME to Rear C.P. (ashore) direct, if it is technically possible to do so.
- d. Copies of prints will be forwarded by water, if possible, after the radio report has been dispatched.

7. The foregoing is the plan for D to D+4. From D+4 to D+8, some photo aircraft will be landed at C.P., 343. Some interpreters will be brought over for duty at 343; one piece of equipment, capable of two prints only, will be available at C.P., 343. Two-way courier service, twice daily, will be instituted, and quantity reproduction of selected prints or sorties will be established at that time.

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Reproduction is definitely limited. All available stocks in the British Isles are now being diverted to this effort. It has been indicated that the United States is supplying the Pacific and other Allies, and none is available from the United States. If 20 copies of any sortie are required, 6000 prints are necessary. The capacity of the land-based multi-printer is 600 prints per hour.

8. All unit interpreters must be kept informed in reference to particular targets to look for in advance of the attack and must be kept informed as to location of friendly front line units to avoid delays occasioned by generalities.

9. It is understood that requested missions will be only tactical and that should strategic missions be required for any reason, these missions will clear through 141. No air boundaries are contemplated.

Koch / *(initials)*  
KOCH,  
AC of S, G-2

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HEADQUARTERS FORCE 343  
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SECRET  
Auth: Force 343  
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Date: 12 June 1943.

10233

Ref. No. Q554

Copy No. 20

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12 June 1943.

G-2 GENERAL INFORMATION BULLETIN #11

I. COVER PLAN.

1. The Cover Plan embraces only such activities as are to deceive the enemy and does not involve any of our security in reference to the handling of our troops to prevent leakages, which would normally be picked up through our Counter Subversive system.

2. The Cover Plan for the 82d Airborne Division has been prepared. In outline, the plan is that after concentration in a certain area, parties will be sent to another area and preparations made for the move of the 82d Division to another staging area prior to the actual assault on the cover destination.

3. The use of dummy parachute landings is proposed and under consideration.

II. BEACH STUDIES.

Two hundred copies of 1/12,500 beach studies are being made, 25 going to Navy; 25 to go to Headquarters 343; 150 to the force concerned. These copies will be ready about 14 June.

III. PRISONER OF WAR INTERROGATION TEAMS.

Prisoner of War Interrogation teams are being ordered directly to their divisions. They will have 1/4-ton 4x4's but lack trailers.

IV. INTERPRETERS.

It has been requested that interpreters be placed on the convoy that is bringing the 45th Division. However, in the event they do not arrive, it is recommended that all Divisional G-2's, through the proper staff section, canvass their own personnel for Spanish, German, Greek, and Italian linguists, with a view to using the latter when the need arises.

V. ROAD MAPS.

Road maps will be available subject to Force 343 Engineer Distribution Plan, at the warehouse in Constantine, after June 16. This is a 1/500,000 scale road map in four colors, to be placed in every vehicle.

VI. RELIEF MODELS.

Additional relief models will be dispatched as they arrive in LANGTREE, directly to sub-units concerned.

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VII. "TARGET" BOOKLETS.

A booklet entitled "Target" will be distributed to units on the following basis: 4000 to JOSS; 4000 to SHARK; 1000 to WILDCAT; 750 to WOLF; 250 to Hq. 343.

VIII. COLLATION MAPS.

One hundred proof sheets of the final collation maps of the beach areas will be ready approximately 14 June. They are to be regarded correct as of 7 June. This headquarters will make distribution to lower echelons immediately thereafter.

IX. PUBLIC RELATIONS.

Public Relations personnel will be distributed to units as early as possible. It is considered good cover to have them dispatched to units early, as ordinarily they arrive just before a new venture is to take place. This personnel will not be classified until necessary for the actual operation but will be considered a part of the organization reference restrictions, etc.

X. CENSORSHIP.

1. One field press censor will be with Hq. 343. The purpose of this censor is to pass on all publicity material after consultation with G-2, 343, and then forward it to Force 141. No press information is allowed to pass by radio below Hq. 343 at any time until the instructions are received from Hq. 141.

2. The remaining post office, telephone, and telegraph censors will be brought over as soon as requested by Hq. 343 and will be held in readiness at the AGOUTI Headquarters of 343.

XI. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE.

1. Personnel and equipment for Psychological Warfare is being provided by Hq. 141. This personnel will report to Hq. 343, at AGOUTI, on approximately D Day, where they will be held in readiness until called for by Hq. 343.

2. Advance copies of Psychological Warfare leaflets will be made available to all major headquarters as soon as printed.

XII. SECURITY PASSES.

1. Two types of security passes will be issued to Corps and Division Headquarters. The white security passes are for issue to United States and British civilian organizations, such as the Red Cross. A brown security pass will also be issued for emergency use only to special individuals for counter intelligence purposes.

2. The above two types of passes are not to be confused with the passes issued by the Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory (AMGOT), which will probably be red in color and are for the purpose of identifying civilians in their normal civilian pursuits.

3. Embossed stamps will be issued for use with the white and brown security passes.

4. Sets of three date stamps, designed to enable local pass systems to be

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established for employees working in docks, service installations, etc., will be issued. They are for stamping daily the actual person (e.g., wrist) of the employees on their entry to the docks or installations, etc.

XIII. CAPTURE OF ENEMY AGENTS.

1. If an enemy agent is captured in HORRIFIED, the nearest CIC officer will be notified at once.

2. This is particularly important in the case of an agent equipped with some means of communication with the enemy, such as a radio transmitter or secret ink. Such an agent must be held in custody and forwarded to Hq. 343, through channels, as quickly as possible.

3. The fact that an enemy agent has been captured must be treated with the greatest secrecy, and knowledge thereof must be strictly limited to those that require such knowledge in order that the case may be properly handled.

*Koch*  
KOCH,  
AC of S., G-2

DISTRIBUTION:

|                |       |
|----------------|-------|
| SHARK          | 1-5   |
| DIME           | 6-10  |
| CENT           | 11-15 |
| JOSS           | 16-20 |
| KOOL           | 21-25 |
| WOLF           | 26-30 |
| Force 343 - CG | 31    |
| C/S            | 32    |
| Secy C/S       | 33    |
| G-1            | 34    |
| G-3            | 35    |
| G-4            | 36    |
| Arty           | 37    |
| Engr           | 38    |
| Sig            | 39    |
| Cml            | 40    |
| Ord            | 41    |
| Med            | 42    |
| A.G.           | 43    |
| QM             | 44    |
| G-2            | 45-50 |
| XII ASC        | 51    |
| COMNAVNAW      | 52    |
| " Comdr Munson | 53    |
| File           | 54-60 |
| MONGOOSE       | 61-65 |

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HEADQUARTERS FORCE 343  
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2  
APO 758

~~SECRET~~  
By: ~~CG, Force 343~~  
Init: ~~LOW~~  
Date: ~~12 June 1943~~

Ref. No. Q-561

12 June 1943

Copy No. 00018

G-2 GENERAL INFORMATION BULLETIN #9

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE ACTIVITIES (PWB)

I. TASKS

The following tasks will be performed by the P.W.B. Combat Teams:

1. Tactical propaganda against enemy troops.
2. Local propaganda amongst the civilian population.
3. Radio propaganda.
4. Collection of propaganda intelligence.

II. METHOD

The above tasks will be accomplished by the following methods:

1. Tactical propaganda against enemy troops.

(a) Leaflets. If the local military situation permits, previously prepared leaflets of general application, but addressed to enemy troops may be distributed by means of:

(i) Patrols.

(ii) Converted 25-Pdr. base ejection smoke shells. Combat Teams will take with them 100 "mushrooms", i.e. modification of smoke shell, together with 50,000 special leaflets.

If necessary tactical leaflets can be produced locally at a later stage for distribution to enemy troops by either of these means.

(b) Loudspeakers. If available, portable loudspeakers of the Naval Portovox type will be taken and used for front-line enemy propaganda if circumstances require and permit.

2. Local Propaganda amongst the civilian population.

(a) Posters. A supply of suitable posters will be taken by the Combat Teams for displaying in occupied localities.

(b) Leaflets and Circulars. A supply of leaflets and circulars will be taken by the Combat Teams for hand distribution amongst the civilians in occupied areas.

(c) Printing Press. Any printing press available will be taken over and used for the local production of leaflets, posters, etc., as required.

-1-

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(d) Newspapers. If it is decided to continue publication of an existing newspaper, or even to launch a fresh one, the Teams will undertake this task.

NOTE : Above will be done in close liaison with AMGQT.

3. Radio Propaganda.

In the event of a local radio station being discovered intact, it will be taken over and worked in cooperation with the C.S.O.\* Radio will be used for:

(a) Broadcasting announcements by C-in-C, Force Commander or Military Governor.

(b) Propaganda to civilians in HORRIFIED and the mainland.

At a later stage, as practicable, mobile radio transmission units will be landed and operated as required.

4. Intelligence.

Information will be collected regarding the morale of enemy troops and civilians for the purpose of immediate tactical and local propaganda from base. Good communications from Force Headquarters to base via Force 111 will be essential.

The principal heading for the types of information required are as follows:

- (a) Attitude of military and civilians to Allied landings.
- (b) Information on the political situation, both local and on the mainland.
- (c) Reactions of military and civilians to our propaganda as guide to future psychological warfare.

III. LOADING SCHEDULE

Psychological personnel and vehicles will report to the CP of Task Force 343 in the vicinity of AGOUTI on D Day, on D+10 and D+30, in accordance with the following schedule, where they will stand by to be ordered in the theater of operations by this Headquarters.

FORCE 343

D - DAY

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

3 Officers  
1 Enlisted Man

1 Car  
500 lbs. leaflets  
1 Typewriter  
1 Desk - Small Field  
2 Chairs - Folding

\*Chief Signal Officer.

-2-  
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D+10

HQ FORCE 343

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

4 Officers  
2 Enlisted Men

2 Jeeps


D+30

HQ FORCE 343

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

13 Officers  
7 Enlisted Men

3 Jeeps  
2 trucks 1/2 ton (radio)  
1 truck 1 1/2 ton  
(loudspeaker)  
1 M/C

  
KOOH  
AC of S, G-2

DISTRIBUTION :

|                     |       |
|---------------------|-------|
| SHARK.....          | 1-5   |
| DIME.....           | 6-10  |
| CENT.....           | 11-15 |
| JOSS.....           | 16-20 |
| KOOL.....           | 21-25 |
| WOLF.....           | 26-30 |
| Force 343 - CG..... | 31    |
| C/S.....            | 32    |
| Secy C/S.....       | 33    |
| G-1.....            | 34    |
| G-3.....            | 35    |
| G-4.....            | 36    |
| Arty.....           | 37    |
| Engr.....           | 38    |
| Sig.....            | 39    |
| Cml.....            | 40    |
| Ord.....            | 41    |
| Med.....            | 42    |
| A.G.....            | 43    |
| Q.M.....            | 44    |
| G-2.....            | 45-50 |
| XII ASC.....        | 51    |
| COMNAVMAW.....      | 52    |
| " Comdr Munson..... | 53    |
| File.....           | 54-60 |
| MONGOOSE.....       | 61-65 |

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DISTRIBUTION:

|                     |       |
|---------------------|-------|
| SHARK               | 1-5   |
| DIME                | 6-10  |
| CENT                | 11-15 |
| JOSS                | 16-20 |
| KOOL                | 21-25 |
| 82d Airborne Div.   | 26-30 |
| Force 343 - CG      | 31    |
| C/S                 | 32    |
| Secy C/S            | 33    |
| G-1                 | 34    |
| G-3                 | 35    |
| G-4                 | 36    |
| Arty                | 37    |
| Engr                | 38    |
| Sig                 | 39    |
| Cml                 | 40    |
| Inf                 | 41    |
| Med                 | 42    |
| A.C.                | 43    |
| QM                  | 44    |
| Navy                | 45    |
| Navy (Comdr Munson) | 46    |
| Air                 | 47    |
| G-2                 | 48-52 |
| File                | 53-60 |

(NOTE: Reproduced from 141 publication 141F/80/G(0) (Undated)).

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30/7/43

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HEADQUARTERS I ARMORED CORPS, REINFORCED  
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2  
A. P. O. 758

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Q-377  
18

SECRET  
Auth: CG, Force 343  
Init: CWB  
Date: 3 June 1943

3 June 1943.

G-2 GENERAL INFORMATION BULLETIN #5

STRENGTH OF GROUND FORCES

FLAK TOWERS

1. The attached estimate of strength of the ground forces at the airfields quoted covers both the German and Italian Army and Air Forces which would be employed on ground defence of these airfields.

2. It is not possible to estimate the proportion of German to Italian personnel but trained Italian personnel would represent a small proportion of the whole.

3. Defence Works. Nothing known other than that described in the latest airfield schedule already in your possession.

Obstacles and Prepared Demolitions. Nothing known and their existence thought to be extremely unlikely.

4. Flak Towers. It is probable that the type of flak towers will be similar to those described in Appendices B and C. These descriptions should be of interest as indicative of what we may expect to encounter although we have no definite identifications of such structures in Sicily.

KOCH,  
AC of S., G-2

Encl:  
Appendices A, B & C.

DISTRIBUTION:

|                   |             |
|-------------------|-------------|
| SHARK             | 1-5         |
| DIME              | 6-10        |
| CENT              | 11-15       |
| JOSS              | 16-20       |
| KOOL              | 21-25       |
| 82d Airborne Div. | 26-30       |
| Force 343 - CG    | 31          |
|                   | C/S 32      |
|                   | Secy C/S 33 |
|                   | G-1 34      |
|                   | G-3 35      |
|                   | G-4 36      |
|                   | Arty 37     |
|                   | Engr 38     |
|                   | Sig 39      |
|                   | Cml 40      |
|                   | Ord 41      |
|                   | Mod 42      |
|                   | A.G. 43     |
|                   | QM 44       |
|                   | G-2 45-50   |
|                   | File 51-60  |

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